Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition最新文献

Ridiculous Beliefs, Irresponsible Beliefs, and Anti-skeptical Evidence 荒谬的信念，不负责任的信念和反怀疑的证据

Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0010

M. Bergmann

{"title":"Ridiculous Beliefs, Irresponsible Beliefs, and Anti-skeptical Evidence","authors":"M. Bergmann","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter identifies three more potential problems (in addition to the one discussed in Chapter Nine) for the commonsense intuitionist particularist response to radical skepticism laid out in Chapters Six through Eight, and argues that none of these three alleged problems constitutes an insurmountable objection to commonsense anti-skepticism. The first additional problem is the Problem of Ridiculous Beliefs, according to which noninferential anti-skepticism is committed to approving of a way of responding to skepticism even if that way of responding to skepticism were used to defend ridiculous beliefs. The second is the Problem of Irresponsible Beliefs, according to which unperturbed persistence in endorsing beliefs undefended by argument (e.g. perceptual beliefs), in the face of obvious skeptical possibilities, is epistemically irresponsible. The third is the Problem of Anti-skeptical Evidence, which objects to the view (endorsed by the intuitionist particularism laid out in Chapters Six through Eight) that many of our justified beliefs in anti-skeptical propositions are based on good evidence. The worry behind this last alleged problem is that, even if people can have justified belief in anti-skeptical propositions (i.e. propositions that assert the falsity of radical skeptical hypotheses), there are good reasons for concluding that these sorts of beliefs cannot be based on good evidence. The chapter concludes that, after careful examination of all three problems, commonsense intuitionist particularism emerges unscathed.","PeriodicalId":369089,"journal":{"name":"Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117204572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Inferential Anti-skepticism about Perception 关于知觉的推理反怀疑主义

Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0003

M. Bergmann

{"title":"Inferential Anti-skepticism about Perception","authors":"M. Bergmann","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines multiple kinds of deductive and nondeductive anti-skeptical arguments from our sensory experience to the likely truth of our perceptual beliefs based on that evidence and finds them all wanting. In the first two sections, it briefly considers deductive anti-skeptical arguments (of the theological and transcendental variety), inductive anti-skeptical arguments from past correlations of sensory experience with true perceptual beliefs based on it, and anti-skeptical arguments based on a priori knowledge of probabilistic principles saying that our sensory evidence for our perceptual beliefs makes probable the truth of those beliefs. In the final three sections, the focus turns to abductive or inference to the best explanation (IBE) arguments, which are currently the most popular anti-skeptical arguments. IBE anti-skeptical arguments conclude that our sensory experience, or some feature of it, is best explained by the truth of our perceptual beliefs. These three sections argue that we lack good reasons for thinking that our sensory experience is better explained by a Standard Hypothesis (saying that the world is approximately as it seems) than by a skeptical hypothesis, such as the hypothesis that a deceptive demon wants to mislead us into falsely believing the world is as it seems.","PeriodicalId":369089,"journal":{"name":"Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition","volume":"29 10","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120984240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Global and Memory Skepticism 对全局和内存的怀疑

Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0004

M. Bergmann

{"title":"Global and Memory Skepticism","authors":"M. Bergmann","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter begins by briefly considering some direct arguments for global skepticism (according to which none of our beliefs are justified) and finding them unacceptable. It then outlines a piecemeal (underdetermination-based) case for global skepticism, which argues that underdetermination problems afflict not only perception but also memory, a priori intuition, introspection, and reasoning, thereby undermining the justification for all of our beliefs. It also explains what’s wrong with self-undermining objections (e.g. Susanna Rinard’s), according to which the conclusion of arguments for global skepticism (i.e. that none of our beliefs are justified) undermines the rationality of belief in the premises of such arguments, thereby neutering their skeptical force. Finally, it lays out an underdetermination argument for memory skepticism and explains why anti-skeptical arguments from our memory evidence to the likely truth of the memory beliefs based on that evidence are unsuccessful. Although a discussion of the underdetermination problems for a priori intuition, introspection, and reasoning is required to complete the presentation of the piecemeal argument for global skepticism, that discussion is postponed until the following chapter.","PeriodicalId":369089,"journal":{"name":"Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124131391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Ecumenical Noninferential Anti-skepticism 基督教非推理反怀疑主义

Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0008

M. Bergmann

引用次数: 0

Underdetermination and Perceptual Skepticism 不确定性和感性怀疑

Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0002

M. Bergmann

{"title":"Underdetermination and Perceptual Skepticism","authors":"M. Bergmann","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter motivates narrowing the book’s focus to a particular kind of argument for perceptual skepticism (the underdetermination argument) and to two main kinds of response to it (inferential anti-skepticism and noninferential anti-skepticism). The first half of the chapter sets aside skeptical arguments (e.g. closure-based arguments) and responses to them (e.g. contextualism, contrastivism, and closure-denial) that overestimate skepticism’s appeal by taking for granted that we don’t know that skeptical hypotheses are false. It also sets aside disjunctivist and “knowledge first” responses to skepticism, both of which underestimate skepticism’s appeal by rejecting the intuitions supporting the New Evil Demon Problem. The second half of the chapter highlights the relative strength of underdetermination arguments for perceptual skepticism, according to which our sensory evidence underdetermines the truth of our perceptual beliefs based on it. This underdetermination problem requires us to be able to infer the likely truth of our perceptual beliefs via good arguments from our sensory evidence, if our perceptual beliefs are to be justified. Given that we aren’t able to make such inferences, the underdetermination argument concludes that our perceptual beliefs aren’t justified. The inferential anti-skeptic’s response insists that we are able to make such inferences. The noninferential anti-skeptic’s response says that, despite the underdetermination problem, our perceptual beliefs can be justified even if we aren’t able to infer their likely truth via good arguments from our sensory evidence.","PeriodicalId":369089,"journal":{"name":"Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131391042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Intuitionist Particularism: An Introduction 直觉主义特殊主义:导论

Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0006

M. Bergmann

{"title":"Intuitionist Particularism: An Introduction","authors":"M. Bergmann","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter lays out an account of the particularist approach to epistemological inquiry and develops a version of it in terms of epistemic intuitions, which are seemings about epistemic value (such as justification or knowledge). It begins by briefly reviewing the history of particularism, from Thomas Reid through G. E. Moore to Roderick Chisholm, and then gives a clear statement of the particularist methodology. The remaining sections elaborate the view, giving pride of place to epistemic intuitions, which is why the resulting view is called ‘intuitionist particularism.’ Particularism in epistemology (which tends to be endorsed by commonsense anti-skeptics) puts more weight on epistemic intuitions about particular cases and which of our beliefs are rational. It stands opposed to methodism, which is typically endorsed by proponents of radical skepticism and puts more weight on epistemic intuitions about principles that say what’s required for a belief to be rational. In their extreme forms, these positions occupy two ends of a spectrum. The position advocated in this chapter is a moderate one that leans toward the particularist end of the spectrum, in a way that is compatible with both internalism and externalism in epistemology.","PeriodicalId":369089,"journal":{"name":"Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134409855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Epistemic Intuition and Underdetermination 认知直觉与决定不足

Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0011

M. Bergmann

引用次数: 0

Intuitionist Particularism: Elucidations and Defenses 直觉主义的特殊主义:阐释与辩护

Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0007

M. Bergmann

引用次数: 0

Epistemic Intuition and Disagreement 认知直觉与分歧

Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0012

M. Bergmann

引用次数: 0

Easy Knowledge and Epistemic Circularity 简单知识和认知循环

Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0009

M. Bergmann

引用次数: 0