{"title":"How Is Post-Normal Science Possible?","authors":"L. Shipovalova","doi":"10.5840/eps202259341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259341","url":null,"abstract":"The author starts from the contemporary image of “post-normal science”, which implies the openness of science to policy (S. Funtovicz and J. Ravetz). She considers the idea of post-normal science as a normative basis for the scientists’ demand for the politicization of science, as a conceptual condition for grasping crises and the role of scientific expertise in their resolution, and as a designation of a special phenomenon of contemporary science with the ambiguous status of a scientist-expert. Based on the analysis of the concept, the author emphasizes the problem of combining scientific validity and political relevance, inherent in post-normal science. The elements of this problem are the danger of including science in politics, the violation of objectivity and the lack of demarcating scientific and non-scientific knowledge. The author argues that the solution of the problem becomes possible if the political relevance of science is interpreted as interaction, and scientific validity as objectivity are revealed through attention to the concept of “knowing-how”.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122366011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fruits of the Enlightenment","authors":"O. Ananyin","doi":"10.5840/eps202360232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360232","url":null,"abstract":"Economics as a science emerged during the Enlightenment, but the impact of the specific general scientific environment of that era on the transformation of pre-scientific economic knowledge into scientific knowledge has not been adequately covered in the historiography of economic thought. The formation of economic science took place in the period of the scientific revolution of the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries. These were two interrelated but different processes. First of all, the transformation of economic knowledge followed fundamental changes in the economy itself – the formation of a market-type economy. At the same time, the emergence of a new discipline in the structure of scientific knowledge could not help but be guided by established standards of scholarship. However, at the time of the scientific revolution, science was in a state of turbulence: the old medieval norms of scholarship were losing their legitimacy, and the new ideals of scholarship had not yet attained the status of an accepted standard. The scientific programs associated with the names of Bacon, Descartes, Leibniz and Newton, as well as the new socio-philosophical doctrines, played different roles in different countries and at different stages of the scientific revolution. The article analyzes the peculiarities of the intellectual environment, in which scientific economic knowledge was shaped, and shows that it was much more diverse than the standard versions of the history of economic thought and earlier attempts (M. Foucault, F. Mirowski) to identify the influence of scientific ideals on its first schools of science suggest. Thus, the prerequisites for the formation of an alternative picture of the emergence of economic science as a result of the rivalry between its various concepts are created.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116117991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Intellectual Vices as Implicit Attitudes","authors":"A. Besedin","doi":"10.5840/eps202259345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259345","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyzes an important concept of contemporary virtue epistemology – the concept of intellectual vice, that is a trait of intellectual character that hinders responsible research. The purpose of this article is to formulate a hypothesis that, today, in the modern culture, a significant part of epistemic vices are implicit attitudes. The first part of the article explores the concept of implicit attitude, examines examples of implicit attitudes that have become widespread in the research literature: implicit sexism and racism. The second part of the article shows that in cases of implicitly biased behavior there is a manifestation of epistemic vice, and that the “motivational” theory based on Zagzebski’s ideas cannot explain the manifestation of intellectual vice in cases of implicit bias. In the third section of the article, it is demonstrated that implicit attitudes can be traits of the agent’s character (like moral vices that are not recognized by the subject herself): they can be acquired, rooted in the personality, and can be corrected. The fourth paragraph of the article analyses the conditions under which intellectual vices can be explicit attitudes. It is possible if the agent is a diabolical being (guided by evil as a goal), has egoistic vices (applies different criteria of vice to himself and to others), or is irrational. In the final section, it is shown that the spread of critical thinking in modern society should lead to the transition of intellectual vices from explicit attitudes to implicit ones. The conclusion is made about the theoretical and practical significance of the hypothesis under discussion. From a theoretical point of view, it allows us to explain why intellectual vices are widespread and difficult to eradicate, to place vices as character traits between the local (situational) and global levels, to apply to the concept of epistemic vice all the research concerning implicit attitudes, to develop a theory of epistemic responsibility. In practical terms, this hypothesis can be used to analyze the manifestations of implicit vices in various spheres.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125896015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Structures, Objects, and Reality. Part 1","authors":"V. Terekhovich","doi":"10.5840/eps202259348","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259348","url":null,"abstract":"The focus of the paper is a discussion around one of the versions of scientific realism – ontic structural realism (OSR), which has gained popularity due to the development of quantum field theory. According to OSR, individual objects do not exist as ontological primitives. The ontology of objects and their properties is replaced by the ontology of structures and relations. The paper discusses the arguments of the proponents of OSR, describing it as the only way to preserve scientific realism in general relativity and in quantum physics, which are reduced to mathematical structures with different symmetries. Five possible variants of the ontological relationship between structures and objects are analyzed in detail. Particular attention is paid to the eliminative and non-eliminative versions of OSR. If the former in principle excludes any existence of objects, then in the latter, objects receive their secondary existence due to relations, and their identity is reduced to nodes in the structures of relations. The main objections to OSR and the answers of its proponents are analyzed. It is shown that references to quantum physics are both its strengths and weaknesses of OSR, since they often superficially refer to the formalism of the theory, not accepting one or another of its interpretation. The paper argues the thesis that the extreme eliminative OSR, despite all its advantages (it removes a few objections to scientific realism and offers a good explanation of modern physical theories), has several serious limitations. The best way out of the situation may be the development of the non-eliminative versions of OSR. In conclusion, it provides a critical analysis of one of these versions – moderate OSR of M. Esfeld and V. Lam, who believe that structures should have causal properties, something resembling a disposition.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121660462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Сознание и язык (ответ П.С. Куслию)","authors":"Андрей Вадимович Смирнов","doi":"10.5840/eps202360350","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360350","url":null,"abstract":"Статья написана в ответ на критический отзыв П.С. Куслия [Куслий, 2023] на мою последнюю монографию [Смирнов, 2021]. Выделены три центральных тезиса П.С. Куслия, призванных показать ложность и ненаучность моей позиции: я исхожу из гипотезы языковой относительности Сепира – Уорфа; я утверждаю, что в арабском литературном языке (АЛЯ) отсутствует связка; АЛЯ не имеет носителей в современном мире, а значит, АЛЯ не релевантен для обсуждения вопроса о соотношении языка и мышления. Показано, что эти три тезиса несостоятельны в силу их измышленного характера. Это не позволяет признать утверждения П.С. Куслия хотя бы в какой-то степени обоснованными и служащими устранению недостатков моей теоретической позиции. Показано, что для европейских языков и АЛЯ невозможен один метаязык: их анализ и описание должны строиться в двух различных, взаимно инаковых системах рациональности, использующих (мета)языки, построенные на разных логиках, имеющие различную содержательную наполненность и напрямую не переводимые друг в друга. Показано, что сбои интерпретации П.С. Куслия вызваны нерефлективным принятием коллективного когнитивного бессознательного европейской большой культуры в качестве безальтернативного и, следовательно, универсального.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121742405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Progress of Science","authors":"Andrey I. Mikhailov","doi":"10.5840/eps202360222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360222","url":null,"abstract":"A study of the relationship of trends towards specialization and universalization of scientific knowledge is most fruitful when sociological and epistemological methods are compared. Sociological methods describe the growth of scientific knowledge quantitatively as an increase in volume, whereas epistemological methods do it qualitatively in terms of an increase in the level of generalization. The sociological explanation of the specialization of researchers is based on the limited resources of the study time, the epistemological explanation of the differentiation of disciplines is in the ontological differences of the objects of research. On the contrary, epistemological universalization – the formulation of generalizing theories is conditioned by the social need to ensure the connectivity of the network of technical practices. The history of the development of natural sciences shows a tendency towards absorption of the less developed paradigms by more developed ones. In other words, scientific knowledge increases cumulatively both in quantitative and qualitative terms.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121711593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When that F is not F. Interpretability, Deixis and Complex Demonstratives","authors":"Joan Gimeno-Simó","doi":"10.5840/eps202259230","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259230","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I defend two claims regarding complex demonstratives (noun phrases of the form “that F”). On the one hand I argue that, when one of these expressions misdescribes the referred object (i.e., when such object is not F), the right semantic analysis is to treat the expression as uninterpretable. On the other, I claim that the uninterpretability thesis finds itself in trouble when it comes to dealing with non-deictic uses of complex demonstratives, i.e., uses of “that F” in which the speaker has no acquaintance or direct perception of any object that could satisfy the predicative material. In order to make these two claims compatible, I set out to modify the way the uninterpretability thesis has been traditionally formulated.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131275710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Б. Рассел, Г. Прист и принцип единого решения логико-семантических парадоксов","authors":"Валерий Александрович Суровцев","doi":"10.5840/eps202360338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360338","url":null,"abstract":"В статье рассматриваются аргументы В.А. Ладова относительно предложенного Г. Пристом принципа единого решения логико-семантических парадоксов. В.А. Ладов считает, что помимо самореферентности для возникновения парадоксов необходимым элементом является отрицание. Однако отрицание есть лишь синтаксический аналог основных семантических понятий «истина» и «ложь». Поскольку истина и ложь являются основной характеристикой объектов, относительно которых формулируются парадоксы, постольку самореферентность является единственной причиной их возникновения.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131289723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why Does Science Need Losers?","authors":"A. Antonovski","doi":"10.5840/eps202360226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360226","url":null,"abstract":"The article raises the problem of functionality and rational explanation of large arrays of communicative and unclaimed scientific knowledge. To solve the problem and explain this phenomenon, the resources of the system-communicative theory of scientific communication and social-evolutionist approaches are involved. The ability of the system-communicative theory itself to explain this phenomenon is considered as a possibility of its verification. In conclusion, a working hypothesis is proposed linking the existence of a class of unclaimed research and researchers with the function of meta-observation: through their online network reactions on appropriate electronic platforms (downloads, citations, readings, reviews, recommendations, etc.), the distribution of scientific reputations of science leaders and selection of the best scientific knowledge is ensured. This function, according to the author, compensates for the lack of an external audience or public capable of understanding and adequately evaluating scientific achievements in the scientific communication system. It is concluded that the past “collegial and deliberative” assessment of scientific achievements, the appropriate distribution of reputations and support for research projects is incompatible with the dynamic conditions of the “publication market”.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128010066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Science as an Object of Faith and Distrust: The Phenomenon of Denialism","authors":"L. Tukhvatulina","doi":"10.5840/eps20236011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps20236011","url":null,"abstract":"The author analyzes the phenomenon of denialism (denial of scientific consensus out of the normative boundaries of scientific discussion). The intellectual origins (including connection with P. Feyerabend’s post-positivism), sociocultural characteristics and political aspects of this phenomenon are discussed. The author defends the thesis that denialism is associated with scientism – non-reflexive trust in science, which is used for unscrupulous manipulations for the purpose of political influence. As an example, she considers the South African expert case related to HIV denial in the early 2000s. The author believes that denialism needs a comprehensive analysis that takes into account the interdependence of its intellectual and socio-political foundations.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132727726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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