Columbia Journal of Tax Law最新文献

{"title":"DEBT AND TAXES","authors":"D. Hasen","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3765178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3765178","url":null,"abstract":"The federal income tax conceptualizes the standard loan transaction as an exchange of cash for promises to pay interest and to repay the amount borrowed by the end of the term. This formulation is subtly incorrect in ways that have led to a weaker foundation for existing tax rules than they merit. Conceptualizing loans instead as closely akin to leases places most of the tax rules for debt on sounder footing because it clarifies that interest is the consideration paid for the use of the loan proceeds. If interest is the cost of the use of money, then simple borrowing is a fully-paid-for transaction, full basis credit in the loan proceeds for the period for which interest is paid is appropriate, and cancellation of debt is a straightforward accession to wealth in the period in which it occurs. These conclusions hold whether the interest is deductible or not and are consistent with current law, which has come under fire from some quarters.Although the proposed reconceptualization of loan as lease supports a number of longstanding income tax rules, one area in which it counsels significant reform is the taxation of partnerships. If loans are like cash leases made in exchange for interest qualifying as rent, Treasury should provide for the allocation of basis credit among partners for the partnership’s debt based on who bears the economic burden of the interest expense. The rule should apply regardless of whether the debt is recourse or nonrecourse and regardless of who would have discharge of indebtedness income on default. Such an approach differs markedly from the existing rules for recourse obligations but is closer to the rules for certain nonrecourse obligations. A modification of the rules applicable to partnership debt consistent with the loan-as-lease theory, therefore, would remove a significant discontinuity in the current tax treatment of partnership debt.","PeriodicalId":368484,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Tax Law","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133908346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"INTER-NATION EQUITY REVISITED","authors":"Ivan Ozai","doi":"10.52214/CJTL.V12I1.7412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52214/CJTL.V12I1.7412","url":null,"abstract":"States are on the verge of a new form of global competition. Some have taken unilateral measures to tax multinational profits that they would typically not be able to tax, at least not according to conventional international tax concepts and rules. Others have threatened to retaliate with economic countermeasures to protect their tax base and corporate residents. The recent attempt of the OECD to build consensus for a global tax compact has so far proven unsuccessful due to broad disagreement about how taxing rights should be equitably distributed between countries. \u0000As policymakers and tax scholars increasingly call into question long-standing theories of international taxation, the concept of inter-nation equity plays a pivotal role as a guiding principle in determining how to divide the international tax base among states. Inter-nation equity is one of the most ubiquitous concepts appearing in international tax policy discussions and yet one of the most understudied in tax scholarship. \u0000This Article introduces a comprehensive normative analysis of inter-nation equity by discussing how the concept should reconcile the two primary goals of international allocation of taxing rights: on the one hand, the concern of states to preserve their tax sovereignty and, on the other hand, the need to promote some degree of redistribution to address the challenges of global poverty and inequality. This Article further explains how a similar notion of inter-nation equity has developed in other areas of international law and discusses some practical implications for tax policy design.","PeriodicalId":368484,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Tax Law","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117035953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A MINIMAL ROLE FOR MINIMUM TAXES","authors":"S. Sheffrin","doi":"10.52214/CJTL.V12I1.7405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52214/CJTL.V12I1.7405","url":null,"abstract":"The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act eliminated the alternative minimum tax for corporations and sharply eviscerated the alternative minimum tax for individuals. Yet recently there has been a resurgence of interest in minimum taxes both for the international tax systems and in certain domestic contexts. \u0000This Article argues that there should be a role, but a very minimal one, for minimum taxes in our tax system. While reasonable arguments have been put forward for minimum taxes, on closer examination, many of these arguments are found wanting. This Article, however, does make a second-best case for one type of minimum tax, namely as a backstop for a potentially flawed or deficient tax. That is the “minimal role for a minimum tax.” \u0000To develop this argument, I explore three distinct theoretical rationales for minimum taxes that have been put forward. First, I discuss the distinction between unilateral and multilateral minimum taxes and the potential role that multilateral minimum taxes can play in alleviating concerns that arise from tax competition and the presence of tax havens. While unilateral minimum taxes may have a strong rationale, the rationale for multilateral minimum taxes is not compelling. Second, I show how considerations of fairness, public perception, and alternative views of the corporation create a demand for minimum taxes. This demand, however, can be satisfied in other ways. Finally, I discuss how the imperfect targeting of tax preferences and practical limitations in the design and effectiveness of the most common taxes can provide a potential, but limited, efficiency rationale for the use of minimum taxes. I lastly provide an example of the use of minimum taxes for reforming state corporate taxation.","PeriodicalId":368484,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Tax Law","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123955724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"ENHANCING EFFICIENCY AT NONPROFITS WITH ANALYSIS AND DISCLOSURE","authors":"David M. Schizer","doi":"10.7916/CJTL.V11I2.6842","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/CJTL.V11I2.6842","url":null,"abstract":"The U.S. nonprofit sector spends $2.54 trillion each year. If the sector were a country, it would have the eighth largest economy in the world, ahead of Brazil, Italy, Canada, and Russia. The government provides nonprofits with billions in tax subsidies, but instead of evaluating the quality of their work, it leaves this responsibility to nonprofit managers, boards, and donors. The best nonprofits are laboratories of innovation, but unfortunately some are stagnant backwaters, which waste money on out-of-date missions and inefficient programs. To promote more innovation and less stagnation, this Article makes two contributions to the literature. \u0000First, this Article breaks new ground in identifying sources of inefficiency at nonprofits. The literature focuses on incentives, arguing that managers and board members are less motivated to run a nonprofit efficiently because they cannot keep its profits. In response, this Article emphasizes that the problem is not just motivation, but also information. Measuring success is harder at nonprofits. Instead of tracking profitability, they use metrics that are less reliable and harder to measure. These measurement challenges complicate the efforts even of dedicated and competent managers to operate efficiently. While this information problem is familiar, another has been largely overlooked in the literature: When success is hard to measure, incompetence and self-interested practices are less visible, and thus are harder to stop. For example, if managers regularly overpay vendors, the consequence at a for-profit firm (lower profits) is easier to observe than at a nonprofit (less effective service for beneficiaries).  \u0000Second, this Article recommends a response to this underappreciated source of inefficiency: better analysis and disclosure as a strategy for organizational change. In principle, nonprofits are supposed to maximize social return, but how can they operationalize this abstract principle? To help them do so, this Article recommends three questions that nonprofits should answer every year: first, how important are the challenges the nonprofit is trying to address?; second, how effective are the nonprofit’s responses to these challenges?; and third, is the nonprofit the right organization to respond to these challenges? These questions press nonprofit managers and boards to be more explicit about priorities, monitor progress, improve and expand high-value programs, and fix or shut down ineffective ones. This Article also recommends that nonprofits should disclose this analysis to the public, even though current law does not require them to do so. This disclosure would empower donors and rating agencies to be more effective monitors. It also would help donors make better informed philanthropic choices and would enable charities to borrow innovative ideas from each other more easily.","PeriodicalId":368484,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Tax Law","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130087745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Partnership Audit Rules of 2015: The Implications for Misvalued Private Funds and New Partners","authors":"Iryna Malakhouskaya","doi":"10.7916/CJTL.V10I2.3566","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/CJTL.V10I2.3566","url":null,"abstract":"This Note takes an interdisciplinary approach by analyzing new Partnership Audit Rules’ effects on misvalued private funds from Securities Law and Tax Law perspectives. First, the funds’ valuation regulations are examined; second, the new Partnership Audit Rules are reviewed; and finally, implications for new investors and private funds are examined. \u0000This Note suggests that marketability of private funds, which are ineligible for an opt-out option, would decrease. Especially serious negative effects may be anticipated for private funds with a history of misvaluation administrative proceedings. Nevertheless, several protective measures are available for new partners who want to continue taking advantage of pooled investment vehicles. Finally, there is a potential positive effect on the private funds’ valuation techniques and, consequently, on the number of the SEC administrative proceedings relating to misvalued funds.","PeriodicalId":368484,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Tax Law","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116980732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"AND YOU MAY ASK YOURSELF, WHAT IS THAT BEAUTIFUL HOUSE: HOW TAX LAWS DISTORT BEHAVIOR THROUGH THE LENS OF ARCHITECTURE","authors":"Meredith R. Conway","doi":"10.7916/CJTL.V10I2.3468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/CJTL.V10I2.3468","url":null,"abstract":"This Article examines the unintended yet profound impacts of various taxes, either currently in effect or historically imposed, most of which are property taxes, on the architectural style in various parts of the world. Many architectural styles that the Article covers were initially intended as a tax-avoidance strategy but later on gained independent status in the history of architecture.","PeriodicalId":368484,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Tax Law","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134538505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Time for the Child Tax Credit to Grow Up: Preserving the Credit’s Availability and Enhancing Benefits for Families","authors":"J. McGroarty","doi":"10.7916/D8QC02VC","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/D8QC02VC","url":null,"abstract":"The Child Tax Credit is one of the largest subsidies in the tax code for families with children. The CTC provides a supplementary boost to families by providing cash income when they do not have income tax liability. The CTC has more recently been used as an economic recovery measure and as a work incentive. However, the Credit's own structure undermines its ability to serve these purposes. The Credit should be structured such that it will further the program's key purposes and remain available to more lowincome families. Some beneficial structural changes include permanently setting the refundability threshold at $3,000 and insulating the Credit's provisions from inflation.  J.D. 2011, Columbia Law School; B.A. 2006, Drew University. The author would like to thank Anne Lieberman for her outstanding editorial assistance and the members of the Columbia Journal of Tax Law for their comments and editorial work. 302 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.2:301","PeriodicalId":368484,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Tax Law","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134458586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An Analysis of the House GOP Tax Plan","authors":"Leonard Burman, Jim Nunns, Benjamin R. Page, Jeff Rohaly, Joseph Rosenberg","doi":"10.7916/D83T9VTR","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/D83T9VTR","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the House GOP tax reform blueprint, which would significantly reduce marginal tax rates, increase standard deduction amounts, repeal personal exemptions and most itemized deductions, and convert business taxation into a destinationbased cash flow consumption tax. Taxes would drop at all income levels in 2017, but the highest-income households would gain the most. Federal revenues would fall by $3.1 trillion over the first decade (static) and $3.0 trillion after accounting for macroeconomic feedback effects. Including added interest costs, the federal debt would rise by at least $3.6 trillion over the first decade and by as much as $9.2 trillion by the end of the second ten years. *We are grateful to Lily Batchelder, Howard Gleckman, Robert Greenstein, Eric Toder, and Roberton Williams for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Yifan Zhang prepared the draft for publication and Devlan O’Connor edited it. The authors are solely responsible for any errors. The views expressed do not reflect the views of the House GOP or those who kindly reviewed drafts. This is an expanded and updated version of a paper posted on the Tax Policy Center website on September 16, 2016. The findings and conclusions contained within are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect positions or policies of the Tax Policy Center or its funders. 258 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.8:257","PeriodicalId":368484,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Tax Law","volume":"171 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123563993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Timing of Income Recognition in Tax Law and the Time Value of Money, by Moshe Shekel","authors":"E. Jensen","doi":"10.7916/D8ZW2SRT","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/D8ZW2SRT","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":368484,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Tax Law","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122953271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Schrödinger’s Currency: How Virtual Currencies Complicate the RIC and REIT Qualification Requirements","authors":"Laura Davidson Pond","doi":"10.7916/D8KD3DXN","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/D8KD3DXN","url":null,"abstract":"Bitcoin and other virtual currencies have created new opportunities for individuals to invest in a rapidly appreciating new asset class, but the Internal Revenue Code has been unable to keep pace with this new technology. Because the Code does not suitably define what a virtual currency is in the contexts of Regulated Investment Companies (RICs) or Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), the concepts of “good” income and “good” assets in I.R.C. §§ 851 (RICs) and 856 (REITs) are inapplicable to virtual currency. Under the current regime, a RIC or a REIT may not be able to invest directly in virtual currency without compromising the investment entity’s qualification as a tax-favorable pass-through entity. The legislative purposes behind Sections 851 and 856 suggest that digital currency possesses the characteristics of “good” income and “good” assets. Accordingly, RICs and REITs should be able to invest in this potentially lucrative new technology without risking disqualification as a tax-favored entity because virtual currency could constitute a “security” for the purposes of Sections 851 and 856. Yet the Code’s RIC and REIT rules require that any qualifying security be registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940. Virtual currency is not yet regulated under the 1940 Act, and thus cannot qualify as a security for the purposes of the RIC and REIT “good” income and “good” asset tests. The inability of the Code and the ’40 Act to adapt to new technology makes virtual currency a nonviable investment for RICs and REITs, but even more so, renders the unyielding nexus between the ‘40 Act and Code Sections 851 and 856 nonsensical. The I.R.C. must somehow provide for the possibility of RIC or REIT investment in a non1940 Act security, while avoiding the significant non-tax consequences attendant with a sweeping classification of all virtual currency as securities. The Investment Company Act of 1940 should supplement—not comprise—the tax rules that define the kinds of income and assets that allow an entity to qualify as a RIC or a REIT. *Columbia Law School, J.D. Candidate 2018. Many thanks to Professor Willard Taylor for his advice and expertise, as well as Aaron Josephson, Jisoo Han, Zhiyuan Zuo, and the editorial staff of the Columbia Journal of Tax Law. 230 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.9:229","PeriodicalId":368484,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Tax Law","volume":"116 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116376671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}