{"title":"The Rationale of Variation in Methodological and Evidential Pluralism","authors":"F. Russo","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82199","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82199","url":null,"abstract":"Causal analysis in the social sciences takes advantage of a variety of methods and of a multi-fold source of information and evidence. The first developments of quantitative causal analysis in the social sciences are due to Quetelet (1869) and Durkheim (1895 and 1897) in demography and sociology respectively. Significant improvements are due to Blalock (1964) and Duncan (1975). Since then causal analysis has shown noteworthy progress in the formal methods of analysis, e.g., structural equation models, covariance structure models, multilevel models, and contingency tables. By means of these different methodologies, social scientists try to infer causal relations between variables of interest with reasonable confidence. Data comes from a variety of different sources: surveys, census, experiments, interviews, etc. Analogously, evidence of causal relations can come from different sources: previous studies, background knowledge, knowledge of mechanisms or of probabilistic relations, etc. This pluralistic methodology and source of information raises the question of whether we should accordingly have a pluralistic metaphysics and epistemology. This paper focuses on epistemology and argues that a pluralistic methodology and evidence do not entail a pluralistic epistemology. It will be shown that causal models employ a single rationale of testing, based on the notion of variation. This view of causality profoundly breaks down with the received view, an heritage of Hume, that sees in regularity and/or invariance the key notions for causality. For instance, the rationale of variation clearly emerges in the interpretation of structural equation models: given a system of equations, parameters quantify the variation of the dependent variable due to the variation in the independent variable(s). Regularity and invariance thus become constraints to impose on the variation in order ensure that the model correctly specify the data generating process and that it does not confuse accidental and spurious relations with causal ones. Further, I argue that this monistic epistemology is also involved in alternative philosophical theories of causation, for instance, in probabilistic theories of causality, mechanist and counterfactual accounts, agency-manipulability theories and in the epistemic theory. The philosophical gain in adopting the rationale of variation is at least threefold. First, causality is not merely lodged in a psychological habit of observing regular successions of events. Agreed, we do experience such regular sequences but it is not because of regularity that we interpret them causally. Instead, this is because certain variational relations hold. Second, causality is not reduced to statistics either. Further, to claim that variation is a precondition for regularity and invariance has the advantage of not confusing the rationale of causality with the conditions that allow to interpret variations causally. Third, the adoption of the rationale of variation ","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73225189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Testimony as Evidence","authors":"Sanford C. Goldberg","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82190","url":null,"abstract":"Regarding testimony as evidence fails to predict the sort of epistemic support testimony provides for testimonial belief. As a result, testimony-based belief should not be assimilated into the category of ep istemically inferen tial, evidence-based belief. 1. Reasons, Evidence, and Inference Holmes is trying to determine who committed the murder. His evidence consists of E1, E2, and E3. It occurs to him that he would have these pieces of evidence only if Mustard did it. He concludes that Mustard committed the murder. Here, the basis of Holmes’ conclusion is (a) his belief that his evidence consists of E1, E2, and E3, (b) his belief that he would have these pieces of evidence only if Mustard committed the murder, (c) whatever it is that supports these beliefs, and (d) whatever it is that bears on Holmes’ entitlement to draw the relevant inference from (a) and (b) to the conclusion that Mustard committed the murder. Smith is suffering from some condition that she would like diagnosed. The doctor notes the manifesting symptoms, S1, S2, and S3. On the basis of observing these symptoms, and having good reason to think that a patient manifests S1, S2, and S3 only if she is suffering from disease D, the doctor diagnoses Smith as suffering from D. Here, the basis of the doctor’s diagnosis is (e) his belief that Smith manifests S1, S2, and S3, (f) his belief that one manifests S1, S2, and S3 only if one is suffering from disease D, (g) whatever it is that supports these beliefs, and (h) whatever it is that bears on the doctor’s entitlement to draw the SANFORD C. GOLDBERG 30 relevant inference from (e) and (f) to the conclusion that Smith suffers from D. My description of these two cases is meant to bring out what I regard as an obvious parallel – one that goes to the heart of the epistemic account of inferential, evidence-based belief. In both case, the materials relevant to an epistemic assessment of the conclusion/diagnosis are the same. They consist of (i) the belief(s) that constitute(s) the subject’s evidence, (ii) the belief(s) that constitute(s) the generalization that links this evidence to the target conclusion/diagnosis, (iii) the epistemic support for all of these beliefs, and (iv) the subject’s entitlement to make the transition from these beliefs to the target conclusion/diagnosis itself. If the evidence-involving inference through which the subject acquired the belief is the only source of support for the belief in question, then (i)(iv) are the only materials that are relevant to the epistemic assessment of the belief: these exhaust the belief’s epistemic support. I will call beliefs of this sort Evidence-based beliefs, or E-beliefs for short. E-beliefs are only as epistemically good as the evidence on which they are based, the generalization(s) applied to that evidence, and the subject-drawn inference(s) to the E-belief itself. We can capture the foregoing idea in terms of the notion of supervenience, as follows: (Spv) The epistemic goodne","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"56 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79221118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction to the Epistemology of Testimony","authors":"D. O’Brien","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82188","url":null,"abstract":"Spoken and written testimony pervades much of our life. I hear the announcement that the train is delayed, I read that Philip Roth has published another novel, and one’s partner can tell you that she loves you. A good deal of our knowledge would appear to be testimonial knowledge – perhaps most. Curiously, though, until fairly recently philosophers did not often concern themselves with this way of acquiring knowledge, and it was thought that one should be suspicious of beliefs acquired in this way. To know something one must be able to reason it through for oneself, or perceive it oneself, and not just acquire it secondhand from someone else. Here is Locke expressing this “individualist” approach to knowledge.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80102927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Causal Pluralism versus Epistemic Causality","authors":"Jon Williamson","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82198","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82198","url":null,"abstract":"It is tempting to analyse causality in terms of just one of the indicators of causal relationships, e.g., mechanisms, probabilistic dependencies or independencies, counterfactual conditionals or agency considerations. While such an analysis will surely shed light on some aspect of our concept of cause, it will fail to capture the whole, rather multifarious, notion. So one might instead plump for pluralism: a different analysis for a different occasion. But we do not seem to have lots of different concepts of cause - just one eclectic notion. The resolution of this conundrum, I think, requires us to accept that our causal beliefs are generated by a wide variety of indicators, but to deny that this variety of indicators yields a variety of concepts of cause. This focus on the relation between evidence and causal beliefs leads to what I call *epistemic* causality. Under this view, certain causal beliefs are appropriate or rational on the basis of observed evidence; our notion of cause can be understood purely in terms of these rational beliefs. Causality, then, is a feature of our epistemic representation of the world, rather than of the world itself. This yields one, multifaceted notion of cause.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78420725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Causal Pluralism and Scientific Knowledge: an Underexposed Problem","authors":"Leen De Vreese","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82200","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82200","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78687446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Testimony, Engineered Knowledge and Internalism","authors":"D. O’Brien","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82191","url":null,"abstract":"Testimonial knowledge sometimes depends on internalist epistemic conditions, those that thinkers are able to reflect upon. In the testimony literature the only internalist conditions that are considered are those concerning a hearer’s knowledge of a speaker’s reliability. I argue, however, that the relevant sense of “internal” should not be seen as referring to just the hearer’s point of view, but rather to the points of view of both the hearer and the speaker. There are certain cases of testimonial knowledge transmission that depend on the speaker’s knowledge of his audience. These include cases of “engineered knowledge” in which a speaker deviously manipulates a hearer’s beliefs. Such knowledge is therefore internalist because it depends on factors that are internal to the point of view of the speaker, and not merely on externalist factors such as the reliability of the speakers’ and hearers’","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"49 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84961088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pluralism in the Philosophy of Causation: Desideratum or Not?","authors":"Leen De Vreese","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82195","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82195","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81640498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Causation, Pluralism and Responsibility","authors":"Francis Longworth","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82197","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82197","url":null,"abstract":"Counterfactual theories of causation have had difficulty in delivering the intuitively correct verdicts for cases of causation involving preemption, without generating further counterexamples. Hall (2004) has offered a pluralistic theory of causatio n, accor ding to which there are two concepts of causation: counterfactual dependence and production. Hall’s theory does deliver the correct verdicts for many of the problematic kinds of preemption. It also dea ls succ essfully with cases of causation by omission, which ha ve proved stubborn counterexamples to physical process theories of causation. Hall’s theory therefore appears to be a significant improvement on extant univocal theories of causation, both physical and counterfactual. In this paper I present a serie s of countere xamples to Hall’s theory. I also describe cases in which our causal judgments appear to be sensitive to moral considerations. It does not seem likely that conventional theories of causation, which attempt to situate causation in an ob jective metaphysical pictu re of the world, will ever accord with our intuitions in such cases. Finally, the notion of responsibility is considered, but rejected as an illuminating primitive for analyzing causation.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74768424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Can Testimony Generate Knowledge?","authors":"P. Graham","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82194","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82194","url":null,"abstract":"Orthodoxy in epistemology maintains that some sources of belief, e.g. perception and introspection, generate knowledge, while others, e.g. testimony and m emory, preserve knowledge. An exam ple from Jennifer Lackey – the Schoolteacher case – purports to show that testimony can generate knowledge. It is argued that Lackey’s case fails to subvert the orthodox view, for the case does not involve the generation of knowledge by testimony. A modified version of the case does. Lackey’s example illustrates the orthodox view; the revised case refutes it. The theoretical explanation of knowledge from testimony as information transmission explains how testimony transfers knowledge and why it can generate knowledge. It also revea ls the real difference between so-called “generative” and so-called “preservative” sources. The former extract information; the latter transmit information. Perception provides knowledge of the world, introspection knowledge of our selves, and mindreading knowledge of other minds. Reasoning extends knowledge beyond things we already know. Perception, introspection, mindreading, and reasoning are all ways of generating new knowledge, generating knowledge of events, facts, and states of affairs not known before. Memory differs. Memory preserves knowledge of things we already know. If I knew something at an earlier time, say on the basis of perception, and then I remember it now, then I know it now, but only because I knew it before. Testimony (the process of forming beliefs on the basis of understanding what other people say) looks like memory. If someone else knows something and tells me what they know, and I accept what they say, then I come to know it too. But I only acquire knowledge from accepting what they say if they know it already. Testimony, like memory, doesn’t generate knowledge where there was no knowledge before; testimony preserves knowledge.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86236396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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