Antitrust Bulletin最新文献_第8页

The Politics and Practice of New Zealand Competition Law 新西兰竞争法的政治与实践

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2021-09-20 DOI: 10.1177/0003603x211044900

Matt Sumpter

引用次数: 0

Intro to Antitrust and Race Symposium 反垄断与种族研讨会简介

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2021-09-01 DOI: 10.1177/0003603x211032773

Hal J. Singer, Ted Tatos

引用次数: 0

Antitrust Anachronism: The Interracial Wealth Transfer in Collegiate Athletics Under the Consumer Welfare Standard 反垄断的时代错误:消费者福利标准下大学体育运动中的种族间财富转移

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2021-09-01 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X211029481

Ted Tatos, Hal J. Singer

{"title":"Antitrust Anachronism: The Interracial Wealth Transfer in Collegiate Athletics Under the Consumer Welfare Standard","authors":"Ted Tatos, Hal J. Singer","doi":"10.1177/0003603X211029481","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X211029481","url":null,"abstract":"Under an illusory nexus to education, intercollegiate athletics in the United States represents a multibillion-dollar enterprise that extracts economic rents from the majority Black athlete labor to the benefit of overwhelmingly White constituencies. Under the aegis of “amateurism,” member universities of the National College Athletic Association (NCAA) collude to fix maximum athlete compensation at cost-of-attendance and strip athletes of the economic rights over their own name, image, or likeness. While this anticompetitive restraint encumbers all athletes competing under the NCAA umbrella, it imposes a disparate impact on Black and other minority athletes who represent a majority of the labor in the largest revenue sports: football and basketball. Although White coaches are the most visible beneficiaries of this anticompetitive restraint, the scope of amateurism’s interracial distributional effects has largely remained uncovered. This article seeks to fill this gap in the literature. Leveraging data from multiple sources, including institutional financial reports and the NCAA Demographics Database from 2007–2020, this article quantifies the NCAA’s wealth transfer away from primarily Black athlete labor to institutions and overwhelmingly White constituencies. Under the NCAA’ restraint, we estimate that Black football and men’s and women’s basketball athletes at the Division I Power 5 Conference level have lost approximately $17 billion to $21 billion in compensation from 2005 to 2019 or roughly $1.2–$1.4 billion per year. The antitrust status quo’s failure to enjoin the NCAA’s collusive wage-fixing restraint, which causes such obvious antitrust injury and harm to athlete labor, underscores the fundamental shortcomings of using the consumer-welfare standard as the exclusive lodestar to investigate and enjoin anticompetitive conduct; it also exposes the divergence between “amateurism” as described in Board of Regents and the modern-day realities of college athletics.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"66 1","pages":"396 - 430"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45783254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Racist Antitrust, Antiracist Antitrust 种族反托拉斯，反种族反托拉斯

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2021-07-26 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X211031675

John M. Newman

引用次数: 0

Antitrust as Antiracism: Antitrust as a Partial Cure for Systemic Racism (and Other Systemic “Isms”) 反托拉斯作为反种族主义：反托拉斯作为系统性种族主义（和其他系统性“伊斯兰主义”）的部分治疗方法

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2021-06-25 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X211023620

Joshua P. Davis, Eric L. Cramer, Reginald L. Streater, Mark R. Suter

{"title":"Antitrust as Antiracism: Antitrust as a Partial Cure for Systemic Racism (and Other Systemic “Isms”)","authors":"Joshua P. Davis, Eric L. Cramer, Reginald L. Streater, Mark R. Suter","doi":"10.1177/0003603X211023620","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X211023620","url":null,"abstract":"We usually think of antitrust law as addressing violations of free market norms, not equality norms. The two, however, may be related. Systemic racism (and other systemic “isms”) is about power and its abuse. So is antitrust law. Moreover, antitrust may be able to fill gaps left by antidiscrimination law. In particular, antitrust law can address: entire markets, not just individual firms or discrete actions; power imbalances from differences in capital, not just disparities in compensation; financial allocations between owners and workers, not just between workers; and legal violations that shrink total worker pay and do not just distort its allocation. Antitrust law also relies on centrist free market principles. Those may be less controversial than tackling issues of race directly. To be sure, in part for that reason, antitrust laws are limited. They can at best remedy a small portion of the potential wrongs caused by systemic racism. But antitrust may nevertheless contribute valuably to systemic racial equality. It also may provide a model for how antidiscrimination law might be reframed to make it more effective in that regard.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"66 1","pages":"359 - 383"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0003603X211023620","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45658399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Stick Versus Carrot: Comparing Structural Antitrust and Behavioral Regulation Outcomes 大棒与胡萝卜:比较结构性反垄断和行为监管的结果

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2021-06-23 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X211023463

S. Majumdar

{"title":"Stick Versus Carrot: Comparing Structural Antitrust and Behavioral Regulation Outcomes","authors":"S. Majumdar","doi":"10.1177/0003603X211023463","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X211023463","url":null,"abstract":"Debates on whether structural antitrust remedies or behavioral regulatory remedies should be used to implement institutional mandates are long-standing. Historical data for an entire population of firms for a fourteen-year period have been used, in a natural experiment format, to evaluate the impacts of both (a) structural antitrust policy (stick) and (b) behavioral regulation (carrot), for (i) exactly the same efficiency outcome, (ii) for the same firms, and (iii) at the same time. The results indicate that the stick has been less effective than the carrot. Implementation of regulations has had a significantly larger economic impact relative to implementing structural antitrust remedies on firm efficiency. Fiscally, annual incremental gains generated by the regulatory approach versus the antitrust approach have been over US$2 billion. Behavioral institutional design, implementation, and outcome assessments could be based on dynamic evolutionary process ideas situated within a managed incentive regulation framework. Given recent clamor for actions against technology companies, the facts suggest that behavioral regulations could constrain unacceptable firm behaviors and the results question contemporary antitrust remedies’ relative efficacy.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"6 4","pages":"431 - 455"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0003603X211023463","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41270142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Oscar Robertson, Antitrust, and the Fight Against Monopsony Power in the NBA 奥斯卡·罗伯逊，反垄断和对抗NBA的垄断力量

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2021-06-21 DOI: 10.1177/0003603x211023622

D. Berri

引用次数: 0

IPR Regime and Antitrust Implications of Mergers and Acquisitions: With a Focus on Software and Pharmaceutical Sector 知识产权制度和并购的反垄断影响:以软件和制药行业为例

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2021-03-11 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X21997021

P. Beena

引用次数: 0

Inbound M&As in India: Issues and Challenges 印度境内并购：问题与挑战

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2021-03-11 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X21997017

K. S. C. Rao, B. Dhar

{"title":"Inbound M&As in India: Issues and Challenges","authors":"K. S. C. Rao, B. Dhar","doi":"10.1177/0003603X21997017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X21997017","url":null,"abstract":"The economic reforms of 1991 drastically transformed India’s approach toward foreign direct investment (FDI). The focus has been on attracting increasingly large amounts of FDI. There were no regulations on mergers and acquisitions for two decades, and when they were finally introduced in 2011 under the Competition Act, 2002, they were rendered ineffective by setting high thresholds, providing exemptions, and by narrowly focusing on competition. As a result, major domestic companies as also emerging leaders were taken over. Many foreign companies gained strong hold in the economy without adding capacities. The domestic private corporate sector lagged far behind in various respects. Belying the expectations of the policy makers, it invested far too inadequately in research and development. This article argues that India should not continue its reliance on FDI to achieve the goal of creating an internationally competitive manufacturing sector. India should do more than establishing an FDI review mechanism. Cross-border acquisitions must be subjected to strict scrutiny by a specialized agency. Proactive and coordinated measures must be devised to encourage domestic enterprises. Special attention must be given to providing long-term risk capital.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"66 1","pages":"158 - 183"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0003603X21997017","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49377396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Application of Economic and Quantitative Tools for Merger Analysis in India 经济和定量工具在印度并购分析中的应用

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2021-03-10 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X21997024

Ramji Tamarappoo, Neha Malhotra Singh

引用次数: 0