Antitrust Bulletin最新文献_第5页

The Vast Space in Which the Vertical Merger Guidelines Lived 垂直并购准则所处的广阔空间

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2022-06-15 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221103114

Edward A. Snyder

{"title":"The Vast Space in Which the Vertical Merger Guidelines Lived","authors":"Edward A. Snyder","doi":"10.1177/0003603X221103114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221103114","url":null,"abstract":"The thesis of this article is that the gap left by the abandoned Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMGs) is small, and that the gap should not be filled until a sound foundation for guidelines is built. The VMGs operated with a narrow scaffolding in a vast space of real-world decisions and a continuum of organizational forms. The illustrations in the VMGs were based on pricing models that show that anticompetitive exclusion may result from vertical mergers. But these models are incapable of generalization, and they do not account for investments, market uncertainty, contracting problems, information asymmetries, and governance issues. Perplexingly, the VMGs ignored research that considers such factors and illuminates a broad range of empirically verifiable efficiencies. The requisite foundation for effective vertical guidelines is not in place. Until it is developed, replacements will fail to screen vertical mergers that do not raise concerns and will not be of assistance when mergers are challenged. Antitrust scholars could advance the foundational work by developing authoritative briefs on topics such as anticompetitive exclusion, asset-specific investments, incomplete contracts and opportunistic behavior, information asymmetries and principal–agent problems, the purposes and effects of restrictive contracts, and the implications of network economies for the scope of firms.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"67 1","pages":"424 - 433"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43874198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Double Markups, Information, and Vertical Mergers 双重标记、信息和垂直合并

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2022-06-15 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221103115

S. Loertscher, L. Marx

{"title":"Double Markups, Information, and Vertical Mergers","authors":"S. Loertscher, L. Marx","doi":"10.1177/0003603X221103115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221103115","url":null,"abstract":"In vertical contracting models with complete information and linear prices, double markups that arise between independent firms provide an efficiency rationale for vertical mergers since these eliminate double markups (EDM). However, the double markups vanish even without vertical integration if the firms are allowed to use two-part tariffs. Hence, the efficiency rationale for vertical mergers in models of complete information requires restrictions on the contracts that firms can use. In a sense, with complete information, two-part tariffs are simply too powerful. If instead one allows incomplete information and removes the restriction on contract forms, then vertical mergers continue to have an effect that is analogous to EDM, but they also have the potential to affect the overall efficiency of the market to the detriment of society. Consequently, the social surplus effects of vertical integration depend on the underlying market structure, and vertical mergers are, in and of themselves, neither good nor bad. We illustrate through an example that with incomplete information, the private benefits from vertical integration tend to be excessive; that is, vertical mergers remain profitable even when they are socially harmful.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"67 1","pages":"434 - 441"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44849316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Radiation-induced coronary artery disease: a difficult clinical conundrum. 辐射诱发冠状动脉疾病：一个棘手的临床难题。

IF 4.4

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI: 10.7861/clinmed.2021-0600

Ali Kirresh, Laura White, Adam Mitchell, Shahzaib Ahmad, Bernard Obika, Sarah Davis, Mahmood Ahmad, Luciano Candilio

{"title":"Radiation-induced coronary artery disease: a difficult clinical conundrum.","authors":"Ali Kirresh, Laura White, Adam Mitchell, Shahzaib Ahmad, Bernard Obika, Sarah Davis, Mahmood Ahmad, Luciano Candilio","doi":"10.7861/clinmed.2021-0600","DOIUrl":"10.7861/clinmed.2021-0600","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Accelerated coronary artery disease seen following radiation exposure is termed 'radiation-induced coronary artery disease' (RICAD) and results from both the direct and indirect effects of radiation exposure. Long-term data are available from survivors of nuclear explosions and accidents, nuclear workers as well as from radiotherapy patients. The last group is, by far, the biggest cause of RICAD presentation. The incidence of RICAD continues to increase as cancer survival rates improve and it is now the second most common cause of morbidity and mortality in patients treated with radiotherapy for breast cancer, Hodgkin's lymphoma and other mediastinal malignancies. RICAD will frequently present atypically or even asymptomatically with a latency period of at least 10 years after radiotherapy treatment. An awareness of RICAD, as a long-term complication of radiotherapy, is therefore essential for the cardiologist, oncologist and general medical physician alike. Prior cardiac risk factors, a higher radiation dose and a younger age at exposure seem to increase a patient's risk ratio of developing RICAD. Significant radiation exposure, therefore, requires a low threshold for screening for early diagnosis and timely intervention.</p>","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"61 1","pages":"251-256"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87284489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The role of vaccination in a model of asset pricing during a pandemic. 疫苗接种在大流行病期间资产定价模型中的作用。

IF 2.9

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2022-04-21 eCollection Date: 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0266511

Yuta Saito

引用次数: 0

The Incursion of Antitrust into China’s Platform Economy 反垄断对中国平台经济的影响

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2022-04-19 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221084152

S. M. Colino

引用次数: 2

Reshaping Digital Competition: The New Platform Regulations and the Future of Modern Antitrust 重塑数字竞争:新的平台法规和现代反垄断的未来

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2022-04-19 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221082742

Elias Deutscher

{"title":"Reshaping Digital Competition: The New Platform Regulations and the Future of Modern Antitrust","authors":"Elias Deutscher","doi":"10.1177/0003603X221082742","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221082742","url":null,"abstract":"This article reflects on the way in which the new initiatives to regulate powerful online platforms in the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany challenge well-established fundamentals of modern antitrust and thereby reshape the future of competition law. It shows that the new platform regulations set in motion a profound transformation of modern antitrust law that operates along four parameters. First, the new platform regulations unsettle the long-standing baseline assumption that the maximization of consumer welfare constitutes competition law’s core mission. Second, the new instruments repudiate the orthodox understanding of error costs that advocates under-enforcement as the optimal standard of intervention in innovation-driven markets. Third, by relying primarily on rule-like presumptions as legal commands to regulate digital competition, the new platform regulations reverse the trend toward an increasingly inductive mode of analysis that characterized modern antitrust under the “more economic” or “effects-based” approach. Fourth, the new platform regulations also fundamentally diverge from a purely probabilistic standard of proof which requires the showing that impugned conduct is more likely than not to cause anticompetitive harm. The reconfiguration of modern antitrust along these four vectors, the article concludes, foreshadows a new, more inclusive model of innovation and growth in digital markets.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"67 1","pages":"302 - 340"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"65215531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Taming Tech Giants: The Neglected Interplay Between Competition Law and Data Protection (Privacy) Law 驯服科技巨头：被忽视的竞争法和数据保护（隐私）法之间的互动

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2022-04-12 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221084145

Wolfgang Kerber

{"title":"Taming Tech Giants: The Neglected Interplay Between Competition Law and Data Protection (Privacy) Law","authors":"Wolfgang Kerber","doi":"10.1177/0003603X221084145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221084145","url":null,"abstract":"The debate about the economic power of large tech firms has led to the insight that due to the key role of personal data on large digital platforms competition and privacy issues are deeply intertwined. This leads also to a complex relationship between competition law and data protection (or privacy) law, and—also from an economic perspective—the need for policy-makers to take into account the interplay between both legal regimes. This article analyzes current discussions about (1) how to integrate privacy effects into traditional competition law and (2) the far-reaching reform discussions about taming the power of the large tech firms, for example, the Digital Markets Act in the European Union or the new antitrust discussion in the United States, with respect to the question whether and to what extent they take into account this interplay between competition policy and data protection (or privacy) law. It is surprising that also the second reform discussion, which directly intends to target the power of the large tech firms, does not take into account sufficiently this interplay and the ensuing need for a more collaborative approach between these policies. Therefore, the opportunities of developing a more effective joint strategy for achieving better both competition and privacy are still missed.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"67 1","pages":"280 - 301"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46476445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Antitrust, Big Tech, and Democracy: A Research Agenda 反垄断、科技巨头和民主:一个研究议程

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2022-04-04 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221082749

V. H. Robertson

{"title":"Antitrust, Big Tech, and Democracy: A Research Agenda","authors":"V. H. Robertson","doi":"10.1177/0003603X221082749","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221082749","url":null,"abstract":"In the twenty-first century, voter choice and the broader political debate are within the reach of those that can access and channel the vast streams of user data that are generated online. How digital platforms utilize personal user data to influence the outcome of democratic processes has become a central issue that liberal democracies must confront. The paper explores whether competition law has a role to play when it comes to addressing this intersection of Big Tech, data, and democracy. It first sets out the democratic roots of competition or antitrust law in the United States and the European Union. From these, the paper deduces that competition law cannot remain inactive when it comes to maintaining a democratic society in the face of the abilities of Big Tech to influence democratic processes and outcomes. The paper then goes a step further and asks what role competition law could play in this regard. Should democratic values simply be reflected in the procedural set-up of antitrust law, or is there a role for democratic values in the substantive provisions as well? And if so, does antitrust law’s focus on keeping market power in check suffice to fulfill its role in a democratic society, or does this role require the law to specifically target antidemocratic market behavior as anticompetitive harm? In navigating these questions, the paper contributes to the ongoing debate on political antitrust and sets out an ambitious research agenda on how to carry this discussion forward.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"67 1","pages":"259 - 279"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46848595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Who’s Afraid of Conglomerate Mergers? 谁害怕企业合并?

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2022-04-02 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221082748

A. Witt

{"title":"Who’s Afraid of Conglomerate Mergers?","authors":"A. Witt","doi":"10.1177/0003603X221082748","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221082748","url":null,"abstract":"Conglomerate merger control went out of fashion in the United States and the European Union several decades ago. Both jurisdictions embraced the premise that nonhorizontal mergers should normally be considered benign because exclusionary theories of harm are economically implausible, and nonhorizontal mergers are almost always certain to result in significant efficiency effects that the merged entity can be expected to pass on to consumers. Conglomerate effects analysis subsequently all but disappeared from the enforcement practice. However, the emergence of a handful of powerful digital platforms with vast global ecosystems of interconnected services is currently causing competition agencies a great deal of concern. Their growth has not been entirely internal. Collectively, Alphabet, Meta, Apple, Amazon, and Apple have acquired over eight hundred companies. Many of their targets were innovative start-ups operating in complementary markets. This contribution compares and critically assesses how this development has affected the U.S., EU, and U.K. competition agencies’ approach to conglomerate merger control. It finds that, as a reaction to the advent of Big Tech, conglomerate effects analysis has made a significant comeback in EU merger control. While the U.S. and U.K. authorities have not yet intervened against any conglomerate acquisitions in practice, evidence suggests that they are also more open to nonhorizontal theories of harm again.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"67 1","pages":"208 - 236"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43624543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Taming Tech Giants 驯服科技巨头

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2022-03-24 DOI: 10.1177/0003603x221084153

A. Witt

引用次数: 0