PSN: Debt Crises (Topic)最新文献_第2页

Dictatorships for Democracy: Takeovers of Financially Failed Cities 民主的独裁:接管财政失败的城市

PSN: Debt Crises (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-03-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2397533

C. Gillette

{"title":"Dictatorships for Democracy: Takeovers of Financially Failed Cities","authors":"C. Gillette","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2397533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2397533","url":null,"abstract":"States have traditionally offered support to their fiscally distressed municipalities. When less intrusive forms of assistance fail to bring stability, some states employ supervisory institutions that exercise approval authority over local budgets or, more intrusively, that displace locally elected officials. These \"takeover boards\" are frequently accused of representing an antidemocratic form of local government and a denial of local autonomy.In this Article, I suggest that the extent to which takeover boards are subject to an anti-democratic critique is frequently overstated. Efforts to revive near-insolvent localities cannot be oblivious to the causes that generated their distress. Depopulation, high unemployment, depleted municipal services, and blight do not arise spontaneously. They are frequently the consequence of long periods of local mismanagement, in which expenditures deviate substantially from those goods and services that residents prefer, inducing the most mobile among them to gravitate to more hospitable jurisdictions. Any viable response must therefore address the causes of political dysfunction. I contend that by addressing the political underpinnings of fiscal distress, takeover boards may be more capable of satisfying the interests of local residents for public goods than local elected officials, and may also represent the interests of nonresidents and creditors who are not considered by those officials. Moreover, I suggest, the authority of takeover boards should be expanded to allow them to engage in restructuring of municipal governance in order to avoid the entrenched and defragmented institutions that are often associated with local fiscal distress. The temporary nature of takeover board jurisdiction means that when local governance returns to the realm of normal politics, residents will be in a more informed position to evaluate the optimal structure of local governance.","PeriodicalId":366245,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt Crises (Topic)","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115835942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

Financial and Sovereign Debt Crises: Some Lessons Learned and Those Forgotten 金融和主权债务危机:吸取的教训和被遗忘的教训

PSN: Debt Crises (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-11-01 DOI: 10.5089/9781475552874.001.A001

Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth Rogoff

引用次数: 116

Assist or Desist? Conditional Bailouts and Fiscal Discipline in Local Governments 协助还是阻止?有条件救助与地方政府财政纪律

PSN: Debt Crises (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-10-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2440627

J. Dietrichson, L. Ellegård

{"title":"Assist or Desist? Conditional Bailouts and Fiscal Discipline in Local Governments","authors":"J. Dietrichson, L. Ellegård","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2440627","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2440627","url":null,"abstract":"Central government bailouts of local governments are commonly viewed as a recipe for local fiscal indiscipline, as local governments learn that the center will come to rescue in times of trouble. Little is however known about whether such tendencies can be dampened if assistance is made conditional upon the local governments' own fiscal efforts. We examine a case in which the Swedish central government provided conditional grants to 36 financially troubled municipalities: to receive the grant, municipalities first had to cut costs and balance their budgets. For each municipality, we estimate the long run program effect on per capita costs of services using the synthetic control method for case studies (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010). The number of municipalities that substantially reduce their costs after the program is much larger than the number that substantially increase their costs, and there is a cost reducing effect on average. Fixed effects estimations with net revenues as measure of fiscal performance corroborate these findings for costs. Conditional bailouts need thus not erode fiscal responsibility and may even induce fiscal discipline. (Less)","PeriodicalId":366245,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt Crises (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123794849","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 31

The European Debt Crisis. An Analysis and Evidence From the Macroeconomic Variables of the EU Members 欧洲债务危机。欧盟成员国宏观经济变量的分析与证据

PSN: Debt Crises (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-08-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3253650

Michel Guirguis

{"title":"The European Debt Crisis. An Analysis and Evidence From the Macroeconomic Variables of the EU Members","authors":"Michel Guirguis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3253650","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3253650","url":null,"abstract":"This article describes the current sovereign debt crisis of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, (GIPS). Using data from the International Monetary Fund, IMF, we illustrate the degree of the problem since the start of 2009. Macroeconomic indicators such as gross domestic product constant prices as percent change, general government net lending/borrowing as percent of GDP, general government net debt as a percent of GDP, unemployment rate, general government revenue as percent of GDP, general government total expenditure as percent of GDP, current account balance as percent of GDP, inflation end of period consumer prices as percent change, total investment as percent of GDP, gross national savings as percent of GDP, volume of imports of goods and services as percent change, volume of exports of goods and services as percent change would be used to show the violations from the Maastricht Treaty which was signed in 1992. The biggest problem was that the Treaty signed without taking into consideration the Greek Orthodox approach. This was the biggest mistake that resulted to magnify the debt and deficit among the EU countries. If there is no blessing from the Orthodox Church, then the decisions and the project will not be sustainable and successful for a long – period of time.","PeriodicalId":366245,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt Crises (Topic)","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128808760","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Foreign Exchange Markets Efficiency Under Recent Crises: Evidence from the European Markets 近期危机下的外汇市场效率:来自欧洲市场的证据

PSN: Debt Crises (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-06-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2283809

Y. Wong, R. Ahmad

{"title":"Foreign Exchange Markets Efficiency Under Recent Crises: Evidence from the European Markets","authors":"Y. Wong, R. Ahmad","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2283809","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2283809","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the European foreign exchange markets efficiency from both the within- and across-country perspectives and subsequently compared them across several recent crises. The European foreign exchange markets are generally efficient over the whole sample period. From the subsample periods analysis, September 11, 2001 event is shown to be the most disturbing event among recent crises. Surprisingly, there is little evidence of disturbance to foreign markets efficiency during the two most recent major crises namely the global financial crisis of 2008/09 and the current European Sovereign Debt Crisis (ESDC). The forward bias puzzle remains a more prominent phenomenon among the advanced countries' currencies than their developing counterparts. There is also evidence showing the convergence in the efficiency condition between the European advanced and developing countries‟ currencies in the later subsample periods. There are three key contributions; one, we have updated the literature until the recent ESDC; two, our results provide comfort to policymakers that the European foreign exchange markets efficiency is least affected by the recent crises; and three, our conclusions support the notion of market efficiency in the long run.","PeriodicalId":366245,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt Crises (Topic)","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125037709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

The Euro Sovereign Debt Crisis and the Built-In Instability of the Euro 欧元主权债务危机和欧元的内在不稳定性

PSN: Debt Crises (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2253823

R. Vranceanu

引用次数: 1

The Implicit Government Guarantee: Evidence from an Unexpected Corporate Bond Default Event 隐性政府担保:来自意外公司债券违约事件的证据

PSN: Debt Crises (Topic) Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3935586

Ying Lei, Ei Yang, Yue Yin

引用次数: 0