{"title":"Diversity","authors":"K. Lippert‐Rasmussen","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190648787.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190648787.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses diversity-based justifications of affirmative action. It offers different accounts of the scope of diversity and different accounts of what diversity consists of. The overall conclusion of the chapter is that while, in some contexts, considerations about diversity speak in favor of specific affirmative action policies, most benefits from diversity are not tied to specifically boosting the representation of excluded groups. Moreover, in some scenarios increasing diversity will actually speak in favor of reducing the representation of an excluded, but large, minority. Finally, the chapter draws a distinction between critiques of proponents of the diversity argument who appeal to a concern for diversity in an opportunistic way and critiques of that argument as such.","PeriodicalId":365406,"journal":{"name":"Making Sense of Affirmative Action","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127326393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Compensation","authors":"K. Lippert‐Rasmussen","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190648787.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190648787.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter looks at so-called backward-looking justifications for affirmative action, e.g., most notably arguments that justify affirmative action as a way of providing quasi-compensation for descendants of victims of past injustices. The chapter is quite critical of this justification. One reason for this derives from Parfit’s important non-identity problem, while another reason for this skepticism derives from the difficulties of providing an attractive account of what a quasi-compensation-relevant relation of descent consists of. With these two problems in mind the chapter also scrutinizes the view that innocent beneficiaries of historic injustice have special duties to bear the costs of affirmative action. In closing, the chapter argues that the expounded criticisms of compensation-based justifications of affirmative action are compatible with the view that there exist duties (e.g., on the part of states) to apologize for past injustices.","PeriodicalId":365406,"journal":{"name":"Making Sense of Affirmative Action","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121841035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}