{"title":"Rational Climate Skeptics: On the Strategic Communication of Scientific Data","authors":"Youngseok Park","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2911038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2911038","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a game-theoretical approach to climate change skeptics. The credibility gap between the scientist and the government is created if the preference of the scientist is not perfectly aligned with that of the government. The credibility gap is eliminated and the ex-ante social welfare is maximized if and only if the scientist’s preference is perfectly aligned with that of the government, not with that of the median voter. This is endogenously achieved when the government is allowed to appoint its optimal scientist without election concerns. In the case where the government has election concerns, if the median voter perceives an alarming message from the scientist, then even a “right-wing” government must choose an aggressive climate change policy to avoid losing the election. Accordingly, it will prefer to appoint a scientist who is unlikely to send an alarming message. Thus the government deliberately creates a credibility gap which may cause a distorted climate change policy in a democracy.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129649115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why the USA Is Doomed to Have Trade Deficits, and Why It Doesn't Matter","authors":"Robert W. McGee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2858432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2858432","url":null,"abstract":"Various presidential candidates over the years have promised to reduce the U.S. trade deficit. Such arguments are based on the mistaken belief that trade deficits are bad. This paper explains why the United States is doomed to have trade deficits, and why it doesn’t matter.The paper also includes a bibliography of more than 100 articles about trade, with links that will take the reader to the article.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114935924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Satisfaction with Democracy in Latin America: Do the Characteristics of the Political System Matter?","authors":"Selim Jürgen Ergun, F. Rivas, Máximo Rossi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2857247","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2857247","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the impact that the rules and characteristics of the political system have on satisfaction with democracy in Latin America. Using individual level survey data provided by Latinobarometer and controlling for both personal characteristics and macroeconomic variables, we find that the rules and characteristics of the political system do matter: Satisfaction with democracy is higher in countries that use a proportional electoral rule for choosing the legislature, where voting is not enforced, and in countries with a federal system. The age of democracy has a negative impact on satisfaction with democracy while the electoral rule used to choose the president does not matter. On the economic side, we find that personal assessments of the economy impact more on satisfaction with democracy than actual macroeconomic data.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"2004 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125801115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pro-Consumer Legislation Supported by Elites: The Curious Case of the 1866 Post Roads Act","authors":"Aaron M. Honsowetz","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2843118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2843118","url":null,"abstract":"Politicians connected to elites who anticipated benefiting from the 1866 Post Roads Act overcame the problem of collective action and passed pro-consumer legislation over the objections of a concentrated economic interest. Mancur Olson’s (1965, 1982) theory on the cost of collective action predicts a concentrated interest should prevail over dispersed consumers. The exclusion of Southern Democrats elected from states that supported the Confederacy enabled a coalition within the Republican Party to push the act through the federal legislature over the vigorous objections of Western Union. Without the support of Republican politicians linked to economic and political elites who stood to benefit from the act, the pro-consumer 1866 Post Roads Act would have failed to pass in the United States Congress or Senate.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"180 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115991248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rethinking the Meaning of Self-Interest, Rational Choice, Growth and Happiness: How the Misunderstanding of These Concepts Caused Misery for Millions","authors":"Hershey H. Friedman, M. Gerstein","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2842427","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2842427","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines four terms that are used a great deal by economists and demonstrates that they are often misunderstood. Not fully comprehending the meaning of these terms can result in serious problems for society. Thus, Greenspan admitted that not knowing how self-interest works resulted in the Great Recession of 2008. Other terms analyzed in this paper include rational choice, growth, and happiness.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124210779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Estimating the Willingness to Pay for Voting When Absentee Voting Is Not Allowed","authors":"C. Chu, S. Lin, Wen-Jen Tsay","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2921686","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2921686","url":null,"abstract":"The existing studies based on the well known rational voter theory analyze voter turnout as the aggregate of individuals' binary choice of to vote or not to vote. However, when people need to travel to vote, the cost associated with different travel modes directly affects their voting decisions. We thus generalize the rational voter theory by taking an individual's specific choice of travel mode into account. Considering that individuals may have different responses to traveling costs, we further allow the disutility from voting to be heterogeneous across individuals. Although our proposed discrete choice model is much more flexible than previous ones in these two respects, we show that it can be estimated via the method of Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) with either individual-level or aggregate level data. We then use traveling and census data to analyze voters' behavior in Taiwan where absentee voting is not allowed, such that people may need to travel quite a long distance to vote. As compared to the observed 30.14% turnout rates of non-registered voters in Taiwan's 2014 local elections, the counterfactual simulations herein suggest that the turnout rates would be 56.49% if convenient voting were to be allowed, such as e-voting.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129260372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
E. Litvintseva, V. S. Karpichev, N. Mamedov, N. Afanasieva, I. Rybakova, T. V. Skipetrova, I. Fateev
{"title":"Разработка Методического Инструментария По Оценке Доверия Граждан К Государственным Гражданским Служащим (The Development of Methodological Tools to Assess Public Confidence in the Civil Servants)","authors":"E. Litvintseva, V. S. Karpichev, N. Mamedov, N. Afanasieva, I. Rybakova, T. V. Skipetrova, I. Fateev","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2831561","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2831561","url":null,"abstract":"Russian Abstract: В работе представлены результаты научного анализа доверия как особой формы проявления социальной реальности и человеческого существования, определенной сферы свободы, результата совместного сосуществования индивидов и социальных групп. Общественное доверие является ключевой характеристикой российского социума, которое проявляется как на межличностном уровне, так и на уровне социальном, включая доверие к общественным институтам и государству в целом. Концептуальная разработка общественного доверия как социального механизма стабилизации общества и государства позволила рассмотреть феномен «доверия» граждан к государственным гражданским служащим в логике «власть – управление – доверие граждан – соуправление (гражданская активность)»English Abstract: The paper presents the results of a scientific analysis of trust as a special form of manifestation of social reality and human existence, certain areas of freedom, the result of co-existence of individuals and social groups. Public trust is a key characteristic of Russian society, which manifests itself as an interpersonal level and at the level of social, including the credibility of the public institutions and the state as a whole.Conceptual development of public trust as a social mechanism for the stabilization of society and the state allowed to consider the phenomenon of \"confidence\" to the citizens of the state civil servants in the logic of \"power - control - citizens' trust - co-management (civic engagement)\"","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128097897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Who's to Blame? Political Centralization and Electoral Punishment Under Authoritarianism","authors":"O. J. Reuter, Quintin H. Beazer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2783108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2783108","url":null,"abstract":"Does decentralization affect how voters attribute blame for poor economic performance? The question of whether political centralization ties regime leaders to local economic outcomes is particularly important in authoritarian regimes, where economic performance legitimacy is a key source of regime stability. Using political and economic data from large Russian cities for the period 2003-2012, we investigate whether replacing direct mayoral elections with appointments affects the way voters attribute blame for economic outcomes. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that the ruling party is more likely to be punished for poor economic performance in cities with appointed mayors than it is in cities with elected mayors.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125053321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Equivalence of Efficiency Notions for Ordinal Assignment Problems","authors":"W. Cho, Battal Doğan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2768488","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2768488","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In ordinal (probabilistic) assignment problems, each agent reports his preference rankings over objects and receives a lottery defined over those objects. A common efficiency notion, s d -efficiency, is obtained by extending the preference rankings to preferences over lotteries by means of (first-order) stochastic dominance. Two alternative efficiency notions, which we call d l - and u l -efficiency, are based on downward and upward lexicographic dominance, respectively. We show that s d -, d l -, and u l -efficiency are all equivalent. Noting that the three efficiency notions are a refinement of ex post efficiency—another well-known efficiency notion—we also identify sufficient and necessary conditions on preference profiles under which ex post efficiency is equivalent to the three notions.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131134369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Konstantin Yanovskiy, Sergei Zhavoronkov, Dmitry Cherny
{"title":"Всеобщий базовый доход и прочие бедствия (Basic Income: Misfortune Which Never Comes Singly)","authors":"Konstantin Yanovskiy, Sergei Zhavoronkov, Dmitry Cherny","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2766319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2766319","url":null,"abstract":"Russian Abstract: Активизация движения за \"базовый доход\" рассматривается в контексте теории общественного выбора как рациональная программа продвижения к власти левых радикалов и расширения перераспределительных программ. Основная аргументация против идеи базового дохода должна строиться даже не на очевидном вреде идеи с точки зрения прагматической. Она должна быть основана на отказе в признании права левых переписывать вечные законы морали не имеющие никакого отношения к насильственному перераспределению.English Abstract: Radical left movement for universal \"Basic income\" is explored and interpreted in the paper as public choice issue. Left radicals are looking forward to extort more money to attract more voters and to move balance of power and all the society as far to the left as possible. Opposition to the idea should be built on moral ground, first and foremost, not on obvious proofs of economic inconsistency of the idea.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127502533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}