Competition Law Journal最新文献_第7页

‘No magic number’ means ‘no magic number’: will the EU Court turn the tide on four-to-three mobile mergers in Europe? “没有神奇数字”意味着“没有神奇的数字”：欧盟法院会扭转欧洲四到三次移动合并的趋势吗？

Competition Law Journal Pub Date : 2021-08-01 DOI: 10.4337/clj.2021.02.03

Katarzyna Czapracka

{"title":"‘No magic number’ means ‘no magic number’: will the EU Court turn the tide on four-to-three mobile mergers in Europe?","authors":"Katarzyna Czapracka","doi":"10.4337/clj.2021.02.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/clj.2021.02.03","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the impact of the General Court's judgment in CK Telecoms and the Commission decision in T-Mobile NL/Tele2 on the assessment of four-to-three mobile mergers. The unconditional clearance in the Dutch case energized some telecoms executives, but the Commission stressed that it was largely due to the very specific circumstances of the case. Then, in CK Telecoms, the General Court delivered a blow to the framework developed by the Commission to assess mobile mergers. The Court's interpretation of the concepts of ‘important competitive force’ and ‘closeness of competition’ raises the threshold for the Commission to challenge mergers and implements the principle that there is no ‘magic number’ of mobile network operators. Though some commentators compared CK Telecoms to the Airtours case, CK Telecoms has not provoked similar soul-searching at DG Competition. Some senior Commission officials criticized the judgment and indicated that the Commission will continue applying the same framework. On appeal, the Commission has challenged all key aspects of the judgment. The Dutch case, however, confirms that the Commission may entertain unconditional clearance in some four-to-three mobile mergers and, while CK Telecoms might not bring an overhaul of the current framework, we can expect some refinements.","PeriodicalId":36415,"journal":{"name":"Competition Law Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48959420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Algorithms and competition: the latest theory and evidence 算法与竞争:最新的理论与证据

Competition Law Journal Pub Date : 2021-04-01 DOI: 10.4337/CLJ.2021.01.04

Ambroise Descamps, Timo Klein, Gareth Shier

引用次数: 3

Access to big data as a remedy in big tech 访问大数据作为大型科技的补救措施

Competition Law Journal Pub Date : 2021-04-01 DOI: 10.4337/CLJ.2021.01.01

N. Dadson, I. Snoddy, Joshua White

{"title":"Access to big data as a remedy in big tech","authors":"N. Dadson, I. Snoddy, Joshua White","doi":"10.4337/CLJ.2021.01.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/CLJ.2021.01.01","url":null,"abstract":"‘Big data’ and ‘big tech’ have become central topics in recent antitrust debate and regulation. For example, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) recently published a report on online platforms, expressing concerns that the major platforms like Google are now protected from competition by such strong incumbency advantages. Underlying the CMA's theory of harm is the essential facility theory of antitrust, under which Google's ability to control access to its click-and-query data is seen as preventing its rivals from competing effectively. EU jurisprudence has identified three criteria to determine whether data are an essential facility and whether access should be mandated. First, the data must be indispensable to compete in the market. Secondly, absent data sharing, technical improvements by competitors must be hampered or precluded. Thirdly, there must be no objective justification to refuse competitors access to the data. It is difficult to reconcile the authorities’ concerns with Google's click-and-query data with these criteria, however. Actual and potential alternatives exist; Google's competitors have been innovating in the search market for more than a decade; and there are objective reasons to limit data access, including threats to innovation and privacy concerns.","PeriodicalId":36415,"journal":{"name":"Competition Law Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45632422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Merger remedies: key recent developments in the CMA's practice 并购补救措施：CMA实践的关键最新进展

Competition Law Journal Pub Date : 2020-12-01 DOI: 10.4337/CLJ.2020.04.05

Daniel Vowden, P. Meaney

引用次数: 0

Loss of potential competition through a minority stake? Takeaways from Amazon/Deliveroo 通过少数股权失去潜在竞争?亚马逊和Deliveroo的外卖

Competition Law Journal Pub Date : 2020-12-01 DOI: 10.4337/CLJ.2020.04.06

U. Akgün, Oliver Latham

引用次数: 0

The battle of the tests: a Pyrrhic victory? A case note on the Supreme Court judgment in Peninsula Securities Ltd v. Dunnes Stores (Bangor) Ltd 考试之战:得不偿失的胜利?最高法院半岛证券有限公司诉Dunnes Stores (Bangor) Ltd案判决要点

Competition Law Journal Pub Date : 2020-12-01 DOI: 10.4337/CLJ.2020.04.01

M. Jephcott, Max Kaufman, Ben Gordon

{"title":"The battle of the tests: a Pyrrhic victory? A case note on the Supreme Court judgment in Peninsula Securities Ltd v. Dunnes Stores (Bangor) Ltd","authors":"M. Jephcott, Max Kaufman, Ben Gordon","doi":"10.4337/CLJ.2020.04.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/CLJ.2020.04.01","url":null,"abstract":"In Peninsula Securities, the Supreme Court held that a restrictive covenant, granted in a lease to an anchor tenant of a shopping centre not to allow any retail unit in the centre to be leased to competing shops, does not engage the doctrine of restraint of trade. The question of its enforceability therefore hinges on whether the relevant covenant breaches competition law, and specifically whether it is anti-competitive by object or effect. This relatively straightforward conclusion of the Supreme Court in Peninsula Securities masks over 50 years of conflicting judgments and uncertainty in the area. Prior to Peninsula Securities, the majority decision of the House of Lords in Esso Petroleum v Harper's Garage gave rise to a ‘battle of the tests’: the majority opined that the doctrine of restraint of trade would only be engaged if the covenantor contracts to give up a freedom they already had (what has come to be known as the ‘pre-existing freedom test’; Lord Wilberforce, dissenting, formulated what came to be known as the ‘trading society test’ which is basically a rule of reason test. In Peninsula Securities, the Supreme Court clearly sided with the latter, but in reality neither test is likely to be considered in future challenges to an anchor tenancy restrictive covenant – the key question is whether it is anti-competitive, something which only the relevant facts of the case will determine.","PeriodicalId":36415,"journal":{"name":"Competition Law Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42341280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Book Review: Nicolas Charbit and Sonia Ahmad (eds), Richard Whish QC (Hon) Liber Amicorum: Taking Competition Law Outside the Box 书评:Nicolas Charbit和Sonia Ahmad(编)，Richard Whish QC (Hon)《自由之法:打破竞争规则》

Competition Law Journal Pub Date : 2020-12-01 DOI: 10.4337/CLJ.2020.04.08

M. O’Regan

引用次数: 0

Using competition tools during the COVID-19 pandemic: are merger control and state support substitutes or complements? 在新冠肺炎大流行期间使用竞争工具：合并控制和国家支持是替代还是补充？

Competition Law Journal Pub Date : 2020-12-01 DOI: 10.4337/CLJ.2020.04.07

Michele Granatstein

引用次数: 0

Here to stay: regression analysis in follow-on cartel damages 留在这里：卡特尔后续损害的回归分析

Competition Law Journal Pub Date : 2020-10-01 DOI: 10.4337/clj.2020.03.04

Spyros Droukopoulos, B. Veronese, Stefan Witte

引用次数: 0

The loss of potential competition in UK merger control – the emergence of an analytical framework in the CMA's recent decisional practice 英国并购控制中潜在竞争的丧失——CMA近期决策实践中分析框架的出现

Competition Law Journal Pub Date : 2020-10-01 DOI: 10.4337/clj.2020.03.02

Joe Williams, Stephen Wisking

{"title":"The loss of potential competition in UK merger control – the emergence of an analytical framework in the CMA's recent decisional practice","authors":"Joe Williams, Stephen Wisking","doi":"10.4337/clj.2020.03.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/clj.2020.03.02","url":null,"abstract":"Loss of potential, rather than actual, competition as a theory of harm in merger control has been a hot topic in competition policy debate. The UK's Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) does not face the same jurisdictional constraints that have prevented some of its peer agencies from investigating transactions which give rise to loss of potential competition concerns, and it has adopted a number of recent merger decisions in this area, in many cases after the conclusion of a detailed Phase 2 review. This article outlines the applicable legal framework and explores the CMA's recent decisional practice by reference to three categories of transaction potentially giving rise to a loss of potential competition where the concern is that absent the transaction: (1) one party would have been a market entrant; (2) one or both parties would have become a greater competitive constraint on the other; and/or (3) there was an alternative purchaser which would have made the target more competitive. It then summarizes the CMA's approach to assessing such transactions, including its intention, ability and incentive framework. It concludes by setting out the case for revision to the CMA's Merger Assessment Guidelines to reflect explicitly its approach to these types of transactions.","PeriodicalId":36415,"journal":{"name":"Competition Law Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43838806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0