访问大数据作为大型科技的补救措施

Q4 Social Sciences
N. Dadson, I. Snoddy, Joshua White
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引用次数: 0

摘要

“大数据”和“大科技”已成为最近反垄断辩论和监管的中心话题。例如,竞争与市场管理局(CMA)最近发布了一份关于在线平台的报告,对谷歌等主要平台现在因其强大的在职优势而免受竞争表示担忧。CMA危害理论的基础是反垄断的基本设施理论,根据该理论,谷歌控制其点击和查询数据访问的能力被视为阻止其竞争对手有效竞争。欧盟判例确定了三个标准,以确定数据是否是一项重要设施以及是否应强制要求访问。首先,数据必须是在市场竞争中不可或缺的。第二,在没有数据共享的情况下,竞争对手的技术改进必须受到阻碍或排除。第三,决不能有任何客观理由拒绝竞争对手获取数据。然而,很难将当局对谷歌点击和查询数据的担忧与这些标准相调和。存在实际和潜在的替代方案;十多年来,谷歌的竞争对手一直在搜索市场进行创新;限制数据访问有客观原因,包括对创新的威胁和隐私问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Access to big data as a remedy in big tech
‘Big data’ and ‘big tech’ have become central topics in recent antitrust debate and regulation. For example, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) recently published a report on online platforms, expressing concerns that the major platforms like Google are now protected from competition by such strong incumbency advantages. Underlying the CMA's theory of harm is the essential facility theory of antitrust, under which Google's ability to control access to its click-and-query data is seen as preventing its rivals from competing effectively. EU jurisprudence has identified three criteria to determine whether data are an essential facility and whether access should be mandated. First, the data must be indispensable to compete in the market. Secondly, absent data sharing, technical improvements by competitors must be hampered or precluded. Thirdly, there must be no objective justification to refuse competitors access to the data. It is difficult to reconcile the authorities’ concerns with Google's click-and-query data with these criteria, however. Actual and potential alternatives exist; Google's competitors have been innovating in the search market for more than a decade; and there are objective reasons to limit data access, including threats to innovation and privacy concerns.
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来源期刊
Competition Law Journal
Competition Law Journal Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
0.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
15
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