{"title":"Writing Conversationalists into History","authors":"James Pearson","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v10i6.4930","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v10i6.4930","url":null,"abstract":"Burton Dreben taught a generation of scholars the value of closely attending to the recent philosophical past. But the few papers he authored do little to capture his philosophical voice. In this article, I turn instead to an unpublished transcript of Dreben in conversation with his contemporaries. In addition to yielding insights into a transitional period in W.V. Quine’s and Donald Davidson’s thought, I argue that this document showcases Dreben in his element, revealing the way that he shaped the views of key analytic philosophers. More broadly, I argue that by writing conversationalists like Dreben into our histories we can capture the collaborative nature of philosophy.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42507069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Two Poles Worlds Apart","authors":"A. Trybus, B. Linsky","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v10i5.4902","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v10i5.4902","url":null,"abstract":"The article describes the background of Roman Ingarden's 1922 review of Leon Chwistek's book Wielość rzeczywistości (The Plurality of Realities), and the back-and-forth that followed. Despite the differences, the two shared some interesting similarities. Both authors had important ties to the intellectual happenings outside Poland and were not considerd mainstream at home. In the end, however, it is these connections that allowed them to gain recognition. Ingarden, who had been a student of Husserl, became the leading phenomenologist in the postwar Poland. For Chwistek, a painter, philosopher, and logician interested in Russell’s work, such connections meant that he won the competition for a professorship at the university in Lwów over Alfred Tarski. Until recently, Chwistek’s place in Polish logic remains unclear and Ingarden’s interactions with Polish logic and the Vienna Circle have not been investigated extensively. A deeper look at this intellectual fracas between Ingarden and Chwistek helps one in the study of the complicated mesh of alliances within the Lwów-Warsaw School. The article also identifies the origins of the split between phenomenology and the analytic philosophical tradition in Poland.\u0000The article is also accompanied by the translations of the reviews.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41336383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Susan Stebbing's Intellectualism","authors":"Bryan Pickel","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v10i4.4829","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v10i4.4829","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000This paper reconstructs Susan Stebbing’s account of intelligentdealing with a problem and defends this account against chargesthat it relies on a “censurable kind” of intellectualism. This chargewas made in Stebbing’s own time by Laird and Wittgenstein. MichaelKremer has recently made the case that Stebbing is also a proximatetarget of Gilbert Ryle’s attack on intellectualism. This paper arguesthat Stebbing should indeed be counted as an intellectualist since sheholds that intelligent dealing with a problem requires propositionalthought. Yet, for Stebbing, thinking is an activity of a whole personand is enabled and constrained by their dispositions. This complexpicture of a thinker enables Stebbing’s account to resist argumentstargeting certain forms of intellectualism such as Ryle’s regressargument. It also helps her to respond to the charge that sheoveremphasizes the importance of intellectual failures. On the picturethat emerges, Stebbing offers a strikingly modern epistemology thatincorporates the social features of a person as well as their purelyintellectual features.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42263133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of Sanford Shieh, Necessity Lost","authors":"Roberta Ballarin","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v10i3.5135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v10i3.5135","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p>~</jats:p>","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43690522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of Matt LaVine, Race, Gender, and the History of Early Analytic Philosophy","authors":"James Pearson","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v10i2.5097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v10i2.5097","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p>~</jats:p>","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46716218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Analysis, Decomposition, and Unity in Wittgenstein's Tractatus","authors":"O. Spinney","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v10i2.4737","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v10i2.4737","url":null,"abstract":"I argue, through appeal to the distinction between analysis and decomposition described by Dummett, that Wittgenstein employs both of those notions in the Tractatus. I then bring this interpretation to bear upon the issue of propositional unity, where I formulate an objection to the views of both Leonard Linksy and José Zalabardo. I show that both Linsky and Zalabardo fail to acknowledge the distinction between analysis and decomposition present in the Tractatus, and that they consequently mischaracterise Wittgenstein’s position with respect to propositional unity.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47218103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mackie and the Meaning of Moral Terms","authors":"Tammo Lossau","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v10i1.4786","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v10i1.4786","url":null,"abstract":"Moral error theory is comprised of two parts: a denial of the existence of objective values, and a claim about the ways in which we attempt to make reference to such objective values. John Mackie is sometimes presented as endorsing the view that we necessarily presuppose such objective values in our moral language and thought. In a series of recent papers, though, Victor Moberger (2017), Selim Berker (2019), and Michael Ridge (2020) point out that Mackie does not seem to commit himself to this view. They argue that Mackie thinks this reference to objective values can, and perhaps should, be detached from our moral statements and judgments. In this paper, I argue that Moberger, Berker, and Ridge are right to point out that Mackie stops short of claiming a necessary connection between moral language and a commitment to objective values, but that he does not endorse the contrary claim either. Instead, Mackie stays neutral on the question whether it is possible to assert moral statements or make moral judgments without presupposing objective value. This is because he does not need to take a position on this matter. Mackie only engages with the conceptual analysis of moral language and thought to the extent required to achieve his argumentative goals: he wants to reject revisionary analyses of moral language and to refute the idea that we can assume moral truths to be in alignment with ordinary moral language.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42306439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of Joan Weiner, Taking Frege At His Word","authors":"H. Sluga","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v10i1.5066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v10i1.5066","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p>~</jats:p>","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46358050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Frege on the Fruitfulness of Definitions","authors":"R. Boddy","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v9i11.5031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v9i11.5031","url":null,"abstract":"What, in Frege’s view, makes definitions fruitful? In Grundlagen §70, Frege offers an answer: Unfruitful definitions are definitions that “could just as well be omitted and leave no link missing in the chain of our proofs”. The §70 passage, however, poses an interpretive puzzle as its characterization of fruitfulness appears to conflict with other conditions that Frege imposes on definitions, namely, eliminability and conservativeness. It appears that the only way to resolve this conflict is to attribute to Frege a notion of fruitfulness that is trivially satisfied and, hence, poorly motivated. I argue that this worry is misplaced. This is because Frege distinguishes between two roles of definitions, namely, between definitions qua explanations of concepts (analytic definitions), and definitions qua resources of a proof system (logical definitions). I use this distinction to argue that a fruitful definition, for Frege, is a definition that plays both roles, and that to play both roles, the definition has to be used in the proof of sentences containing the term so defined. Starting from §70, I develop and defend this reading of Frege’s notion of fruitful definition.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67252948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strictures on an Exhibition","authors":"A. Yates","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v9i11.5033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v9i11.5033","url":null,"abstract":"In Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Frege tried to show that arithmetic is logical by giving gap-free proofs from what he took to be purely logical basic laws. But how do we come to judge these laws as true, and to recognize them as logical? The answer must involve giving an account of the apparent arguments Frege provides for his axioms. Following Sanford Shieh, I take these apparent arguments to instead be exhibitions: the exercise of a logical capacity in order to bring us into a state of judgement. I provide an account of what sort of inferential capacities are at play in such exhibitions, and explain how they lead us to judge that Frege’s primitive laws are general and undeniable. I will also situate my account with respect to other rival interpretations, particularly the elucidatory interpretations of Joan Weiner and Thomas Ricketts.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45624320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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