Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy最新文献_第2页

Review of Gary Ebbs, Carnap, Quine, and Putnam on Methods of Inquiry Gary Ebbs、Carnap、Quine和Putnam关于调查方法的评论

Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-07-20 DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v10i6.5227

Cory Juhl

引用次数: 0

Writing Conversationalists into History 把健谈者写进历史

Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-07-20 DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v10i6.4930

James Pearson

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Two Poles Worlds Apart 两极相隔

Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-07-03 DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v10i5.4902

A. Trybus, B. Linsky

{"title":"Two Poles Worlds Apart","authors":"A. Trybus, B. Linsky","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v10i5.4902","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v10i5.4902","url":null,"abstract":"The article describes the background of Roman Ingarden's 1922 review of Leon Chwistek's book Wielość rzeczywistości (The Plurality of Realities), and the back-and-forth that followed. Despite the differences, the two shared some interesting similarities. Both authors had important ties to the intellectual happenings outside Poland and were not considerd mainstream at home. In the end, however, it is these connections that allowed them to gain recognition. Ingarden, who had been a student of Husserl, became the leading phenomenologist in the postwar Poland. For Chwistek, a painter, philosopher, and logician interested in Russell’s work, such connections meant that he won the competition for a professorship at the university in Lwów over Alfred Tarski. Until recently, Chwistek’s place in Polish logic remains unclear and Ingarden’s interactions with Polish logic and the Vienna Circle have not been investigated extensively. A deeper look at this intellectual fracas between Ingarden and Chwistek helps one in the study of the complicated mesh of alliances within the Lwów-Warsaw School. The article also identifies the origins of the split between phenomenology and the analytic philosophical tradition in Poland.\u0000The article is also accompanied by the translations of the reviews.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41336383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Susan Stebbing's Intellectualism 苏珊·斯特宾的理智主义

Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-06-01 DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v10i4.4829

Bryan Pickel

引用次数: 1

Wittgenstein's Reductio 维特根斯坦还原论

Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-03-30 DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v10i3.4410

Gilad Nir

{"title":"Wittgenstein's Reductio","authors":"Gilad Nir","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v10i3.4410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v10i3.4410","url":null,"abstract":"By means of a reductio argument, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus calls into question the very idea that we can represent logical form. My paper addresses three interrelated questions: first, what conception of logical form is at issue in this argument? Second, whose conception of logic is this argument intended to undermine? And third, what could count as an adequate response to it? I show that the argument construes logical form as the universal, underlying correlation of any representation and the reality it represents. I further show that the argument seeks to undermine core commitments of Frege’s and Russell’s. But the reductio, as I read it, is not intended to establish the falsity of any of their specific assumptions. Rather, its aim is to make manifest the indeterminacies that underlie the language in which these assumptions are framed, and establish the need for a transformation of that language. So understood, Wittgenstein’s argument exemplifies his idea that philosophy is not a theory, but an activity of elucidation. The interpretation I propose bears on one of the central debates in the literature, namely how we should understand Wittgenstein’s contention that his elucidations succeed despite being nonsensical.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47523400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Review of Sanford Shieh, Necessity Lost 谢《必然性的丧失》述评

Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-03-30 DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v10i3.5135

Roberta Ballarin

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Review of Matt LaVine, Race, Gender, and the History of Early Analytic Philosophy 马特·拉文:《种族、性别与早期分析哲学史》

Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-02-26 DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v10i2.5097

James Pearson

引用次数: 0

Analysis, Decomposition, and Unity in Wittgenstein's Tractatus 维特根斯坦《拖拉机》的分析、分解与统一

Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-02-26 DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v10i2.4737

O. Spinney

引用次数: 1

Mackie and the Meaning of Moral Terms 麦基与道德术语的意义

Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-01-27 DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v10i1.4786

Tammo Lossau

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引用次数: 0

Review of Joan Weiner, Taking Frege At His Word 琼·韦纳的书评《相信弗雷格的话》

Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-01-27 DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v10i1.5066

H. Sluga

引用次数: 0