{"title":"Monetary incentives and social ties in academic publications","authors":"Zhenxi Chen , Donald Lien","doi":"10.1016/j.jmse.2023.06.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmse.2023.06.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Monetary incentives underlie academic publications, especially in countries where many researchers' incomes are performance-based. Evidence has documented that social ties improve the chances of publication in journals, whereas building and maintaining social ties require resources. We develop a simple model to investigate the consequences of monetary investment on the probability of publication through social ties. The results indicate that monetary incentive can stimulate researchers to make more efforts regarding publication. Through social ties, monetary investment in the process of academic publication distorts researchers' incentive. Monetary investment through social ties improves the probability of publication and then disables the signaling function of publication in terms of researchers’ abilities. Depending on the contribution of different types of researchers to society and the ability of the latter to differentiate the quality of publication in journals, the improvement in publication probability by monetary investment through social ties may improve or reduce the level of social welfare.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":36172,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Science and Engineering","volume":"8 4","pages":"Pages 490-497"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44366040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Retailers’ incentives for green investment in differentiated competition channels","authors":"Xinxin Zhang , Junran Huang , Chenglin Shen","doi":"10.1016/j.jmse.2023.03.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmse.2023.03.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>With increasing public environmental awareness, green activities in retail and distribution processes have become crucial tools for retailers to boost demand and enhance competitiveness. This study develops an analytical model to study the green investment choices of two differentiated retailers dealing with a common green manufacturer. It also explores the impacts of these investment choices on the manufacturer's operational decisions, channel efficiency, consumer welfare, and the environment. We derive three main results. First, the powerful retailer always favors green investments, whereas the less powerful (inferior) retailer may either prefer or avoid green investments. The fiercer the inter-retailer competition, the lower the willingness of the inferior retailer to introduce green investments. Second, although all supply chain parties may disagree on their preferences for retailers' green investments, a bilateral green investment (i.e., both retailers make green investments) can reach an incentive alignment for all firms if the differentiation between retailers is low enough and the competition between them is not substantially fierce. Moreover, a bilateral green investment improves consumer welfare and channel efficiency because of the great demand expansion and double marginalization reduction. Third, the retailers' green investments can motivate the manufacturer to produce greener products, but they do not necessarily benefit the environment. We show that the supply chain's economic sustainability aligns with its environmental sustainability only if the environmental improvement efficiency of green investments is substantially high. We further examine the impact of retailers with differentiated green investment abilities and the manufacturer's green investment efficiency to verify the robustness of the main results.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":36172,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Science and Engineering","volume":"8 4","pages":"Pages 465-489"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43070972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Economic uncertainty, central bank digital currency, and negative interest rate policy","authors":"Baogui Xin, Kai Jiang","doi":"10.1016/j.jmse.2023.04.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmse.2023.04.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The COVID-19 outbreak has brought unprecedented social attention to economic uncertainty and negative interest rate policy (NIRP). How does uncertainty affect economic activity, and how effective is a NIRP based on central bank digital currency (CBDC)? To answer the two questions, we constructed a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that accommodates sticky prices and wages. The results indicated: (i) Economic uncertainty has substantially reduced investment, output, wage, and loans, which increases unemployment risk. In the short term, it has triggered impulsive consumption by households, while consumption has fallen into a slump in the long run. (ii) After suffering an uncertainty shock, the economy entered short-term stagflation and long-term deflation. The short-term stagflation was mainly caused by resident wage adjustment, and the long-term deflation was due to the decline in effective demand caused by unemployment risk. (iii) CBDC could eliminate the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint, thereby improving the effectiveness of NIRP. Compared with traditional currency, CBDC-based NIRP could more effectively smooth macroeconomic fluctuations and alleviate the negative impact of an uncertainty shock, which is more conducive to restoring market confidence and promoting economic recovery.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":36172,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Science and Engineering","volume":"8 4","pages":"Pages 430-452"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42728304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Application of quantum computing in discrete portfolio optimization","authors":"Justus Shunza , Mary Akinyemi , Chika Yinka-Banjo","doi":"10.1016/j.jmse.2023.02.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmse.2023.02.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study proposes a novel and more efficient quantum algorithm for portfolio optimization using quantum combinatorial optimization (QCO) techniques. A recent construction developed in 2021 has sparked the field of financial portfolio optimization through the Quantum Walk Optimization Algorithm (QWOA). In this study, we investigated the complexity and efficiency of quantum optimization algorithms with a special interest in QWOA. The objective is to minimize investment risk by having a good combination of assets in the portfolio. We also focused on reducing the number of iterations while attaining a high-quality resolution through contraction of the solution space to ease computations. The concept of QWOA was extended by constructing a newly outperforming scheme known as the “Quantum Mix Optimization Algorithm (QMOA).” QMOA algorithm codes were provided for the implementation and simulation of numerical results. In addition, the efficiency of QMOA, which is better than the existing QCO algorithms, was discussed. For instance, the least QWOA number of computations required to execute the initial state equation was <em>p</em> > 2, whereas this value was <em>p</em> ≥ 2 in the proposed QMOA.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":36172,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Science and Engineering","volume":"8 4","pages":"Pages 453-464"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44395054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Social network learning efficiency in the principal–agent relationship","authors":"Chuan Ding, Yilin Hong, Yang Li, Peng Liu","doi":"10.1016/j.jmse.2023.11.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmse.2023.11.002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36172,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Science and Engineering","volume":"55 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139190433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Time-varying road network design for urban hazmat transportation","authors":"Jingyi Chen , Qiuchen Gu , Hanwen Yu , Wei Zhou , Tijun Fan","doi":"10.1016/j.jmse.2023.05.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmse.2023.05.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Hazmat transportation in cities faces significant risks that may cause catastrophic losses to humans. From the perspective of the regulator, the main responsibility is to mitigate hazmat transport risk by determining the availability of road networks to hazmat carriers. Based on the time-variant population distribution, the hazmat transport risk was assessed via the total population exposure associated with the resident and variable populations at different times. We propose a risk-minimizing urban hazmat road network design model for multiple types of hazmats, considering time-varying traffic. The model was applied to a realistic case study of hazmat transportation in a densely populated urban area with complex traffic in Shanghai, China.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":36172,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Science and Engineering","volume":"8 4","pages":"Pages 558-569"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47630289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Production quality and pricing strategy for substitutable products under comparison effects","authors":"Huanyu Yue, Yifan Xu","doi":"10.1016/j.jmse.2023.01.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmse.2023.01.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Comparison effects have been studied extensively in many fields. In particular, existing operations management articles have discussed the impact of comparison effects on enterprises' production and pricing decisions. Research has also shown that consumers' purchasing decisions are primarily determined by three factors: product quality, selling price, and comparison effects. The current study introduces the concepts of social and temporal comparison effects to examine how comparison effects influence a monopolist’s production quality and pricing strategy for substitutable products. Results reveal the following: (1) Setting different prices for even two types of substitutable products with negligible quality differences can divide customers into three groups under the influence of social comparison effects in a single-stage model. (2) The monopolist should avoid using a price discrimination strategy in which products with a short market life cycle have the same quality but different prices. (3) When the market life cycle of products is sufficiently long in the single-product market and the market with two substitutable products, the monopolist’s optimal choice in the second stage is to keep production quality constant and increase the selling price. Consequently, the number of buyers does not decrease because of temporal comparison effects. Therefore, the firm increases its revenue. (4) For the market with two substitutable products with quality differences, one approximate optimal strategy for the enterprise in the second stage is to keep the selling price constant with the assumption that product quality cannot be adjusted after the first period. At this point, the consumption situation in the market is the same as that in the first stage. Therefore, when no external constraints exist, the monopolist firm can obtain more benefits in the second stage than in the first stage by exploiting the temporal comparison effects of consumers in the second stage. (5) When consumer identity information can be confirmed in the market, social comparison effects, similar to temporal comparison effects, could help the enterprise increase its price and profit while maintaining product quality. These social and temporal comparison effects constrain consumers. Thus, the number of people who continue to buy products does not decrease.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":36172,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Science and Engineering","volume":"8 4","pages":"Pages 529-557"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48866916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dayong Liu , Jie Liu , Qihang Li , Nixuan Guo , Tong Chen , Qiaoran Meng
{"title":"Technology inflow following high-speed railway: Evidence from Chinese cities","authors":"Dayong Liu , Jie Liu , Qihang Li , Nixuan Guo , Tong Chen , Qiaoran Meng","doi":"10.1016/j.jmse.2023.06.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmse.2023.06.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Urban development thrives from technology inflows, which refers to the transfer of high-value technology from various cities to local recipients. The asymmetry of technical information—rooted in the tacit knowledge inherent in technology—mandates that technology transfer is heavily dependent on interactions and communication among talented individuals. This study examines the effect of China's high-speed railway (HSR) on technology inflow, with an emphasis on talent interaction in the technology transfer process. The findings suggest that HSR mitigates cross-city commuting costs and facilitates face-to-face interactions between talent, thereby fostering an increase in technology inflows to various cities. “Talent” use HSR to transfer knowledge to cities teeming with such talent resources. Concurrently, areas with robust intellectual property rights protection witness an upsurge in intercity technology transfer via HSR. This study elucidates the macro-mechanism of urban technology flow from the perspective of public transportation offering valuable insights for technology market infrastructure and services.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":36172,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Science and Engineering","volume":"8 4","pages":"Pages 570-583"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47423377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cholesky GAS models for large time-varying covariance matrices","authors":"Tingguo Zheng, Shiqin Ye","doi":"10.1016/j.jmse.2023.10.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmse.2023.10.003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36172,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Science and Engineering","volume":" 58","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138612067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Understanding how heterogeneous agents affect Principal's returns: Perspectives from short-termism and Bayesian learning","authors":"Chuan Ding , Yang Li , Zhenyu Cui","doi":"10.1016/j.jmse.2022.12.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmse.2022.12.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We consider a general framework of optimal contract design under the heterogeneity and short-termism of agents. Our research shows that the optimal contract must weigh the agent's information rent, incentive cost, and benefit to overcome the contract's adverse selection and moral hazards. Agents with higher moral levels were more likely to choose higher effort and lower manipulation. Simultaneously, the principal offers lower incentives and receives more significant payoff. We also extend our model to investigate the benefits of Bayesian learning. Furthermore, we compare the principal's returns in general and learning models and find that the learning contract can bring more profit to the principal.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":36172,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Science and Engineering","volume":"8 3","pages":"Pages 342-368"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43557322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}