{"title":"What Role for Electric Vehicles in the Decarbonization of the Car Transport Sector in Europe?","authors":"Christina Littlejohn, S. Proost","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3468018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3468018","url":null,"abstract":"The transport sector is the only sector where carbon emissions continue to grow. This has led policy makers to propose ambitious policies to reduce emissions in the car sector, in particular fuel efficiency standards, portfolio mandates for Electric Vehicles and purchase taxes or subsidies. A portfolio mandate describes a minimum quota of annual electric vehicle sales. We use a two-period model for the car manufacturing sector to compare the cost efficiency of these policies. The model has gasoline fuelled cars (GV) compete with battery electric cars (EV). Both types of cars have endogenous technological progress that is triggered by environmental policies, including tradable fuel efficiency standards, portfolio mandates, carbon taxes, purchase taxes and R&D subsidies. EVs can serve as batteries that permit grid operators to shift off peak (renewable) electricity to peak hour supply. The model is calibrated to evaluate the EU policy to reduce average carbon emissions of cars by 37,5% in 2030. We assess the cost-efficiency of three types of policy instruments evaluating production costs, fuel costs, and externalities. We find that a fuel efficiency standard targeting gasoline cars achieves emission reductions at a much lower cost than a portfolio mandate for Electric cars.","PeriodicalId":360530,"journal":{"name":"CESifo Working Paper Series","volume":"166 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133709600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Classical and Belief-Based Gift Exchange Models: Theory and Evidence","authors":"S. Dhami, Mengxing Wei, Ali al-Nowaihi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3826068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3826068","url":null,"abstract":"We derive, compare, and test the predictions of three models of gift exchange: Classical (CGE); Augmented (AGE) based on unexpected wage surprises and first order beliefs; and Belief-based (BGE) that uses second order beliefs to formally model guilt-aversion. Motivated by Akerlof (1982), we also introduce signals of exogenous industry wage norms, θw, and effort norms, θe. We study the effects on the worker’s optimal effort of exogenous variation in the wage, w, the signals θw, θe, and a signal of firm’s expectations of effort from the worker, s. All three models successfully predict gift exchange (higher effort in response to higher w). The AGE and the CGE models fail to explain the data for the worker’s effort responses to the signals θw, θe, and s. The BGE model successfully explains the data in all these respects. Gift exchange is underpinned by guilt-aversion and a formal modelling of second order conditional beliefs.","PeriodicalId":360530,"journal":{"name":"CESifo Working Paper Series","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131954459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Labor Market Hardships and Preferences for Public Sector Employment and Employers: Evidence from Russia","authors":"Olivia S. Jin, W. Pyle","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3904531","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3904531","url":null,"abstract":"A growing literature connects labor market hardships to stronger preferences for government welfare and redistribution programs. Potential preference shifts with respect to other types of state involvement in the economy, however, have gone unexplored. We draw on both longitudinal and pseudo-panel data from Russia to explore how labor market hardships relate to preferences for public sector employment and employers. In fixed effects specifications, we demonstrate that feelings of job insecurity, experiences with wage arrears, and spells of unemployment all increase the attractiveness of work in the public sector. Pseudo-panel data provide only mixed evidence as to whether such effects endure over the longer run.","PeriodicalId":360530,"journal":{"name":"CESifo Working Paper Series","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117286850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Optimal Taxation of Robots","authors":"Uwe Thuemmel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3338646","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3338646","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I study the optimal taxation of robots, other capital, and labor income. I show that it is optimal to distort robot adoption. The robot tax (or subsidy) exploits general-equilibrium effects to compress wages, which reduces income-tax distortions of labor supply, thereby raising welfare. In the calibrated model, when robots are expensive, a robot subsidy is optimal. As robots get cheaper, it becomes optimal to tax them. Yet, when reforming the status-quo tax system, most welfare gains can be achieved by adjusting the income tax. The additional gains from taxing robots differently than other equipment capital are close to zero.","PeriodicalId":360530,"journal":{"name":"CESifo Working Paper Series","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130478541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Power of Markets: Impact of Desert Locust Invasions on Child Health","authors":"Bruno Conte, Lavinia Piemontese, A. Tapsoba","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3863833","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3863833","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the consequences of the 2004 locust plague in Mali. We argue that in agricultural economies with a single harvest per year, this type of shock can affect households through two channels: first, a speculative/anticipatory effect that kicks in during the growing season, followed by a local crop failure effect after harvest. We document a substantial impact of the plague on crop price inflation before the harvest. Regarding health setbacks, children subject only to the speculative/anticipatory effect suffered as much as those exposed to the actual crop failure effect. The latter is more severe for children born in isolated areas.","PeriodicalId":360530,"journal":{"name":"CESifo Working Paper Series","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123994222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Politics from the Bench? Ideology and Strategic Voting in the U.S. Supreme Court","authors":"T. Clark, B. Montagnes, Jörg L. Spenkuch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3250082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3250082","url":null,"abstract":"Supreme Court justices often vote along ideological lines. Is this due to a genuinely different interpretation of the law, or does it reflect justices' desire to resolve politically charged legal questions in accordance with their personal views? To learn more about the nature of decision-making in the Court, we differentiate between votes that were pivotal and those that were not. When a justice's choice decides the outcome of a case, her ideology plays an even greater role in determining her vote - both relative to her choices on other cases and relative to other justices voting on the same case. We develop and empirically assess a model of voting in which judges trade off expressive and instrumental concerns. The evidence we present suggests that justices vote strategically, at least in part, to affect precedent.","PeriodicalId":360530,"journal":{"name":"CESifo Working Paper Series","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125306422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Kantians Defy the Economists’ Mantra of Uniform Pigovian Emissions Taxes","authors":"T. Eichner, R. Pethig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3748949","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3748949","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the efficient emissions taxation in economies with individuals who are morally motivated to reduce their emissions footprint. They are heterogenous with respect to their morality and their consumption preferences. We distinguish between the concepts of moral and conventional utilitarian (= material) welfare. The materially efficient tax rates turn out to be consumer-type specific; they are smaller than the Pigovian tax rate; and the smaller, the higher the individuals’ propensity to act morally. Finally, we briefly characterize the second-best uniform emissions tax.","PeriodicalId":360530,"journal":{"name":"CESifo Working Paper Series","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122658950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Profit Effects of Consumers’ Identity Management: A Dynamic Model","authors":"D. Laussel, Ngo van Long, J. Resende","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3916640","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3916640","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a nondurable good monopolist that collects data on its customers in order to profile them and subsequently practice price discrimination on returning customers. The monopolist’s price discrimination scheme is leaky in the sense that an endogenous fraction of consumers choose to incur a privacy cost to conceal their identity when they return in the following periods. We characterize the Markov perfect equilibrium of the game under two alternative customer profiling regimes: full information acquisition (FIA) and purchase history information (PHI). In both cases, we find that, contrary to what could be expected, the monopolist’s aggregate profit is not monotonically increasing in the level of the privacy cost, but a U-shaped function of it, leading to ambiguous profit effects: a reduction in privacy costs increases the fraction of customers who choose to be anonymous (detrimental profit effect), but it also softens the firm’s introductory price, reducing the pace at which prices targeted to new customers fall over time (positive profit effect). When comparing results under FIA and PHI, we find that market expansion is faster, and more customers conceal their identity under FIA than under PHI. Equilibrium profits are also higher in the FIA case. Although equilibrium profits are U-shaped functions of the privacy cost in both profiling regimes, they tend to be globally decreasing with the privacy cost under PHI and globally increasing under FIA. This paper was accepted by Eric Anderson, marketing.","PeriodicalId":360530,"journal":{"name":"CESifo Working Paper Series","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133750342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Jobs and Intimate Partner Violence - Evidence from a Field Experiment in Ethiopia","authors":"Andreas Kotsadam, Espen Villanger","doi":"10.1257/rct.2569-1.0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2569-1.0","url":null,"abstract":"We identify the effects of employment on Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) by collaborating with 27 large companies in Ethiopia to randomly assign jobs to equally qualified female applicants. The job offers increase formal employment, earnings, and earnings shares within couples in the short and medium run but we can reject relatively small effects in any direction on our main outcome, physical IPV. In the short run, job offers reduce emotional abuse and there are indications of heterogeneous effects whereby women with low bargaining power at baseline experience increased risks of abuse if offered a job.","PeriodicalId":360530,"journal":{"name":"CESifo Working Paper Series","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124460536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Gini and Optimal Income Taxation by Rank","authors":"Laurent Simula, A. Trannoy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3551808","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3551808","url":null,"abstract":"We solve the nonlinear income tax program for rank-dependent social welfare functions, expressing the trade-off between size and inequality using the Gini and related families of positional indices. Absent bunching, ranks in the actual and optimal allocations are invariant. Exploiting this feature, we provide new, simple, and intuitive tax formulas for both the quasilinear and additive cases and new comparative static results. Our approach makes insights from optimal taxation more widely accessible. In some of our simulations the actual US tax policy is close to being optimal—except at the top, where optimal rates are much higher than in actuality. (JEL D31, D63, H21, H24, K34)","PeriodicalId":360530,"journal":{"name":"CESifo Working Paper Series","volume":"26 7","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133071967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}