法官席上的政治?美国最高法院的意识形态与战略投票

T. Clark, B. Montagnes, Jörg L. Spenkuch
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引用次数: 7

摘要

最高法院的法官们经常根据意识形态进行投票。这是由于对法律的真正不同的解释,还是反映了法官们希望根据他们的个人观点解决带有政治色彩的法律问题?为了更多地了解法院决策的性质,我们区分了关键的投票和非关键的投票。当法官的选择决定案件的结果时,她的意识形态在决定她的投票时起着更大的作用——无论是相对于她对其他案件的选择,还是相对于其他法官对同一案件的投票。我们开发和经验评估的投票模型,其中法官交易表达和工具的关注。我们提出的证据表明,法官的投票至少在一定程度上是策略性地影响先例。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Politics from the Bench? Ideology and Strategic Voting in the U.S. Supreme Court
Supreme Court justices often vote along ideological lines. Is this due to a genuinely different interpretation of the law, or does it reflect justices' desire to resolve politically charged legal questions in accordance with their personal views? To learn more about the nature of decision-making in the Court, we differentiate between votes that were pivotal and those that were not. When a justice's choice decides the outcome of a case, her ideology plays an even greater role in determining her vote - both relative to her choices on other cases and relative to other justices voting on the same case. We develop and empirically assess a model of voting in which judges trade off expressive and instrumental concerns. The evidence we present suggests that justices vote strategically, at least in part, to affect precedent.
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