{"title":"The Intentionality Challenge","authors":"M. Textor","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198769828.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198769828.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter introduces and assesses Brentano’s and Marty’s arguments against Mach’s Neutral Monism. These arguments concern the intentionality of sensation and the intentionality of expectation.","PeriodicalId":359391,"journal":{"name":"The Disappearance of the Soul and the Turn against Metaphysics","volume":"668 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122968007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Act/Content/Object, Act/Object, or Just Object?","authors":"M. Textor","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198769828.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198769828.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"Thus chapter revolves around the act/content/object distinction. Russell characterized Austrian Psychology, Cambridge Realism, Idealism, and Neutral Monism with respect to their different treatments of this distinction. The Cambridge Realists like Russell and Moore argued that the distinction between act and object is given introspectively, but that there is no distinction between content and object. The Neutral Monists (American Realists) like James argued that there is no act/object distinction and that, consequently, there is no intrinsic distinction between the mental and physical. Russell changed tack by arguing for the existence of the distinction on the basis of ‘hypotheses’. He held a hybrid position: there is no act/object distinction in sensation, but the full act/content/object distinction in thought. The chapter assesses arguments in favour of the act/object distinction and against the act/content/object distinction.","PeriodicalId":359391,"journal":{"name":"The Disappearance of the Soul and the Turn against Metaphysics","volume":"109 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124776676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Brentano’s One-Term View of Judgement","authors":"M. Textor","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198769828.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198769828.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"The view that (atomic) judgements have at least ‘two terms’—predicate something of an object or objects—is a widely held one in philosophy. The chapter introduces the two-term dogma about judgement as the background for Brentano’s view of judgement. Brentano challenged the dogma and argued that an acknowledgement of an object is a judgement but has only one term. The chapter considers Brentano’s argument in favour of the one-term view and connects them to our understanding of non-epistemic perception. Brentano’s one-term view of judgement will be the philosophical contrary to the two-term views of judgement of the positivists that will figure in chapter 11.","PeriodicalId":359391,"journal":{"name":"The Disappearance of the Soul and the Turn against Metaphysics","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129600956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Drawing the Limits of Knowledge","authors":"M. Textor","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198769828.003.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198769828.003.0014","url":null,"abstract":"Metaphysicians hold that there are two kinds of real things: those that are truly real and those that are less real. The former are the grounds of the latter. Metaphysics is supposed to be knowledge of the truly real things; the reality that underlies appearances. Schlick argued (i) that metaphysics so understood needs to have a special source of knowledge distinct from the sources of knowledge on which science and common sense rely and (ii) that there is no such source of knowledge. Hence, even if there are truly real objects and facts, they are beyond the limits of knowledge. Schlick concludes that there are no differences in degrees of being: all being is on a par. The chapter gives an overview of the metaphysicians attacked by Schlick and reconstructs his argument against metaphysical knowledge that is based on the two-term view of cognition.","PeriodicalId":359391,"journal":{"name":"The Disappearance of the Soul and the Turn against Metaphysics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129275932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}