Act/Content/Object, Act/Object, or Just Object?

Abstract

Thus chapter revolves around the act/content/object distinction. Russell characterized Austrian Psychology, Cambridge Realism, Idealism, and Neutral Monism with respect to their different treatments of this distinction. The Cambridge Realists like Russell and Moore argued that the distinction between act and object is given introspectively, but that there is no distinction between content and object. The Neutral Monists (American Realists) like James argued that there is no act/object distinction and that, consequently, there is no intrinsic distinction between the mental and physical. Russell changed tack by arguing for the existence of the distinction on the basis of ‘hypotheses’. He held a hybrid position: there is no act/object distinction in sensation, but the full act/content/object distinction in thought. The chapter assesses arguments in favour of the act/object distinction and against the act/content/object distinction.