Managerial Accounting eJournal最新文献_第10页

Market Share Growth and Stock Returns 市场份额增长和股票回报

Managerial Accounting eJournal Pub Date : 2018-11-01 DOI: 10.1111/acfi.12300

Jaideep Chowdhury, Gokhan Sonaer, Umut Celiker

引用次数: 3

Investor Sentiment and the Risk–Return Tradeoff in the Brazilian Market 巴西市场的投资者情绪与风险回报权衡

Managerial Accounting eJournal Pub Date : 2018-11-01 DOI: 10.1111/acfi.12342

Pedro Piccoli, Newton Carneiro Affonso da Costa Jr, W. V. da Silva, June A. W. Cruz

引用次数: 15

The Effect of Relative Performance Information on Knowledge Sharing among Employees 相对绩效信息对员工知识共享的影响

Managerial Accounting eJournal Pub Date : 2018-10-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3275320

Christian Schnieder, Friedrich Sommer, Arnt Wöhrmann

引用次数: 1

Comparing Incentive Contract Desirability within an Integrated Risk Setting 综合风险环境下激励契约可取性比较

Managerial Accounting eJournal Pub Date : 2018-08-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3233897

Stephanie F. Cheng, Michael Majerczyk, James C. Wilhelm

{"title":"Comparing Incentive Contract Desirability within an Integrated Risk Setting","authors":"Stephanie F. Cheng, Michael Majerczyk, James C. Wilhelm","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3233897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3233897","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, we experimentally investigate how performance risk and relational risk affect a principal’s willingness to offer gift, bonus, or penalty contracts and the subsequent motivational effect that these three contracts have on agents. Prior literature has not directly compared performance-contingent contracts to gift contracts, and extrapolation from existing empirical data is difficult because the literature has typically examined each in settings focused only on the mechanism through which each contract acts (i.e., interactive settings for gift exchange and settings with stochastic production and unobservable effort for performance-contingent contracts). We combine features of both settings and construct a willingness-to-pay (WTP) measure indicative of the principal’s propensity to offer a contract. Comparing the WTPs for the contracts, we find that gift exchange contracts are less attractive to principals than performance-contingent contracts. More importantly, we demonstrate that performance-contingent contracts evoke reciprocity concerns, suggesting that they function as both incentive compatible instruments, consistent with agency theory, and as behavioral instruments, consistent with models of gift exchange.","PeriodicalId":357263,"journal":{"name":"Managerial Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133193345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

When Should We Reward Creativity: A New Perspective on Creativity Types 我们何时应该奖励创造力:关于创造力类型的新视角

Managerial Accounting eJournal Pub Date : 2018-08-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3233126

Shanming Liu, A. Ditillo, Alexandra G. H. L. Van den Abbeele

{"title":"When Should We Reward Creativity: A New Perspective on Creativity Types","authors":"Shanming Liu, A. Ditillo, Alexandra G. H. L. Van den Abbeele","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3233126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3233126","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the effects of different types of reward on the performances of two types of creativity. We challenge the assumption that creativity is a unitary concept that cannot be differentiated. Specifically, we distinguish creativity into expected creativity (for open, self-discovered problems) and responsive creativity (for closed, presented problems) (Unsworth, 2001). We examine whether monetary reward (present or absent) has different effects on creativity performance when the creativity task is responsive creativity compared to when the creativity task is expected creativity. We predict and find that the presence of monetary reward positively affects creativity performance when it is responsive creativity, but negatively affects creativity performance when it is expected creativity. Additionally, we find that compared to monetary reward, social-recognition reward leads to higher performance in expected creativity task but not in responsive creativity task. These results document that, when stimulating different types of creativity performance, it is important for managers to know not only whether to use reward or not, but also how the reward should be provided.","PeriodicalId":357263,"journal":{"name":"Managerial Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127050549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Implications of Prospect Theory for the Stickiness of Costs 前景理论对成本粘性的启示

Managerial Accounting eJournal Pub Date : 2018-08-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3230688

A. Klein, Thomas Lindner, Markus Wabnegg

{"title":"Implications of Prospect Theory for the Stickiness of Costs","authors":"A. Klein, Thomas Lindner, Markus Wabnegg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3230688","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3230688","url":null,"abstract":"Accounting literature on cost stickiness documents an asymmetric behavior of costs, meaning that costs rise more in response to sales increases than they drop for sales decreases. This asymmetric behavior of costs is ascribed to managerial decisions on resource commitment. In this study, we apply prospect theory to further explore this asymmetry. More specifically, we build on core components of prospect theory to examine how cost stickiness may be affected by risk preferences in managerial decision-making when firms face declining (increasing) activity. In particular, we hypothesize how risk taking (aversion) in the domain of losses (gains) as well as industry performance as a reference point for firm performance act as determinants of managerial decision-making on resource commitment decisions. To test these hypotheses, we use secondary unbalanced panel data on 3,558 companies across nine industry sectors from 26 countries around the world over the period of six years (2008-2013). By introducing a behavioral perspective rooted in prospect theory, we contribute to existing cost stickiness literature in considering the role of risk preferences in different domains (losses and gains) as well as the aspect of industry performance as a reference point for managerial decisions on resource commitment.","PeriodicalId":357263,"journal":{"name":"Managerial Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115466532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Virtual Issue on Empirical Management Accounting Research 实证管理会计研究中的虚拟问题

Managerial Accounting eJournal Pub Date : 2018-08-01 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12222

M. Abernethy, D. Campbell

引用次数: 2

When Boards Use Related Parties: Outsourcing and Superannuation Fund Performance 当董事会使用关联方:外包与退休基金绩效

Managerial Accounting eJournal Pub Date : 2018-06-21 DOI: 10.1111/acfi.12379

K. Liu, E. Ooi

引用次数: 5

Determinants and Consequences of Chief Information Officer Equity Incentives 首席信息官股权激励的决定因素和后果

Managerial Accounting eJournal Pub Date : 2018-06-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3192082

V. Richardson, J. M. Sánchez, Pankaj Setia, Rodney E. Smith

{"title":"Determinants and Consequences of Chief Information Officer Equity Incentives","authors":"V. Richardson, J. M. Sánchez, Pankaj Setia, Rodney E. Smith","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3192082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3192082","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The chief information officer (CIO) is responsible for bridging the gap between two critical domains—technology and business, making the CIO's job uniquely different from other executives. As digital technologies become increasingly important to firms' competitive success, boards of directors and senior executives seek to align the CIO role with overall firm's objectives. Agency theory suggests that one way to create the alignment between an executive's efforts and firm performance is to implement appropriate equity compensation incentives (i.e., those resulting from stock and stock options) tying the executive's wealth to firm value. To date, research does not address what factors a firm should consider when designing CIO incentives and how these incentives influence firm performance. To address this major gap, we examine both the antecedents and performance consequences of CIO equity incentives. We assess organizational, environmental, and individual factors that influence CIO equity incentives and find that environmental and organizational factors are more important than individual CIO characteristics in the determination of CIO equity incentives. We also find that firms that create higher CIO equity incentives realize greater subsequent accounting and market performance. Our research contributes to the IT personnel literature by showing how firms can use compensation policies to leverage the CIO role to enhance overall business performance.","PeriodicalId":357263,"journal":{"name":"Managerial Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121536791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 9

Does the Accruals Quality Premium Arise from Information Risk? 应计质量溢价是否来源于信息风险?

Managerial Accounting eJournal Pub Date : 2018-06-01 DOI: 10.1111/acfi.12224

Lijuan Zhang, Mark Wilson

引用次数: 0