{"title":"Complying with the First Law of Robotics: An Analysis of the Occupational Risks Associated with Work Directed by an Algorithm/Artificial Intelligence","authors":"Adrián Todolí-Signes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3522406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3522406","url":null,"abstract":"Spanish Abstract: Cada vez es mas frecuente la utilizacion por parte de la empresa de mecanismos de inteligencia artificial, mas o menos avanzados, para gestionar el trabajo: establecer turnos de trabajo, tiempos en la produccion, designar y disenar tareas para los trabajadores, contratar, evaluar el desempeno y despedir. Las empresas confian en que la tecnologia recoja toda la informacion disponible, la procese y tome las mejores decisiones de gestion –optimizacion productiva- en beneficio de la misma. Con ello, se sustituye a los supervisores y mandos intermedios humanos, asi como a los expertos de recursos humanos dejando la direccion de los trabajadores en manos de procesos automatizados manejados por algoritmos –o en su estado mas avanzado, en la inteligencia artificial-. \u0000 \u0000En este trabajo, se exponen los peligros para la salud que nueva forma de gestion tecnologica puede provocar. En efecto, la monitorizacion constante a traves de sensores, la intensificacion del trabajo derivada de las decisiones tomadas por una maquina sin empatia ni conocimiento sobre los limites humanos, la reduccion de autonomia del trabajador sometido a las decisiones tomadas por la inteligencia artificial, las discriminaciones bajo un manto de neutralidad algoritmica de esas decisiones, asi como los posibles errores de funcionamiento, pueden acabar provocando serios problemas de salud fisica y psicologica para los trabajadores. \u0000 \u0000Estos riesgos pueden reducirse si se tienen en cuenta en la programacion. En este trabajo, se defiende la necesidad de una correcta programacion del algoritmo para que valore los riesgos laborales expuestos. Es decir, de la misma forma que un supervisor debe tener formacion en prevencion de riesgos para poder realizar su trabajo, el algoritmo debera ser programado para que sopese los riesgos laborales en el trabajo –y en caso de no contar con esta programacion debera impedirse su utilizacion para dirigir trabajadores. Concretamente, el algoritmo debera ser trasparente, adaptado a las capacidades reales del trabajador, debera dejar algun margen de autonomia al trabajador y respetar su privacidad. En definitiva, el algoritmo debera valorar cualquier elemento que suponga un riesgo para la seguridad y salud de los trabajadores. Para ello, se defiende que la preceptiva evaluacion de riesgos, realizada por los tecnicos, sea volcada en la programacion del algoritmo para que este la respete en la toma de decisiones en la direccion del trabajo. \u0000 \u0000English Abstract: The use of Artificial Intelligence mechanisms, more or less advanced, to manage the work is more and more frequent: to establish work shifts, production times, designate and design tasks for workers, hire, evaluate the performance and fire. Companies trust that technology collects all available information, processes it and makes the best management decisions - productive optimization - for the benefit of it. With this, the supervisors and middle managers are replaced, as well as the hum","PeriodicalId":357008,"journal":{"name":"Employment Law eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131240748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Implications of CJEU Jurisprudence on the Delimitation of Working Time by Rest Time in the Collaborative Economy","authors":"R. Anghel","doi":"10.31235/osf.io/pj63e","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/pj63e","url":null,"abstract":"The specificity of the collaborative economy has raised a number of issues with regard to the qualification of legal relationships between workers, final beneficiaries and the online platform that mediates the provision of work, respectively whether between the platform and the worker there is an employment relationship or there is a commercial relationship between the platform, self-employees and consumers. In particular, the question arises whether, in the case of these workers, the working time regulations apply and, if so, how they can be applied in concrete manner. The article contains an analysis on how some principles derived from the CJEU case law can be used to determine whether and under what conditions workers in the collaborative economy can benefit from protection by limiting working time and how can work time be delimited by rest time in their case, given the specificity of their work condition, in order to ensure an effective protection.","PeriodicalId":357008,"journal":{"name":"Employment Law eJournal","volume":"89 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121213490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Antitrust Challenge to Covenants Not to Compete in Employment Contracts","authors":"E. Posner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3453433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3453433","url":null,"abstract":"Employee covenants not to compete bar workers who leave their jobs from working for a competing employer for a period of time. The common law regards noncompetes as restraints of trade and imposes a “reasonableness” standard on them; they can also be challenged under the antitrust laws. But new research suggests firms frequently abuse noncompetes, causing significant harm to workers and to the economy. The existing legal approach is inadequate because the common law offers minimal sanctions and antitrust law imposes excessive burdens of proof on plaintiffs. While antitrust law is the appropriate vehicle for challenging noncompetes because of its focus on market effects, it needs to be strengthened.","PeriodicalId":357008,"journal":{"name":"Employment Law eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128851155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Argument for Restricting the Blue Pencil Doctrine","authors":"G. T. Pivateau","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3576169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3576169","url":null,"abstract":"The blue pencil doctrine gives courts the authority to either (1) strike unreasonable clauses from a noncompete agreement, leaving the rest to be enforced, or (2) actually modify the agreement to reflect the terms that the parties could have--and probably should have--agreed to. <br><br>In recent years, a number of courts refused to blue pencil noncompetition agreements. In response, some state legislatures responded by passing laws requiring courts to modify unreasonable noncompetition agreements. Legislation mandating the use of the blue pencil, even if well-intentioned, encourages employer overreach. This overreach harms employers, employees, and society as a whole.","PeriodicalId":357008,"journal":{"name":"Employment Law eJournal","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116171085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reassessing the Regulation of High-Risk Medical Device Cases","authors":"R. Rabin, A. Picard","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3383687","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3383687","url":null,"abstract":"In 1976, Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments (MDA), plugging a gap between regulation of prescription drugs, which were subjected to a premarket protocol aimed at assuring safety and efficacy, and medical devices, which were solely monitored for adulteration and misbranding after distribution in the marketplace. \u0000 \u0000Class III devices “usually sustain or support life, are implanted, or present potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury;” they represent the remaining 10% of medical devices and include devices like pacemakers, breast implants, and intrauterine devices. Only Class III devices are required to go through the premarket approval process (PMA)—a process that requires clinical data. In a leading case on the preemption of tort claims, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008), the U.S. Supreme Court had occasion to review the rigor of PMA premarketing oversight and concluded that it was indeed notable for its scrupulousness. On average, the Court noted, the FDA spent 1,200 hours reviewing an application, which included reports of every study and investigation of the device, a description of component parts, samples of products, a specimen of the proposed labeling, and descriptions of the production, manufacturing, packaging, and installation methods. As part of the PMA process, the FDA had discretion to bring in a panel of outside experts and could request more information or data from the manufacturer. \u0000 \u0000Viewing the process through this lens, the Court preempted the plaintiff’s tort claim, which was based on failure to adequately warn of the risk that defendant manufacturer’s balloon catheter would rupture during angioplasty surgery—a risk that came to fruition. According to the Court, Section 360k of the MDA—an express preemption clause barring “any requirement…which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement…[under the Act] which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device….”—was applicable to the claim. \u0000 \u0000A sharp line was drawn between the PMA process in Riegel and FDA’s 510(k) substantial equivalence review, which only subjects a device to a limited form of review to determine whether it is “substantially equivalent” to a preexisting legally marketed device. Twelve years earlier, in Medtronic, Inc., v. Lohr, 552 U.S. 312 (2008), the Supreme Court found substantial equivalence review insufficiently rigorous to preempt tort claims. Taken together, the two decisions seemed to mark out a persuasive boundary between tort claims that would, if allowed, impermissibly re-tread the same ground covered by the agency (via the PMA process), and claims premised on a risk/utility tort process complementary to the once-over-lightly of “substantial equivalence” review. \u0000 \u0000In this Article, Part I probes more deeply into the case for recognizing a safe harbor from tort claims under the existing regime of FDA premarket assessment of high-risk devices. Part II addresses post-market FDA strategies for assessment o","PeriodicalId":357008,"journal":{"name":"Employment Law eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121931368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
E. Tucker, L. Vosko, Rebecca Casey, Mark P. Thomas, J. Grundy, A. Noack
{"title":"Carrying Little Sticks: Is There a ‘Deterrence Gap’ in Employment Standards Enforcement in Ontario, Canada?","authors":"E. Tucker, L. Vosko, Rebecca Casey, Mark P. Thomas, J. Grundy, A. Noack","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3165580","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3165580","url":null,"abstract":"This article assesses whether a deterrence gap exists in the enforcement of the Ontario Employment Standards Act (ESA), which sets minimum conditions of employment in areas such as minimum wage, overtime pay and leaves. Drawing on a unique administrative data set, the article measures the use of deterrence in Ontario’s ESA enforcement regime against the role of deterrence within two influential models of enforcement: responsive regulation and strategic enforcement. The article finds that the use of deterrence is below its prescribed role in either model of enforcement. We conclude that there is a deterrence gap in Ontario.","PeriodicalId":357008,"journal":{"name":"Employment Law eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123612203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Party Autonomy and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality","authors":"J. Coyle","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3319849","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3319849","url":null,"abstract":"What happens when contracting parties attempt to use a choice-of-law clause to bring about the extraterritorial application of statutes that would ordinarily be subject to the presumption against extraterritoriality? Should the choice-of-law clause trump the presumption? Or should the presumption take precedence over the clause? \u0000 \u0000This symposium Essay aspires to answer these questions. It begins by surveying the ability of parties under existing doctrine to utilize choice-of-law clauses to bring about the extraterritorial application of state statutes. Next, it lays out a framework for thinking through the relationship between the presumption and the principle of party autonomy. It then utilizes this framework to determine how courts should resolve conflicts between the two doctrines in the context of state statutes that are silent or ambiguous as to their geographic scope. The Essay concludes by discussing the implications of this analysis for state common law and for federal statutes.","PeriodicalId":357008,"journal":{"name":"Employment Law eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126598594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Coase and the Platform Economy","authors":"Orly Lobel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3083764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3083764","url":null,"abstract":"This Chapter analyzes the ways in which digital platforms such as Uber and Airbnb are perfecting the deal and lowering transaction costs. The chapter argues that the three stages of pre-deal, deal-making, and post-deal, 1) search costs; 2) bargaining and decision costs; and 3) policing and enforcement costs, may benefit from the digital platform. Each stage depends on enhanced information and optimal matching to reduce costs. The chapter suggests that the platform – based on digital large scale multi-sided networks and sophisticated algorithmic pricing – impacts the relevant transaction costs at all three stages. It then argues that regulators must consider the opportunities that come from the platform delivery as well as the possibility that certain traditional regulations become redundant by platform innovations.","PeriodicalId":357008,"journal":{"name":"Employment Law eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129370615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"#ME_TOO in India Is Just a Tip of an Iceberg and It Has Shaken the Patriarchy to Its Core","authors":"Shalu Nigam","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3271508","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3271508","url":null,"abstract":"India is witnessing the crucial change where a few women courageously came out with their experience of sexual harassment they have faced at their work place and shared with the hashtag #MeToo on the social media. Though, their number is small, yet the movement is reaching and spreading out. Still, what is being shared is just the tip of iceberg. There are many hidden untold stories of violence that women in male-dominated societies face day in day out. Yet, these few narratives which came out from the hidden corners have shaken the patriarchy to its core. <br><br>The response of male dominated state as well as society reveals that the power dynamics continue to operate while the politics of victim blaming and under-positioning women survivors of violence remain, yet, one of the fall out of the MeToo movement is that the women’s concerns are making space in the prevailing autocratic, authoritarian and tyrannical environment. This movement is crucial because of its timing. This is a period when the fundamentalist state and the fascist majoritarian society, both are acting to further oppress women. Crime against women is on increase and the politics behind rapes that took place in Kathua, Unnao, Mandsaur and other places are reversing the gains made in the field of gender equality or empowerment. The conflict between the progressive and liberal ideas with that of regressive patriarchal values is making adverse impact on the rights of women. This is evident in the matter relating to women’s entry into the Sabrimala temple where despite of the Supreme Court verdict to allow the females of any age to enter the place of worship, protestors including priests are not allowing women to go inside the temple. The state seemingly is surrendering before the powerful patriarchal forces. <br><br>Whether the Sabrimala temple entry issue or the concerns relating to MeToo movement, the bureaucratic as well as the legal system is failing to provide space to women to assert their rights or to fight against the patriarchal forces. In the current regressive environment it is significant that women’s agency and choices find space and the movement such as MeToo facilitate such informal support system and provide a platform where women’s voices could be raised. It is different from the top-down campaigns initiated by the State and aims to change men’s behaviour rather than expecting women to learn to deal with violence committed by men. Such movements have potential to change the notion of sex, power and consent in a male-dominated society. MeToo is about women making space in a toxic male-dominated work environment. The need is to expand and strengthen this movement further.","PeriodicalId":357008,"journal":{"name":"Employment Law eJournal","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114416062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Common Law Constitution at Work: R (on the Application of UNISON) v Lord Chancellor","authors":"Alan L. Bogg","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12343","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12343","url":null,"abstract":"This note considers the radical significance of Supreme Court's judgment in R (on the Application of UNISON) v Lord Chancellor (UNISON) on the unlawfulness of tribunal fees. It argues that the decision marks the coming of age of the ‘common law constitution at work’. The radical potential of UNISON lies in its generation of horizontal legal effects in disputes between private parties. Recent litigation on employment status in the ‘gig economy’ is analysed through the lens of UNISON and common law fundamental rights. The note identifies the various ways in which the common law tests of employment status might be ‘constitutionalised’ in the light of UNISON.","PeriodicalId":357008,"journal":{"name":"Employment Law eJournal","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114799657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}