Stefano Cló, C. D. Del Bo, Matteo Ferraris, C. Fiorio, M. Florio, D. Vandone
{"title":"Publicization versus Privatization: Recent Worldwide Evidence","authors":"Stefano Cló, C. D. Del Bo, Matteo Ferraris, C. Fiorio, M. Florio, D. Vandone","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2589180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2589180","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes deals involving private and State-owned enterprises (SOEs) worldwide since 2004. We consider four types of deals: privatizations, publicizations, private reorganizations (i.e private firms acquiring a private target) and public reorganizations. (i.e. both acquirers and targets are SOEs). We study whether the pre-deal performance and corporate characteristics of the acquirer and target companies vary across the four types of deals depending on ownership: public or private. Data are taken from Zephyr, which provides information on completed deals worldwide and Orbis, a firm-level dataset. The empirical analysis suggests the following. Some results of previous literature on M&As performed by private firms (‘the inefficiency management hypothesis’) are both confirmed and expanded. Acquirers involved in deals are both larger and better performing than their targets but some qualifications are in order with respect to ownership. The difference in size and performance between acquirers and targets is in fact more pronounced for public with respect to private acquirers. The evidence thus points to an active role of SOEs as acquires, as they significantly out-perform relative to their targets, including private ones, in terms of return on sales. Given these novel findings, further research is needed to examine the motivations behind the different types of deals considered and to verify the role of ownership.","PeriodicalId":354906,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Comparative eJournal","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122247683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Global Financial Crisis, the Pervasive Resilience of Shareholder Value, and the Unfulfilled Promises of Anglo-American Corporate Law","authors":"Vincenzo Bavoso","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2360265","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2360265","url":null,"abstract":"The paper provides a review of the theoretical, normative and judicial base of the shareholder value paradigm in order to assess its ultimate justification both in the UK and the US. It further critically reflects on the extent to which shareholder value has shaped the direction of corporate strategies in a mono-dimensional way beyond having failed to provide sound mechanisms of control in large public firms.","PeriodicalId":354906,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Comparative eJournal","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132982787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cash Holding Levels and Partial Adjustments - Evidence from Three Asian Countries","authors":"Sung Hee Lew, Suk-Pil Lim","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2359103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2359103","url":null,"abstract":"Three issues are addressed in this paper; What are the important cash holding determinants? Do firms adjust cash levels toward their optimal ones? Do holding more cash contribute to stock return? The data covers between 1998 and 2008 for firms from Korea, Taiwan and Japan. We find that earning volatility, profits and asset tangibility are identified as the most important determinants for cash holding; and firms adjust cash levels toward their optimal ones. Our finding also indicate that high profit increases cash holding level. These three findings indicates that firms' cash holding behaviors can be explained by both the trade-off and pecking order theories. The relationship between cash holding and stock market return is not the same across the countries. We also observe substantial differences between countries in important cash holding level determinants and adjustment speed and patterns.","PeriodicalId":354906,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Comparative eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130512646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"State Ownership and Corporate Governance in China: An Executive Career Approach","authors":"Li-wen Lin","doi":"10.7916/CBLR.V2013I3.2873","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/CBLR.V2013I3.2873","url":null,"abstract":"China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) now comprise over 60 percent of the largest 500 companies in China and more than 10 percent of Fortune Global 500 companies in the world. Despite their importance to China’s domestic economy and foreign investment strategy, many governance characteristics of the SOEs remain a black box, one of which is the SOEs’ executive composition and recruitment development. This Article shifts away from the typical focus on how the things function (e.g. ownership structure and board of directors) to who the people in charge are, which is an important approach to understanding corporate governance and economic development in countries with weak legal institutions. It investigates the legal guidelines of SOE executive recruitment and the evolution of educational, political and career attributes of the CEOs of China’s large SOEs over the past decade. This Article utilizes legal, historical, sociological, and comparative methods to explain the change and stability of the executive composition in China’s large SOEs. The executive recruitment shows an orientation toward politically-bounded and firm-specific professionalism as well as some faint potential of bottom-up and competition-driven marketization. The recruitment guidelines and empirical findings in this Article raise questions about the adequacy and capacity of existing international laws and enforcement in coping with the rise of Chinese SOEs, the challenges to improving Chinese corporate governance, and the underlying forces that form apparent similarities in elite composition across countries.","PeriodicalId":354906,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Comparative eJournal","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126419319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Financial and Non-Financial Value Drivers in Shareholder Value Creation Process","authors":"K. Śledzik","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2257767","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2257767","url":null,"abstract":"The principal problems associated with the concept of strategic corporate management is to identify the financial and non-financial value drivers. In Value Based Management theory the main focus was on financial value drivers but today there is a serious necessity of intangible resources (intellectual capital) valuation and identification. Most studies concerning the measurement of intangible resources relates to companies in such industries as biotechnology, aerospace, computer software, cosmetics, healthcare, In-ternet, media, advertising, pharmaceuticals and computer industry. The main goal of this paper is to propose value drivers (ratios) that can be used in shareholder value creation process in corporation.","PeriodicalId":354906,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Comparative eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116119211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Outside Directors and Stock Return Volatility: The Foreign Investor Connection","authors":"S. Jordan, Ji‐Hwan Lee, Elisabeth A. Bui","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2180360","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2180360","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we note that unrelated research in the management and finance fields, if combined, makes predictions concerning board reforms in emerging countries. Specifically, outside directors’ demographic characteristics that are salient to foreign investors should reduce stock price volatility in the local market. We investigate a sample of large public Korean firms in 2000-2003, a watershed period when Korean firms were forced to introduce a significant number of outside directors and allow a substantially larger amount of foreign ownership in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Our empirical results show that the proportion of outside directors with advanced foreign degrees stabilizes stock price volatility. Given the possibility of bilateral interplay between board characteristics and foreign ownership, this study employs a variety of econometric models, including feedback, to test the robustness of our empirical results.","PeriodicalId":354906,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Comparative eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130547958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Competition and Corporate Governance","authors":"Sharmendra Chaudhry","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2006330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2006330","url":null,"abstract":"Different countries are having different corporate governance systems. For instance, in U.K. and U.S., it is understood that the threat of takeover of the company is a factor which ensures that the managers have to act in the promotion of the interests of the shareholders. In the countries like Germany, France and Japan, it is understood that the financial institutions like banks act as monitors for the corporate governance. But neither of the systems is fool-proof. At the same time, it may be argued that the competition among the corporations can act as the most efficient mechanism for ensuring the corporate governance. It affects the productivity of a firm in a positive manner. Stiff competition in the product market ensures that the management does not avoid its responsibilities; even if its internal monitoring is weak. Competition ensures that the management lethargy is less and less. It can definitely be claimed that competition provides a benchmark for measuring the performance of a company from inside, i.e. the management. The managers are forced to rely on high performance; otherwise they may end up in bankruptcy or closer. Competition induces the managers to put greater efforts for the purpose of costs reduction so as to avoid any possibility of being bankrupt. The aim of this paper is to show as to how the interaction of product market competition with corporate governance variables affects the performance of a corporation. The aim is show that how the competition in the product market can act as an externality to the corporate governance, and act as a check on the exercise Manager's discretionary power. There is no doubt that there is a perfect linkage between the internal governance mechanism and the performance of a corporation. But it has to be remembered at the same time that the external governance mechanisms including competition, as also of vital importance, though there has been a very little attention given to the interaction between internal and external governance mechanism in emerging market economies. Here the paper hastried to show the independent and interaction effect of ownership and competition variable on firm level productivity. This paper is advancing a study of the linkage between the product market competition and the corporate governance and the resulting effect on productivity and efficiency level of the corporation in the light of an emerging market economy.","PeriodicalId":354906,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Comparative eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128806483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Corporate Governance Convergence","authors":"P. Rampling","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1969274","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1969274","url":null,"abstract":"Purpose – This paper develops a discussion looking at the correlation between corporate governance convergence, that how similar is corporate governance between the said countries. Design/methodology/approach – This study entails Australia, The United States of America, The United Kingdom France, Germany and Italy.The data collected is from public listed corporations from 2000 – 2006 for the development of multivariate regression models for parametric data.These developed models are constructed to test relationships between dependant and independent variables in line with research questions and hypotheses.Findings – The findings found that there is a general correlation of compliance/convergence between common law and codified law countries.Originality/value – The paper will be of vital importance to other academics looking at this question, and to both public and private sector entities.Paper type – Research Paper","PeriodicalId":354906,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Comparative eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127704025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Emerging Country Cross-Border Acquisitions: Characteristics, Acquirer Returns and Cross-Sectional Determinants","authors":"Sanjai Bhagat, Shavin Malhotra, Peng Cheng Zhu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1813202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1813202","url":null,"abstract":"What are the important characteristics of cross-border acquisitions (CBAs) by firms from emerging countries and do these acquisitions create market value for the acquirers? Using a unique and a manually collected dataset, we identify 698 CBAs made by emerging country firms during the period January 1991 through December 2008. Targets tend to be small (by U.S. transaction value measures) -- the median ranging between $10Â million and $40Â million (in 2008 dollars). However, from 2000 to 2008, 24 acquisitions were worth more than a billion dollars each. Emerging country acquirers experience a positive and a significant market response of 1.09% on the announcement day. Additionally, in the cross-section, acquirer returns are positively correlated with (better) corporate governance measures in the target country. The positive announcement return and the cross-sectional relation between these returns and governance measures are consistent with Martynova and Renneboog's (2008) and Khanna and Palepu's (2004) bootstrapping hypothesis: the acquirer voluntarily bootstraps itself to the higher governance standards of the target -- resulting in a positive valuation impact for the acquirer.","PeriodicalId":354906,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Comparative eJournal","volume":"120 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124514084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}