2021 IEEE 34th International System-on-Chip Conference (SOCC)最新文献

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LC-Physical Unclonable Function in Wireless 3D IC for Securing Internet of Things Devices 物联网设备安全无线3D集成电路中的lc -物理不可克隆功能

2021 IEEE 34th International System-on-Chip Conference (SOCC) Pub Date : 2021-09-14 DOI: 10.1109/SOCC52499.2021.9739553

Jaya Dofe, Wafi Danesh

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