{"title":"Partial Ownership, Control, and Investment in Vertical Relationships","authors":"Nadav Levy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3475158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3475158","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines whether partial ownership of a trading partner can alleviate hold‐up problems and promote relationship‐specific investments. Unlike a silent financial interest, which does not give the owner control over the partner and promotes both parties' investments, partial control over the partner could reduce the partner's investment and lead the owner to overinvest, thereby decreasing the joint surplus. The inability of the owner to restrain himself from abusing his control limits the effectiveness of partial ownership. An analysis of the control environment should be part of the empirical analysis of partial ownership and the assessment of its potential benefits by competition authorities.","PeriodicalId":352857,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Other Investment Decision-Making (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130873422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Financial Advisors Exploit Responsible Investment Preferences?","authors":"Marten Laudi, Paul Smeets, U. Weitzel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3887716","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3887716","url":null,"abstract":"An unprecedented number of investors are giving their financial advisors a mandate for socially responsible investing (SRI). Yet, the impact of SRI mandates on consumers is unclear. In a pre-registered lab-in-the-field experiment with 345 professional advisors, we find that advisors charge a premium to SRI clients that cannot be justified by higher effort, skill, or costs. This suggests that advisors exploit the SRI preferences of their clients (who accept these higher fees). In an independent survey, financial regulators predict higher SRI fees but do not predict exploitation. Regulators confirm that our findings are externally valid and require attention from policymakers.","PeriodicalId":352857,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Other Investment Decision-Making (Sub-Topic)","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114682284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jochen Papenbrock, Peter Schwendner, Philipp G. Sandner
{"title":"Can Adaptive Seriational Risk Parity Tame Crypto Portfolios?","authors":"Jochen Papenbrock, Peter Schwendner, Philipp G. Sandner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3877143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3877143","url":null,"abstract":"As cryptocoins are not tied to fundamental values or to investor protection regulation, their price dynamics is unhinged in both directions. In institutional asset management of conventional asset classes, target volatility concepts and dynamic allocation heuristics are popular to improve the robustness of portfolios. Can similar techniques also be used to construct delevered and diversified portfolios of crypto assets? A robust candidate approach for allocation is Hierarchical Risk Parity (HRP), as it incorporates a filtered correlation structure and is less sensitive to noise than quadratic optimization, as shown in several studies. Recent publications have extended the concept of HRP in several directions. We compare some of these extensions to determine which variant is most useful for constructing crypto baskets. We find that a particular type of adaptive HRP strategy outperforms other extensions on a risk-adjusted basis, leading us to a deeper investigation of the changing nature of correlation structures between cryptos - both quantitatively and visually. We find that structural breaks in crypto correlations are prevalent and that the best-fitting hierarchical cluster representations change over time, which is only captured by distance matrix-based adaptive HRP approaches.","PeriodicalId":352857,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Other Investment Decision-Making (Sub-Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116854242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Informational Frictions in Intermediated Credit Markets","authors":"M. Sockin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3892644","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3892644","url":null,"abstract":"In the presence of informational frictions, bond markets aggregate the private information of firms and intermediaries, and bond prices serve as signals about the financial sector and the real economy. Such frictions amplify the credit constraints faced by intermediaries, depressing firm investment, leverage, and asset valuations and raising credit spreads. These observations are consistent with evidence on the introduction of TRACE and help explain the under-leverage and credit spread puzzles, the excess bond premium, intermediary asset pricing in bond markets, and bond market dysfunction during the last financial crisis. Informational frictions can improve welfare, suggesting limits to promoting market transparency.","PeriodicalId":352857,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Other Investment Decision-Making (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129309729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Cost of Capital – A Back Up for Learners","authors":"S. Senthilnathan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3855165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3855165","url":null,"abstract":"For investing in profitable ventures, the firms intend to recover the investment made in them. Thus, the determination of the respective cost of capital of a venture can provide a base for making decisions on whether to accept the project profitably. In this context, this paper provides some basic explanations to facilitate the learners of the cost of capital with appropriate exhibits for their easy understanding. This paper primarily attempts to explain and illustrate how the determination of the cost of capital for the investment of equity and debt capitals can be made. Relatively, the use of dividend–price and earnings–price measures, Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC), Weighted Marginal Cost of Capital (WMCC), and breaking points of financing sources are also explained meaningfully. Further, in determining the optimum capital budget considering various projects, the use of the investment opportunity curve (IOC) and WMCC is also explained and illustrated. Finally, some of the major problems in determining the cost of capital are presented in brief.","PeriodicalId":352857,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Other Investment Decision-Making (Sub-Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127654214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Competitive is the Stock Market? Theory, Evidence from Portfolios, and Implications for the Rise of Passive Investing","authors":"Valentin Haddad, Paul Huebner, Erik Loualiche","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3821263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3821263","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a framework to theoretically and empirically analyze investor competition on financial markets. The classic view assumes that markets are very competitive: if a group of investors changes its behavior, other investors react such that nothing happens in equilibrium. Our framework quantifies the strength of the competitive response. We estimate a demand system of institutional investors in the US stock market accounting for two layers of equilibrium: how investors compete with each other in setting their strategies and how prices adjust to clear asset markets. We find that investors react to the behavior of others in the market: when an investor is surrounded by less aggressive traders she trades more aggressively. This reaction reduces the equilibrium consequences of changes in individual behavior by 50%. However, it also implies that the stock market is far from the competitive ideal. A consequence of this result is that the large increase in passive investing over the last 20 years has led to substantially more inelastic aggregate demand curves for individual stocks, by 15%.","PeriodicalId":352857,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Other Investment Decision-Making (Sub-Topic)","volume":"99 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134220359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Investors’ Judgment and Decisions after a Cybersecurity Breach: Understanding the Value Relevance of Cybersecurity Risk Management Assurance","authors":"Patricia Navarro, S. Sutton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3817763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3817763","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates how voluntary cybersecurity risk management (CyRM) assurance affects non-professional investors’ judgments and decisions. The study also examines how the value relevance of CyRM assurance is altered when having such assurance is expected/unexpected. Employing an experimental approach, we find that after a cyber-breach occurs, companies previously engaging in voluntary CyRM assurance receive more favorable investor assessments of management credibility and, in turn, higher stock valuations. We also find that investors’ assessments of management credibility and stock valuations are more extreme for companies that engage (do not engage) in CyRM assurance in industries where such assurance is not (is) the norm. This study begins to address the question of whether there is a demand for CyRM assurance offered by audit firms, particularly given lingering concerns in research and practice as to the viability of IT-related assurance services. Our research reinforces the profession’s position that management and boards need to recognize that cyber risk will differ by industry and that investors will react to violations of implicit industry standards for cyber risk management. The results also demonstrate the value to management credibility of having prior CyRM assurance after a cyber-breach; the reputation and damage control is important for both management and the company.","PeriodicalId":352857,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Other Investment Decision-Making (Sub-Topic)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115537900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Competition Between Infinitely Many Fund Managers and Investor's Welfare","authors":"Enrico Lupi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3612933","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3612933","url":null,"abstract":"This work analyzes the dynamic competition among an infinite number of managers acting in a financial market with a riskless bond and a risky asset. Each player competes against infinitely many competitors for receiving money flows that depend on her relative performances. We assume that each manager attempts to overperform the industry average performance. We find the closed formula for the optimal policy. We show that when all the agents are identical (homogenous case) the competition induced by the convex incentive affects both the risk aversion of the manager and her optimal policy. The change in the risk aversion and the shift in the risk taking behavior have opposite effects on manager's optimal policy. In the homogenous case the two effects perfectly offset and the optimal policy coincide with the usual Merton policy. We characterize the optimal solution of the problem also in the extended framework allowing for heterogenous groups of managers. In this case the two opposite forces acting on the manager's choice do not balance each other and there is room for the analysis of the change in the risk-taking optimal behavior of managers and in the whole industry as function of the parameters of the utility function of the managers as well as the relative weight of the groups in the population. We study the welfare loss of investors, who let their money being managed by managers, relating to the level of competition in the market.","PeriodicalId":352857,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Other Investment Decision-Making (Sub-Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127225738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Managerial Market Timing: What Is the Pot Size for Long-Term Shareholders Assuming Firm Management Acts in Their Best Interest and Does Have an Informational Advantage?","authors":"Jan Vogt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3753695","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3753695","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Using a stochastic model, this paper quantifies the potential value gain, for a diversified long-term shareholder, from market timing by trustworthy managers with superior information. If firms have flexibility and can issue or buy back shares up to 10% of their market capitalization, perfect market timing can yield an annualized average value gain between 0.07% (in a fair low-opportunity market) and 7.51% (in a fair high-opportunity market). With an error rate of 25%, the annual gains amount to −0.01% and 3.51%. Flexibility and management skill are key: long-term investors should grant limited flexibility to firm managers, and managers should avoid too prompt exploitation of opportunities due to price pressure effects.","PeriodicalId":352857,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Other Investment Decision-Making (Sub-Topic)","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123266430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dynamic Unravelling","authors":"Joel P. Flynn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3496074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3496074","url":null,"abstract":"Rapid declines in the prices of financial securities on low trading volume -- low volume crashes -- are ubiquitous. This paper proposes a dynamic model with informational asymmetries and costly short-selling to explain this phenomenon. Owing to short-selling constraints, no-trade events are bad news. No-trade therefore lowers prices, worsens adverse selection, increases bid-ask spreads and causes liquidity traders to leave the market, making no-trade more likely. This generates endogenous auto-correlation in no-trade events -- dynamic unravelling -- and causes low volume crashes. Short-selling prohibitions harm price discovery and make crashes more likely. Liquidity interventions aid price discovery and avert crashes.","PeriodicalId":352857,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Other Investment Decision-Making (Sub-Topic)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121276886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}