Games最新文献_第8页

COVID-19 Activities: Publicness and Strategic Concerns 新冠肺炎活动：公开性和战略关注

IF 0.9

Games Pub Date : 2023-01-12 DOI: 10.3390/g14010007

T. Sandler

{"title":"COVID-19 Activities: Publicness and Strategic Concerns","authors":"T. Sandler","doi":"10.3390/g14010007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010007","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers the diverse public good characteristics of COVID-19 activities along with their strategic implications. The underlying aggregator technologies, which relate individual contributions to the amount consumed, affect the prognosis for the supply of COVID-related activities. Weakest-link activities assume a particularly pivotal role in curbing the spread of COVID-19. For instance, the propagation of COVID-19 through new strains is disproportionately influenced by those countries with the smallest vaccination rates or least isolation actions. Diverse income distribution among at-risk countries raises the need to “shore up” weakest-link countries’ provision to lift global supply. Generally, shoring-up actions result in a Prisoner’s Dilemma with unfavorable collective action prospects. As the number of countries requiring shoring up increases, the less favorable is the prospect for addressing provision shortfalls. Also, as the number of capable countries to do the shoring up increases, the prospect for successful action diminishes. The paper also examines the strategic implications of other aggregators—e.g., best shot and better shot—associated with COVID-inhibiting actions. To address best-shot anti-COVID actions, countries must pool or coordinate actions to meet a threshold. A host of institutions—e.g., the World Health Organization or public-private partnerships—can facilitate shoring-up weakest-link activities or coordinating best-shot actions.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"7"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44885927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Connection between Imported Inputs and Exports: The Importance of Strategic Interdependence 进口投入与出口之间的联系：战略相互依存的重要性

IF 0.9

Games Pub Date : 2023-01-09 DOI: 10.3390/g14010006

A. Mukherjee, Yao Liu

引用次数: 0

Pre-Registration in Experimental Economics: An Editorial Policy 实验经济学预注册：一项编辑政策

IF 0.9

Games Pub Date : 2023-01-04 DOI: 10.3390/g14010005

H. Nax

引用次数: 0

The Impact of Organizer Market Structure on Participant Entry Behavior in a Multi-Tournament Environment 多赛事环境下主办者市场结构对参与者进入行为的影响

IF 0.9

Games Pub Date : 2023-01-03 DOI: 10.3390/g14010004

Timothy Mathews, S. Namoro, James W. Boudreau

{"title":"The Impact of Organizer Market Structure on Participant Entry Behavior in a Multi-Tournament Environment","authors":"Timothy Mathews, S. Namoro, James W. Boudreau","doi":"10.3390/g14010004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010004","url":null,"abstract":"A multi-tournament environment is analyzed, focusing on the impact of organizer market structure on agent entry behavior. Two high ability agents first decide which tournament to enter (with fields then filled by low ability agents). If the marginal benefit of high ability agents in an event is weakly increasing, a monopsonist organizer sets prizes so that the high ability agents enter the same event. If this marginal benefit is diminishing, a monopsonist organizer will either: always set prizes for which the high ability agents enter different events; or set prizes for which the high ability agents enter different events if and only if the difference in ability between the high ability and low ability agents is sufficiently small. Sequentially competing organizers set prizes for which both high ability agents enter the same event if and only if the marginal benefit of having two high ability agents in one event is relatively large. For competing organizers there may be either a first or second mover advantage. Finally, Social Welfare may be higher or lower with competing organizers, implying greater organizer competition does not necessarily increase Social Welfare. Parallels are noted throughout to the labor market for professional golfers both over years when the PGA TOUR was essentially a monopsonist and more recently when LIV Golf emerged as a competitor.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"4"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46626116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Ad-Valorem Taxes, Prices and Content Diversification in the News Market 从价税、价格与新闻市场内容多元化

IF 0.9

Games Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3390/g14020025

A. Pires

引用次数: 0

Oligopoly Pricing: The Role of Firm Size and Number 寡头垄断定价:企业规模和数量的作用

IF 0.9

Games Pub Date : 2022-12-29 DOI: 10.3390/g14010003

Iwan Bos, Marco A. Marini

引用次数: 0

Exchange Networks with Stochastic Matching 具有随机匹配的交换网络

IF 0.9

Games Pub Date : 2022-12-27 DOI: 10.3390/g14010002

A. Dragicevic

引用次数: 0

Defining Cyber Risk Scenarios to Evaluate IoT Systems 定义网络风险场景以评估物联网系统

IF 0.9

Games Pub Date : 2022-12-20 DOI: 10.3390/g14010001

R. Andrade, Iván Ortiz-Garcés, María Cazares, Gustavo Navas, María Isabel Sánchez-Pazmiño

引用次数: 1

Rent Dissipation in Simple Tullock Contests 简单图洛克竞赛中的租金耗散

IF 0.9

Games Pub Date : 2022-12-13 DOI: 10.3390/g13060083

Alex Dickson, I. MacKenzie, Petros G. Sekeris

引用次数: 2

Cournot's Oligopoly Equilibrium under Different Expectations and Differentiated Production 不同期望和差异化生产下的古诺寡头均衡

IF 0.9

Games Pub Date : 2022-12-05 DOI: 10.3390/g13060082

Nora Grisáková, Peter Štetka

{"title":"Cournot's Oligopoly Equilibrium under Different Expectations and Differentiated Production","authors":"Nora Grisáková, Peter Štetka","doi":"10.3390/g13060082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g13060082","url":null,"abstract":"The subject of this study is an oligopolistic market in which three firms operate in an environment of quantitative competition known as the Cournot oligopoly model. Firms and their production are differentiated, which brings the theoretical model closer to real market conditions. The main objective was to expand the Cournot duopoly and add another firm, resulting in an oligopolistic market structure assuming a partially differentiated production and coalition strategy between two firms. This article contains an oligopolistic model specifically designed for three different types of expectations, and has been applied to find and verify the stability of the net equilibrium of oligopolists. The market of telecommunication operators in Slovakia was selected as a real market case with accessible data on an oligopoly with three companies and partial differentiation. There are studies in which the authors limit their considerations to a certain number of repetitions of oligopolistic games. An infinite time interval is considered here. Three types of future expectations were considered: a simple dynamic model (or naïve expectations) in which the oligopolist assumes that its competitors will behave in the future based on their response functions, an adaptive expectations model in which the oligopolist considers a weighted average of the quantities offered by its competitors, and real expectations in which firms behave as rational players and do not have complete information about demand and offer output based on expected marginal profit. While the presented model proved to be stable under naïve and adaptive expectations, no stable equilibrium was found under real expectations and further results indicate a chaotic behavior.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"13 1","pages":"82"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43327645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2