Workshop on Trustworthy Embedded Devices最新文献

Beasty Memories: The Quest for Practical Defense against Code Reuse Attacks 可怕的记忆:对代码重用攻击的实用防御的探索

Workshop on Trustworthy Embedded Devices Pub Date : 2014-11-03 DOI: 10.1145/2666141.2668386

A. Sadeghi, Lucas Davi

{"title":"Beasty Memories: The Quest for Practical Defense against Code Reuse Attacks","authors":"A. Sadeghi, Lucas Davi","doi":"10.1145/2666141.2668386","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2666141.2668386","url":null,"abstract":"Code reuse attacks such as return-oriented programming (ROP) are predominant attack techniques that are extensively used to exploit vulnerabilities in modern software programs. ROP maliciously combines short instruction sequences (gadgets) residing in shared libraries and the application's executable to bypass data execution prevention (DEP) and launch targeted exploits. ROP attacks apply to many processor architectures from Intel x86 [1] to tiny embedded systems [2]. As a consequence, a variety of defenses have been proposed over the last few years - most prominently code randomization (ASLR) and control-flow integrity (CFI). Particularly, constructing practical CFI schemes has become a hot topic of research recently. In this talk, we present the evolution of return-oriented programming (ROP) attacks and defenses. We first give an overview of ROP attacks and techniques. Second, we investigate the security of software diversity based approaches such as finegrained code randomization [3]. Third, we dive deeper and focus on control-flow integrity (CFI) and show how to bypass all recent (coarse-grained) CFI solutions, including Microsoft's defense tool EMET [4]. Finally, we discuss new research directions to mitigate code reuse attacks, including our current work on hardware-assisted fine-grained control-flow integrity [5]. Part of this research [3-5] was conducted in collaboration with A. Dmitrienko, D. Lehmann, C. Liebchen, P. Koeberl, F. Monrose, and K. Z. Snow","PeriodicalId":350304,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Trustworthy Embedded Devices","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115142192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Providing Root of Trust for ARM TrustZone using On-Chip SRAM 使用片上SRAM为ARM TrustZone提供信任根

Workshop on Trustworthy Embedded Devices Pub Date : 2014-11-03 DOI: 10.1145/2666141.2666145

Shijun Zhao, Qianying Zhang, Guangyao Hu, Yu Qin, D. Feng

{"title":"Providing Root of Trust for ARM TrustZone using On-Chip SRAM","authors":"Shijun Zhao, Qianying Zhang, Guangyao Hu, Yu Qin, D. Feng","doi":"10.1145/2666141.2666145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2666141.2666145","url":null,"abstract":"We present the design, implementation and evaluation of the root of trust for the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) provided by ARM TrustZone based on the on-chip SRAM Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). We first implement a building block which provides the foundations for the root of trust: secure key storage and truly random source. The building block doesn't require on or off-chip secure non-volatile memory to store secrets, but provides a high-level security: resistance to physical attackers capable of controlling all external interfaces of the system on chip (SoC). Based on the building block, we build the root of trust consisting of seal/unseal primitives for secure services running in the TEE, and a software-only TPM service running in the TEE which provides rich TPM functionalities for the rich OS running in the normal world of TrustZone. The root of trust resists software attackers capable of compromising the entire rich OS. Besides, both the building block and the root of trust run on the powerful ARM processor. In one word, we leverage the on-chip SRAM, commonly available on mobile devices, to achieve a low-cost, secure, and efficient design of the root of trust.","PeriodicalId":350304,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Trustworthy Embedded Devices","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130543841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 63

Challenges of Establishing Trust in Online Entities and Beyond 建立在线实体及其他信任的挑战

Workshop on Trustworthy Embedded Devices Pub Date : 2014-11-03 DOI: 10.1145/2666141.2668385

T. Kim

{"title":"Challenges of Establishing Trust in Online Entities and Beyond","authors":"T. Kim","doi":"10.1145/2666141.2668385","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2666141.2668385","url":null,"abstract":"In today's Internet, authenticating online entities is challenging since people lack the real-world cues upon which to base their context-dependent trust decisions. For example, how can a user confirm that a Facebook invitation truly originates from the claimed sender, as anyone can trivially set up a bogus online identity with someone else's photo? Given an SSL certificate warning, how can a user validate it be- fore proceeding, as the certificate could be legitimate (e.g., the certificate is signed by a legitimate authority that the browser does not recognize) or malicious (e.g., it is signed by a compromised CA)? This talk demonstrates that providing useful evidence can empower users to make informed context-dependent trust decisions regarding previously unknown entities in the context of identity and public-key authentication. We first introduce an identity authentication logic called RelationGram that visualizes interpersonal tie strength of virtual entities using both physical and social proximities [2,4]. RelationGram enables casual users to authenticate online identities in a safe and easy manner, and build trust in previously unknown online entities. We then introduce new public-key validation proposals called Accountable Key Infrastructure (AKI) [3] and Attack Resilient Public-Key Infrastructure (ARPKI) [1] that reduce the amount of trust in any single entity to improve the resilience of the current PKI systems. AKI and ARPKI support trust agility such that entities select a security policy for their public-key certificates, and checks and balances such that entities monitor each other for misbehavior and prevent a single point of failure. When users are given pieces of evidence to which they can easily relate, they can make context-dependent authentication decisions online and build trust in online entities. As concluding remarks, we highlight some of the remaining challenges and future research directions to truly empower users to make informed trust decisions.","PeriodicalId":350304,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Trustworthy Embedded Devices","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128084763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

6LoWPAN Security: Avoiding Hidden Wormholes using Channel Reciprocity lowpan安全性:使用通道互惠避免隐藏虫洞

Workshop on Trustworthy Embedded Devices Pub Date : 2014-11-03 DOI: 10.1145/2666141.2666143

Konrad-Felix Krentz, G. Wunder

引用次数: 19

How to Build Hardware Trojans 如何构建硬件木马

Workshop on Trustworthy Embedded Devices Pub Date : 2014-11-03 DOI: 10.1145/2666141.2668384

C. Paar

{"title":"How to Build Hardware Trojans","authors":"C. Paar","doi":"10.1145/2666141.2668384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2666141.2668384","url":null,"abstract":"Countless systems ranging from consumer electronics to military equipment are dependent on integrated circuits (ICs). A surprisingly large number of such systems are already security critical, e.g., medical devices, automotive electronics, or SCADA systems. If the underlying ICs in such applications are maliciously manipulated through hardware Trojans, the security of the entire system can be compromised. In recent years, hardware Trojans have drawn the attention of governments and the scientific community. Initially, the primary attacker model was a malicious foundry that could alter the design, i.e., introduce hardware Trojans which could interfere with the (securitysensitive) functionality of a chip. Many other attacker models exist too. For instance, a legitimate IC manufacturer, e.g., a consumer electronics company abroad, might be in cohort with a foreign intelligence agency to alter its products in a way that compromises their security. Even though hardware Trojans have been considerably studied, little is known about how they might look, especially those that are particularly designed to avoid detection. In this talk we introduce two recent research projects which deal with the Trojan insertion in two different types of hardware platforms, ASICs and FPGAs. This is joint work with Georg Becker, Wayne Burleson, Marc Fyrbiak, Philipp Koppe, Franceso Regazzoni and Pawel Swierczynski.","PeriodicalId":350304,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Trustworthy Embedded Devices","volume":"59 16","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113933483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

A Secure Algorithm for Task Scheduling against Side-channel Attacks 一种抗侧信道攻击的安全任务调度算法

Workshop on Trustworthy Embedded Devices Pub Date : 2014-11-03 DOI: 10.1145/2666141.2666142

Chongxi Bao, Ankur Srivastava

引用次数: 10

Challenges in Remote Attestation of Low-End Embedded Devices 低端嵌入式设备远程认证的挑战

Workshop on Trustworthy Embedded Devices Pub Date : 2014-11-03 DOI: 10.1145/2666141.2668383

G. Tsudik

{"title":"Challenges in Remote Attestation of Low-End Embedded Devices","authors":"G. Tsudik","doi":"10.1145/2666141.2668383","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2666141.2668383","url":null,"abstract":"Embedded computing devices increasingly permeate many aspects of modern life: from medical to automotive, from building and factory automation to weapons, from avionics to home entertainment. Despite their specialized nature as well as limited resources and connectivity, these devices are becoming an increasingly popular and attractive target for remote malware infestation attacks, exemplified by Stuxnet [1]. Many mitigation techniques have been proposed, varying in terms of generality and underlying assumptions. One common theme is the need for Remote Attestation, a distinct security service that allows a trusted party (verifier) to check the internal state of a remote untrusted embedded device (prover). Purely software-based techniques, while efficient, offer dubious security guarantees. Most hardware-based techniques are too costly for low-end embedded devices.This talk focuses on three important challenges in designing Remote Attestation techniques for low-end embedded devices. First, what is the minimal set of hardware and software features for a low-end embedded device to attain provably secure remote attestation, under the strongest possible and realistic adversary model? Second, what mechanisms and features are needed to protect the remote attestation process from unauthorized invocation, i.e., how to assure that an embedded device is not being misused? Third, how to design efficient remote attestation for a multitude of potentially heterogeneous embedded devices, e.g., within a vehicle, a household, or an aircraft? Some of this research [2-4] was conducted in collaboration with K. Eldefrawy, A. Francillon, D. Perito and K. Rasmussen.","PeriodicalId":350304,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Trustworthy Embedded Devices","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128075184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Embedded System Security in Smart Consumer Electronics 智能消费电子产品中的嵌入式系统安全

Workshop on Trustworthy Embedded Devices Pub Date : 2014-11-03 DOI: 10.1145/2666141.2673888

Yier Jin

{"title":"Embedded System Security in Smart Consumer Electronics","authors":"Yier Jin","doi":"10.1145/2666141.2673888","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2666141.2673888","url":null,"abstract":"Advances in manufacturing and emerging technologies in miniaturization and reduction of power consumption have proven to be a pivotal point in mankind's progress. The once advanced machines that occupied entire buildings and needed hundreds of engineers to be operated are now shadowed by the smart cellular phones we carry in our pockets. With the advent of the Internet and proliferation of wireless technologies, these devices are now extremely interconnected. Enter the nascent era of Internet of Things (IoT) and wearable devices, where small embedded devices loaded with sensors collect information from its surroundings, process it and relay it to remote locations for further analysis. Albeit looking harmless, this nascent technologies raise security and privacy concerns. In this talk, we pose the question of the possibility and effects of compromising one of such devices. Concentrating on the design flow of IoT devices, we discuss some common design practices and their implications on security and privacy. We present the Google Nest Learning Thermostat as an example on how these practices affect the resulting device and the potential consequences to user security and privacy. We will then introduce design flow security enhancement methods through which security will be built into the device, a major difference from traditional practices which treat security as an add-on property implemented at post-fabrication stage.","PeriodicalId":350304,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Trustworthy Embedded Devices","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114812912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Simple AEAD Hardware Interface (SÆHI) in a SoC: Implementing an On-Chip Keyak/WhirlBob Coprocessor SoC中的简单AEAD硬件接口(SÆHI):实现片上Keyak/WhirlBob协处理器

Workshop on Trustworthy Embedded Devices Pub Date : 2014-11-03 DOI: 10.1145/2666141.2666144

Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen

{"title":"Simple AEAD Hardware Interface (SÆHI) in a SoC: Implementing an On-Chip Keyak/WhirlBob Coprocessor","authors":"Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen","doi":"10.1145/2666141.2666144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2666141.2666144","url":null,"abstract":"Simple AEAD Hardware Interface (SÆHI) is a hardware cryptographic interface aimed at CAESAR Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms. Cryptographic acceleration is typically achieved either with a coprocessor or via instruction set extensions. ISA modifications require re-engineering the CPU core, making the approach inapplicable outside the realm of open source processor cores. At minimum, we suggest implementing CAESAR AEADs as universal memory-mapped cryptographic coprocessors, synthesizable even on low end FPGA platforms. AEADs complying to SÆHI must also include C language API drivers targeting low-end MCUs that directly utilize the memory mapping in a ``bare metal'' fashion. This can also be accommodated on MMU-equipped mid-range CPUs.\u0000 Extended battery life and bandwidth resulting from dedicated cryptographic hardware is vital for currently dominant computing and communication devices: mobile phones, tablets, and Internet-of-Things (IoT) applications. We argue that these should be priority hardware optimization targets for AEAD algorithms with realistic payload profiles.\u0000 We demonstrate a fully integrated implementation of WhirlBob and Keyak AEADs on the FPGA fabric of Xilinx Zynq 7010. This low-cost System-on-Chip (SoC) also houses a dual-core Cortex-A9 CPU, closely matching the architecture of many embedded devices. The on-chip coprocessor is accessible from user space with a Linux kernel driver. An integration path exists all the way to end-user applications.","PeriodicalId":350304,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Trustworthy Embedded Devices","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131716445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 11

Citizen Electronic Identities using TPM 2.0 使用TPM 2.0的公民电子身份

Workshop on Trustworthy Embedded Devices Pub Date : 2014-09-03 DOI: 10.1145/2666141.2666146

Thomas Nyman, Jan-Erik Ekberg, N. Asokan

引用次数: 15