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Oil Exports, Non-Oil GDP, and Investment in the GCC Countries 海湾合作委员会国家的石油出口、非石油GDP和投资
London School of Economics & Political Science STICERD Research Papers Series Pub Date : 2009-10-14 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2009.00524.x
Nasri Harb
{"title":"Oil Exports, Non-Oil GDP, and Investment in the GCC Countries","authors":"Nasri Harb","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9361.2009.00524.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2009.00524.x","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the long-run and short-run relationships between oil exports, non-oil GDP, and investment in five major oil-exporting countries. Its goal is to verify the effect of natural resources exports on economic performance. It considers the effect of cross-sectional correlations and uses the corresponding panel unit-root tests to study the long-run characteristics of the data series. The results show that resources' exports have no long-run relationship with the macroeconomic variables. A VAR analysis is used to estimate the short-run dynamics and shows that the effect of oil exports on those variables depends on local policies.","PeriodicalId":345385,"journal":{"name":"London School of Economics & Political Science STICERD Research Papers Series","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114697373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 18
Nonparametric Identification in Asymmetric Second-Price Auctions: A New Approach 非对称二次价格拍卖中的非参数辨识:一种新方法
London School of Economics & Political Science STICERD Research Papers Series Pub Date : 2009-10-01 DOI: 10.1920/WP.CEM.2009.3109
T. Komarova
{"title":"Nonparametric Identification in Asymmetric Second-Price Auctions: A New Approach","authors":"T. Komarova","doi":"10.1920/WP.CEM.2009.3109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1920/WP.CEM.2009.3109","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes an approach to proving nonparametric identification for distributions of bidders' values in asymmetric second-price auctions. I consider the case when bidders have independent private values and the only available data pertain to the winner's identity and the transaction price. My proof of identification is constructive and is based on establishing the existence and uniqueness of a solution to the system of non-linear differential equations that describes relationships between unknown distribution functions and observable functions. The proof is conducted in two logical steps. First, I prove the existence and uniqueness of a local solution. Then I describe a method that extends this local solution to the whole support. This paper delivers other interesting results. I show how this approach can be applied to obtain identification in more general auction settings, for instance, in auctions with stochastic number of bidders or weaker support conditions. Furthermore, I demonstrate that my results can be extended to generalized competing risks models. Moreover, contrary to results in classical competing risks (Roy model), I show that in this generalized class of models it is possible to obtain implications that can be used to check whether the risks in a model are dependent. Finally, I provide a sieve minimum distance estimator and show that it consistently estimates the underlying valuation distribution of interest.","PeriodicalId":345385,"journal":{"name":"London School of Economics & Political Science STICERD Research Papers Series","volume":"7 12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124698972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India 只奖励吗?南印度的地方政治与公共资源配置
London School of Economics & Political Science STICERD Research Papers Series Pub Date : 2007-10-01 DOI: 10.1093/WBER/LHR039
T. Besley, R. Pande, V. Rao
{"title":"Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India","authors":"T. Besley, R. Pande, V. Rao","doi":"10.1093/WBER/LHR039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/WBER/LHR039","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses data on elected village councils in South India to examine the political economy of public resource allocation. We find that the pattern of policy-making reflects politicians' self-interest. Elected councillors benefit from improved personal access to public resources. In addition, the head councillor's group identity and residence influences public resource allocation. While electoral incentives do not eliminate politician opportunism, voters appear able to use their electoral clout to gain greater access to public resources.","PeriodicalId":345385,"journal":{"name":"London School of Economics & Political Science STICERD Research Papers Series","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129992925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 198
Working or Shirking? a Closer Look at Mps Expenses and Parliamentary Attendance 工作还是逃避?国会议员的开支和出席国会的情况
London School of Economics & Political Science STICERD Research Papers Series Pub Date : 2005-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.885604
T. Besley, Valentino Larcinese
{"title":"Working or Shirking? a Closer Look at Mps Expenses and Parliamentary Attendance","authors":"T. Besley, Valentino Larcinese","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.885604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.885604","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies determinants of MPs expense claims in Parliament using the data released under the freedom of information act in 2004. Using a multiple regression framework, we correlate expenses with three sets of variables: constituency characteristics, party affiliation and individual characteristics. We also look at the ratio of parliamentary expenses claimed to votes cast in parliament as a crude measure of value for money. We use the results to reflect on two views of the motivation of MPs, the public Choice view and the public service view.","PeriodicalId":345385,"journal":{"name":"London School of Economics & Political Science STICERD Research Papers Series","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116928560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Governance from Below a Theory of Local Government with Two Empirical Tests 自下而上治理:地方政府理论与两个实证检验
London School of Economics & Political Science STICERD Research Papers Series Pub Date : 2005-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.842884
J. Faguet
{"title":"Governance from Below a Theory of Local Government with Two Empirical Tests","authors":"J. Faguet","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.842884","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.842884","url":null,"abstract":"I examine decentralization through the lens of the local dynamics that it unleashes. The national effects of decentralization are simply the sum of its local-level effects. Hence to understand decentralization we must first understand how local government works. This paper proposes a theory of local government as the confluence of two quasi-markets and one organizational dynamic. Good government results when these three elements - political, economic and civil - are in rough balance, and actors in one cannot distort the others. Specific types of imbalance map into specific forms of government failure. I use comparative analysis to test the theory's predictions with qualitative and quantitative evidence from Bolivia. The combined methodology provides a higher-order empirical rigor than either approach can alone. The theory proves robust.","PeriodicalId":345385,"journal":{"name":"London School of Economics & Political Science STICERD Research Papers Series","volume":"32A 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134091302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 20
Why so Much Centralization? A Model of Primitive Centripetal Accumulation 为什么如此集中化?原始向心堆积模式
London School of Economics & Political Science STICERD Research Papers Series Pub Date : 2004-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.579241
J. Faguet
{"title":"Why so Much Centralization? A Model of Primitive Centripetal Accumulation","authors":"J. Faguet","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.579241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.579241","url":null,"abstract":"With strong conceptual arguments in its favor, decentralization is a popular and growing policy trend across the world. And yet dozens of empirical studies have failed to find convincing evidence that past reforms have worked. This begs two questions: (1) Why does decentralization produce indifferent results? and (2) Why is there so much centralization in the first place? The paper develops a simple model of a legislature in which municipal representatives bargain with central government agents over the allocation of public resources. By locating central government in a particular geographic space - the \"capital\" - and invoking self-interest on the part of its residents, I can answer both questions. I introduce the concept of residual power, which underpins the model and determines the flow of resources to districts. There is so much centralization because residual power is located in the capital, whose residents directly benefit from weak local governments.","PeriodicalId":345385,"journal":{"name":"London School of Economics & Political Science STICERD Research Papers Series","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126564903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 24
Market Share Dynamics and the Persistence of Leadership Debate 市场份额动态与领导力争论的持续
London School of Economics & Political Science STICERD Research Papers Series Pub Date : 2004-01-01 DOI: 10.1257/AER.97.1.222
J. Sutton
{"title":"Market Share Dynamics and the Persistence of Leadership Debate","authors":"J. Sutton","doi":"10.1257/AER.97.1.222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.97.1.222","url":null,"abstract":"This paper introduces a novel analysis of the classic \"persistence of leadership\" question, and applies it to a newly constructed dataset for Japanese manufacturing. The analysis rests on an appeal to an empirical \"scaling relationship\" between current market share and the variance of changes in market share. This relationship provides a powerful \"model selection criterion\" for candidate models of market share dynamics. It also makes it feasible, even in small datasets, to test directly for the properties of the \"first passage times\" corresponding to loss of leadership.","PeriodicalId":345385,"journal":{"name":"London School of Economics & Political Science STICERD Research Papers Series","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129643703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 113
Unforeseen Contingencies 无法预料的突发事件
London School of Economics & Political Science STICERD Research Papers Series Pub Date : 2002-02-01 DOI: 10.4337/9781781002032.00007
Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Luca Anderlini, L. Felli
{"title":"Unforeseen Contingencies","authors":"Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Luca Anderlini, L. Felli","doi":"10.4337/9781781002032.00007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781002032.00007","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a model of unforeseen contingencies. These are contingencies that are understood by economic agents ' their consequences and probabilities are known' but are such that every description of such events necessarily leaves out relevant features that have a non-negligible impact on the parties' expected utilities. Using a simple co-insurance problem as a backdrop, we introduce a model where states are described in terms of objective features, and the description of an event specifies a finite number of such features. In this setting, unforeseen contingencies are present in the co-insurance problem when the first-best risk-sharing contract varies with the states of nature in a complex way that makes it highly sensitive to the component features of the states. In this environment, although agents can compute expected pay-offs, they are unable to include in any ex-ante agreement a description of the relevant contingencies that captures (even approximately) the relevant complexity of the risky environment.","PeriodicalId":345385,"journal":{"name":"London School of Economics & Political Science STICERD Research Papers Series","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127477700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability 给掠夺之手戴手铐?媒体捕获与政府问责
London School of Economics & Political Science STICERD Research Papers Series Pub Date : 2002-01-01 DOI: 10.1257/AER.96.3.720
T. Besley, A. Prat
{"title":"Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability","authors":"T. Besley, A. Prat","doi":"10.1257/AER.96.3.720","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.96.3.720","url":null,"abstract":"It is widely recognized that active media can play a role in enhancing political competition by informing voters. Collusion between government and media can, however, undermine this role. We extend the political accountability model to include the presence of media outlets and the possibility that the incumbent exerts influence over them. In equilibrium, the media structure is linked to political outcomes in two ways: directly through its monitoring capacity and indirectly through political capture. We examine evidence both across countries and within India.","PeriodicalId":345385,"journal":{"name":"London School of Economics & Political Science STICERD Research Papers Series","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125596374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1008
Asymptotic Expansions for Some Semiparametric Program Evaluation Estimators 一类半参数规划估计量的渐近展开式
London School of Economics & Political Science STICERD Research Papers Series Pub Date : 2001-09-12 DOI: 10.1920/WP.CEM.2001.0401
Hidehiko Ichimura, O. Linton
{"title":"Asymptotic Expansions for Some Semiparametric Program Evaluation Estimators","authors":"Hidehiko Ichimura, O. Linton","doi":"10.1920/WP.CEM.2001.0401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1920/WP.CEM.2001.0401","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the performance of a class of semiparametric estimators of the treatment effect via asymptotic expansions. We derive approximations to the first two moments of the estimator that are valid to 'second order'. We use these approximations to define a method of bandwidth selection. We also propose a degrees- of-freedom like bias correction that improves the second order properties of the estimator but without requiring estimation of higher order derivatives of the unknown propensity score. We provide some numerical calibrations of the results.","PeriodicalId":345385,"journal":{"name":"London School of Economics & Political Science STICERD Research Papers Series","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114962405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 85
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