{"title":"The Concept of Apokatastasis as a Symbol of Human Equality and Religious Inclusion","authors":"W. Szczerba","doi":"10.35765/forphil.2022.2702.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2022.2702.14","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyzes the notion of apokatastasis, first as it appears in the Greek philosophical tradition and then in the context of Christian thought. It shows how the cosmic theory of eternal return unfolded within early currents of Hellenic philosophy, and subsequently how the personal dimension of apokatastasis grew out of those traditions, where questions about the fate of humanity became primary. The article then points to the fundamental philosophical assumptions of apokatastasis in its cosmic and personal forms. Christian thought, in the process of its evolution, made significant use of Greek methodology and concepts. One of the theories transferred to the Christian context concerned the notion of universal salvation (apokatastasis). Such thinkers as Origen, Gregory of Nyssa and John Scotus Eriugena developed the concept into its mature form. Although apokatastasis has been condemned on numerous occasions, it has survived in Christian teaching. From a secular perspective, it can be regarded as a symbol of the equity of all people, beckoning us in the direction of the notion of religious inclusion. As such, it ought to be construed as translating into respect and care for the other person sic et nunc. ","PeriodicalId":34385,"journal":{"name":"Forum Philosophicum","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47053360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Phenomenology as Apologetics","authors":"S. Urbaniak","doi":"10.35765/forphil.2022.2702.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2022.2702.12","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we analyse the relation of philosophy and theology in the work of Jean‑Luc Marion in order to be able to see not only how the phenomenology of givenness can serve as a “new apologetics” for theology, but also how Marion’s phenomenology itself, in its historical development and in its core principle and method, is influenced and changed by theological phenomena. We present three ways of describing the relation, tension, mutual influence and separation of philosophy and theology: firstly, in line with Pascal’s distinction between the orders of reason and of the heart; secondly, in phenomenology, in terms of indications to the effect that there can be a phenomenon of revelation in the mode of possibility that is distinguished from the phenomenon of Revelation in theology in the mode of historicity; and thirdly, by analogy with Christian apologetics. In particular, we analyse this third dimension, putting forward the thesis that Marion’s phenomenology itself has some characteristics of the Christian apologetics he describes. We try to demonstrate this interpretation of his phenomenology in its key dimensions, such as the counter-method and descriptions of the phenomena of love and revelation, which constitute the culmination of the phenomenology of givenness, although at the same time, as it were, its limit, crossing over into the theological order.","PeriodicalId":34385,"journal":{"name":"Forum Philosophicum","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44414588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hans Wagner’s Transcendental Argument for the Idea of Human Dignity","authors":"A. PIetras","doi":"10.35765/forphil.2022.2702.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2022.2702.15","url":null,"abstract":"Hans Wagner (1917–2000), using the achievements of German transcendental philosophy, gives a transcendental argument for the idea of human dignity. He claims that to ground the validity of human thinking and all its products (e.g. culture), we must accept the validity of the idea of human dignity. The structure of my paper is as follows: First, I consider what it means to give a transcendental justification of something. I reconstruct the neo-Kantian’s understanding of transcendental method. Then I argue that Wagner’s idea of human dignity as a foundation of every ethics and law is nothing other than a fruitful interpretation and continuation, perhaps only making explicit Kant’s main ethical ideas. To make this more clear I present the relation between Kant’s ethics and the material ethics of values and, following Wagner, I argue that grounding ethics on the idea of self-determination of human will does not necessarily lead to formalism in the form in which it was criticised by the representatives of the material ethics of values. Finally, I reconstruct Wagner’s argument for the claim that the idea of human dignity is a transcendental condition for the possibility of ethics and law in general.","PeriodicalId":34385,"journal":{"name":"Forum Philosophicum","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48416360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Phenomenology of Initiative","authors":"J. Jakubowski","doi":"10.35765/forphil.2022.2702.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2022.2702.11","url":null,"abstract":"This article starts with the hypothesis that the measure of first-person experience of initiative is not, as it has been customary to believe, the present moment. Jean Nabert’s philosophy (and especially his early work titled L’expérience intérieure de la liberté) provides tools that make it clear that the sense of initiating action that one has in the present moment carries the stigma of illusoriness. If I experience initiative in the present moment, it means that I have taken part in an activity initiated before. Therefore, even though the very moment of initiating action remains unavailable to me, the measure of initiative experience should be sought not in the present but in the past. To this end, one needs to consider the genesis of motives propelling my action. In line with Nabert’s conception, these motives—manifesting themselves as some kind of representations—are grounded in actions that I have not completed. However, the fact that the initiative I demonstrate is conditioned by these unfinished actions does not imply that my actions so far make up, by definition, a harmonious arrangement. Nevertheless, all these actions coalesce in one history, embracing my “desire to be” that constitutes my existence.","PeriodicalId":34385,"journal":{"name":"Forum Philosophicum","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43535761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Heidegger and the Thorny Issue of (Re)configuring Facticity","authors":"G. Seidel","doi":"10.35765/forphil.2021.2602.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2021.2602.02","url":null,"abstract":"Heidegger revisits German idealism after the “turn” in his thought in the mid-1930's. There are a couple of reasons for this. One is philosophical, if not “theological” in his sense of that term. The other is personal. This later reason is emphasized by Otto Pöggeler, who suggests that after 1945 Heidegger sought to understand what had gone wrong in the tragic European debacle. Heidegger will lay the blame at the doorstep of what he terms onto-theology and the subjectivism he sees as endemic to the German idealist tradition, above all as exemplified in Hegel's “onto-theo-ego-logy.” The article explores Heidegger’s reading of this tradition of German philosophy as it begins with Leibniz and culminates in Nietzsche.\u0000 It is the Event itself that makes possible the overcoming of metaphysics and its onto-theology. As Heidegger says in Contributions to Philosophy (From the Event), the ens realissimum (das Seiendste) “is” no more. It is the Event (Ereignis) that is the “most real,” since it is the Event that shows up and manifests itself as the revelation of the truth of Beinge in Da-sein, the being that is there in the Event.","PeriodicalId":34385,"journal":{"name":"Forum Philosophicum","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42807456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Forum Philosophicum","authors":"J. Surzyn","doi":"10.35765/forphil.2021.2601.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2021.2601.01","url":null,"abstract":"Editor-in-Chief's note on the 25th anniversary of the journal","PeriodicalId":34385,"journal":{"name":"Forum Philosophicum","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43135706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From “catharsis in the text” to “catharsis of the text”","authors":"C. Zalewski","doi":"10.35765/forphil.2020.2502.21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2020.2502.21","url":null,"abstract":"Roman Ingarden (1893–1970) was a prominent Polish philosopher, phenomenologist, and student of Edmund Husserl. A characteristic feature of his works was the almost complete absence of analyzes from the history of philosophy. That is why it is so surprising that right after the end of World War II, the first text analyzed when Ingarden started working at the Jagiellonian University was Aristotle’s “Poetics.” Ingarden published the results of his research in Polish in 1948 in “Kwartalnik Filozoficzny” and in the early 1960s his essay was translated and published in the renowned American magazine “The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism” as “A Marginal Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics.”\u0000As far as I know today, this text does not arouse much interest among the many commentators and followers of Ingarden’s philosophy. Perhaps this state of affairs is justified: Ingarden’s own ideas are only repeated here, and their usefulness in the meaning of “Poetics” remains far from obvious. However, I think that this relative obscurity is worth considering now, because it shows how modern reason tries to control ancient concepts. The main purpose of this article is therefore to recon- struct the strategy by which philosophy tames the text of “Poetics,” especially its concepts such as catharsis and mimesis. The discovery and presentation of these treatments would not have been possible were it not for the mimetic theory of René Girad, which provides anthropological foundations for a critique of philosophical discourse.","PeriodicalId":34385,"journal":{"name":"Forum Philosophicum","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48256284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Doctrine of Double Effect","authors":"Anna Bogatyńska-Kucharska","doi":"10.35765/forphil.2020.2502.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2020.2502.18","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of the article is to present some of the differences and similari- ties in various versions of the double effect principle (DDE or PDE). The following formulations will be analyzed: that of Thomas Aquinas and two contemporary ap- proaches, namely those of Mangan and Boyle. It will be shown that the presented modern versions vary significantly and the distinction between their intended and only predicted effects is far from clear. As a result, the different contemporary for- mulations of DDE lead to contradictory conclusions, with some justifying what the others condemn. Moreover, it will be demonstrated that, unlike Aquinas, contem- porary authors mostly concentrate on unintentionality condition while neglecting the proportionality requirement. So, unlike Aquinas, they only take into account a narrow scope of cases, where the evil effect occurs with certainty, which leads to a complicated and intricate hypothetical intention test like Donagan’s. It will be shown that, besides its theoretical indistinctness, DDE lead to serious pragmatic risks. It can be quite easily misused as a kind of psychological mechanism to protect self-esteem from a sense of guilt since wrong-doing is treated as merely a predicted unintended effect.","PeriodicalId":34385,"journal":{"name":"Forum Philosophicum","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43417657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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