The Phenomenology of Initiative

Q4 Arts and Humanities
J. Jakubowski
{"title":"The Phenomenology of Initiative","authors":"J. Jakubowski","doi":"10.35765/forphil.2022.2702.11","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article starts with the hypothesis that the measure of first-person experience of initiative is not, as it has been customary to believe, the present moment. Jean Nabert’s philosophy (and especially his early work titled L’expérience intérieure de la liberté) provides tools that make it clear that the sense of initiating action that one has in the present moment carries the stigma of illusoriness. If I experience initiative in the present moment, it means that I have taken part in an activity initiated before. Therefore, even though the very moment of initiating action remains unavailable to me, the measure of initiative experience should be sought not in the present but in the past. To this end, one needs to consider the genesis of motives propelling my action. In line with Nabert’s conception, these motives—manifesting themselves as some kind of representations—are grounded in actions that I have not completed. However, the fact that the initiative I demonstrate is conditioned by these unfinished actions does not imply that my actions so far make up, by definition, a harmonious arrangement. Nevertheless, all these actions coalesce in one history, embracing my “desire to be” that constitutes my existence.","PeriodicalId":34385,"journal":{"name":"Forum Philosophicum","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Forum Philosophicum","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2022.2702.11","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

This article starts with the hypothesis that the measure of first-person experience of initiative is not, as it has been customary to believe, the present moment. Jean Nabert’s philosophy (and especially his early work titled L’expérience intérieure de la liberté) provides tools that make it clear that the sense of initiating action that one has in the present moment carries the stigma of illusoriness. If I experience initiative in the present moment, it means that I have taken part in an activity initiated before. Therefore, even though the very moment of initiating action remains unavailable to me, the measure of initiative experience should be sought not in the present but in the past. To this end, one needs to consider the genesis of motives propelling my action. In line with Nabert’s conception, these motives—manifesting themselves as some kind of representations—are grounded in actions that I have not completed. However, the fact that the initiative I demonstrate is conditioned by these unfinished actions does not imply that my actions so far make up, by definition, a harmonious arrangement. Nevertheless, all these actions coalesce in one history, embracing my “desire to be” that constitutes my existence.
主动性现象学
这篇文章首先提出了一个假设,即衡量第一人称经验的尺度并不像人们习惯认为的那样是当下。让·纳伯特的哲学(尤其是他早期的作品《自由主义的经验》)提供了一些工具,让人们清楚地认识到,一个人在当下发起行动的感觉带有虚幻的污名。如果我现在体验到主动性,这意味着我参加了以前发起的活动。因此,即使我无法获得发起行动的那一刻,衡量主动经验的尺度也不应该在现在,而应该在过去。为此,我们需要考虑推动我们行动的动机的起源。按照纳伯特的概念,这些动机——以某种表现形式表现出来——是以我尚未完成的行动为基础的。然而,我所展示的主动性是以这些未完成的行动为条件的,这一事实并不意味着我迄今为止的行动根据定义构成了一种和谐的安排。然而,所有这些行为在一个历史中结合在一起,包含了构成我存在的“渴望”。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
2
审稿时长
30 weeks
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信