Economics of Networks最新文献

Recommended for You: The Effect of Word of Mouth on Sales Concentration 推荐给你:口碑对销售集中的影响

Economics of Networks Pub Date : 2015-02-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1025123

A. Hervas-Drane

引用次数: 0

Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets 平台与双边市场的垂直整合与排他性

Economics of Networks Pub Date : 2013-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1022682

Robin S. Lee

引用次数: 8

Pricing Digital Goods: Discontinuous Costs and Shared Infrastructure 数字商品定价:非连续成本和共享基础设施

Economics of Networks Pub Date : 2011-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.940402

Ke-Wei Huang, A. Sundararajan

引用次数: 47

Compatibility and Proprietary Standards: The Impact of Conversion Technologies in IT Markets with Network Effects 兼容性和专有标准:转换技术在具有网络效应的IT市场中的影响

Economics of Networks Pub Date : 2011-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.980726

C. Liu, Esther Gal‐Or, C. Kemerer, Michael D. Smith

{"title":"Compatibility and Proprietary Standards: The Impact of Conversion Technologies in IT Markets with Network Effects","authors":"C. Liu, Esther Gal‐Or, C. Kemerer, Michael D. Smith","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.980726","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.980726","url":null,"abstract":"In markets that exhibit network effects, the presence of digital conversion technologies provides an alternative mechanism to achieve compatibility. This study examines the impact of conversion technologies on market equilibrium in the context of sequential duopoly competition and proprietary technology standards. \u0000 \u0000We analyze this question by departing from the extant literature to endogenize the decision to provide a converter and incorporate explicit negotiations between firms concerning the extent of conversion. We argue that these choices better reflect the environment facing firms in digital goods industries and find that these decisions change some of the established results in the literature. \u0000 \u0000Specifically, we find that unless network effects are very large, the subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPNE) involves firms' agreeing to provide digital converters at a sufficiently low price to all consumers. At this equilibrium, both the entrant and the incumbent are better off because the provision of converters alleviates price competition in the market and leads to both higher product revenues and higher proceeds from the sale of converters. Moreover, under some circumstances, the provision of converters is welfare enhancing. \u0000 \u0000These findings have important implications for research and practice in the adoption of new digital goods as the introduction of conversion technologies can reduce the social costs of standardization without compromising the benefits of network effects.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129211013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 26

Stuck in the Adoption Funnel: The Effect of Interruptions in the Adoption Process on Usage 陷入采用漏斗:采用过程中中断对使用的影响

Economics of Networks Pub Date : 2010-10-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.941697

Anja Lambrecht, Katja Seim, Catherine Tucker

引用次数: 42

Reputation, Search Cost, and Airfares 声誉，搜索成本和机票

Economics of Networks Pub Date : 2010-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.975799

V. Bilotkach

引用次数: 16

Olson's Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Analysis of incentives to contribute in P2P File-Sharing Communities 重新审视奥尔森悖论:P2P文件共享社区贡献动机的实证分析

Economics of Networks Pub Date : 2010-07-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1299190

Sylvain Dejean, T. Pénard, R. Suire

引用次数: 12

Business Models and Compatibility Incentives 商业模式和兼容性激励

Economics of Networks Pub Date : 2010-03-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1350520

Feng Zhu

引用次数: 5

Wardrop Equilibria with Risk-Averse Users 具有风险规避用户的Wardrop均衡

Economics of Networks Pub Date : 2010-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.987104

F. Ordóñez, N. Stier-Moses

{"title":"Wardrop Equilibria with Risk-Averse Users","authors":"F. Ordóñez, N. Stier-Moses","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.987104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.987104","url":null,"abstract":"Network games can be used to model competitive situations in which agents select routes to minimize their cost. Common applications include traffic, telecommunication, and distribution networks. Although traditional network models have assumed that realized costs only depend on congestion, in most applications they also have an uncertain component. We extend the traffic assignment problem first proposed by Wardrop in 1952 by adding random deviations, which are independent of the flow, to the cost functions that model congestion in each arc. We map these uncertainties into a Wardrop equilibrium model with nonadditive path costs. The cost on a path is given by the sum of the congestion on its arcs plus a constant safety margin that represents the agents' risk aversion. First, we prove that an equilibrium for this game always exists and is essentially unique. Then, we introduce three specific equilibrium models that fall within this framework: the percentile equilibrium where agents select paths that minimize a specified percentile of the uncertain cost; the added-variability equilibrium where agents add a multiple of the variability of the cost of each arc to the expected cost; and the robust equilibrium where agents select paths by solving a robust optimization problem that imposes a limit on the number of arcs that can deviate from the mean. The percentile equilibrium is difficult to compute because minimizing a percentile among all paths is computationally hard. Instead, the added-variability and robust Wardrop equilibria can be computed efficiently in practice: The former reduces to a standard Wardrop equilibrium problem and the latter is found using a column generation approach that repeatedly solves robust shortest path problems, which are polynomially solvable. Through computational experiments of some random and some realistic instances, we explore the benefits and trade-offs of the proposed solution concepts. We show that when agents are risk averse, both the robust and added-variability equilibria better approximate percentile equilibria than the classic Wardrop equilibrium.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133271652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 82

Mechanism design and communication networks 机制设计和通信网络

Economics of Networks Pub Date : 2010-01-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1285424

L. Renou, Tristan Tomala

引用次数: 27