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Hedonic valence at the core of consciousness: A review of "A philosophy for the science of animal consciousness" by Walter Veit 意识的核心是享乐主义：沃尔特-维特《动物意识科学的哲学》评论
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences Pub Date : 2024-05-23 DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2024.11472
Nadine Meertens
{"title":"Hedonic valence at the core of consciousness: A review of \"A philosophy for the science of animal consciousness\" by Walter Veit","authors":"Nadine Meertens","doi":"10.33735/phimisci.2024.11472","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.11472","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000A book review of “A philosophy for the science of animal consciousness” by Walter Veit Routledge, 2023, 162 pages, ISBN 9781032343617.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":340575,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy and the Mind Sciences","volume":"37 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141107882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Prospects for epistemic generationism about memory 关于记忆的认识论生成论的前景
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences Pub Date : 2024-05-13 DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2024.10248
Uku Tooming, Kengo Miyazono
{"title":"Prospects for epistemic generationism about memory","authors":"Uku Tooming, Kengo Miyazono","doi":"10.33735/phimisci.2024.10248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.10248","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000A source of epistemic justification can be either preservative or generative, in that it can either just preserve justification that was provided by some other source or generate justification on its own. This paper asks what is required for generationism about memory to be true and argues that there are rather demanding conditions that a case of memory justification needs to satisfy in order to count as epistemically generative in a substantive sense. By considering a parallel argument for epistemically generative cases of imagination and drawing from empirical data on event completion, we argue that there are such cases of memory justification because the way in which memory processes fill in the content of event memories suggests that memory is fit to provide justification about past events that is not due to a source other than memory.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":340575,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy and the Mind Sciences","volume":"99 31","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140984204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Remembering trauma in epistemology 在认识论中铭记创伤
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences Pub Date : 2024-04-15 DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2024.10220
M. Frise
{"title":"Remembering trauma in epistemology","authors":"M. Frise","doi":"10.33735/phimisci.2024.10220","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.10220","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000This paper explores some surprising effects of psychological trauma on memory and develops the puzzle of observer memory for trauma. Memory for trauma tends to have a third-person perspective, or observer perspective. But it appears observer memory, by having a novel visual point of view, tends to misrepresent the past. And many find it plausible that if a memory type tends to misrepresent, it cannot yield knowledge of, or justification for believing, details of past events. But it is also plausible that, with respect to details of past trauma, observer memory can yield knowledge or justification. I argue for a novel set of views that offers a way out of the puzzle: observer memory does tend to misrepresent, but it still has epistemic power regarding details of the past, although with special limits; but observer memory for trauma has other epistemic powers too, in that it allows for a kind of self-awareness.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":340575,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy and the Mind Sciences","volume":"50 s23","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140700254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Daydreaming as spontaneous immersive imagination: A phenomenological analysis 作为自发沉浸式想象的白日梦：现象学分析
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences Pub Date : 2024-04-04 DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2024.9913
Emily Lawson, Evan Thompson
{"title":"Daydreaming as spontaneous immersive imagination: A phenomenological analysis","authors":"Emily Lawson, Evan Thompson","doi":"10.33735/phimisci.2024.9913","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.9913","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000Research on the specific features of daydreaming compared with mind-wandering and night dreaming is a neglected topic in the philosophy of mind and the cognitive neuroscience of spontaneous thought. The extant research either conflates daydreaming with mind-wandering (whether understood as task-unrelated thought, unguided attention, or disunified thought), characterizes daydreaming as opposed to mind-wandering (Dorsch, 2015), or takes daydreaming to encompass any and all “imagined events” (Newby-Clark & Thavendran, 2018). These dueling definitions obstruct future research on spontaneous thought, and are insufficiently precise to guide empirical studies. They also fail to illuminate the phenomenal core of daydreaming, namely, its dreamlike qualities. Although daydreaming is related to both mind-wandering and narrative imagination, it is not reducible to either. We argue that daydreams are experiences of spontaneous, immersive imagination in the waking state. The main task of our investigation is to distinguish daydreaming, conceptually and phenomenologically, from mind-wandering, on the one hand, and night dreaming, on the other. Although daydream experiences can vary widely, we distinguish prototypical experiences of daydreaming from adjacent imaginative activity, including fleeting imagery and “focused daydreaming,” or crafted visualization. We consider our phenomenological analysis as preparatory work for conceptually distinguishing different spontaneous and imaginative states so that they can be investigated accordingly with questionnaires and qualitative methods. We argue that precision about the phenomenal character of daydreaming can guide neurophenomenological investigations, help delimit studies on individual variance in daydreaming features, and identify differences among daydreaming, mind-wandering, and night dreaming conceptually and phenomenologically, and possibly eventually in terms of neural correlates.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":340575,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy and the Mind Sciences","volume":"22 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140744666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The justificatory power of memory experience 记忆经验的合理性
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2024.10238
Lu Teng
{"title":"The justificatory power of memory experience","authors":"Lu Teng","doi":"10.33735/phimisci.2024.10238","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.10238","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000Psychological research has discovered that episodic memories are constructive in nature. This paper examines how, despite being constructive, episodic memories can provide us with justification for beliefs about the past. In current literature, two major approaches to memorial justification are internalist foundationalism and reliabilism. I first demonstrate that an influential version of internalist foundationalism, dogmatism, encounters problems when we compare certain types of memory construction with cognitive penetration in perception. On the other hand, various versions of reliabilism all face skeptical challenges. I propose an alternative, two-factor theory that recognizes an epistemic distinction typically overlooked by dogmatism and reliabilism. Although our account leaves certain aspects unspecified, it is an important step forward.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":340575,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy and the Mind Sciences","volume":"53 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140791875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Metacognition and the puzzle of alethic memory 元认知与形象记忆之谜
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences Pub Date : 2024-01-08 DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2024.9880
André Sant’Anna
{"title":"Metacognition and the puzzle of alethic memory","authors":"André Sant’Anna","doi":"10.33735/phimisci.2024.9880","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.9880","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000Alethism is the view that successful remembering only requires an accurate representation of a past event. It opposes the truth-and-authenticity view, according to which successful remembering requires both an accurate representation of a past event and an accurate representation of a past experience of that event. Alethism is able to handle problematic cases faced by the truth-and-authenticity view, but it faces an important challenge of its own: If successful remembering only requires accurately representing past events, then how is it possible that our memories are also experienced as originating in past experiences of those events? I call this the puzzle of alethic memory. I argue that alethism can be reconciled with the claim that memories are experienced as originating in past experiences of those events—what I call the experience of first-handedness—if we conceive of the phenomenology of remembering in metacognitive terms. According to the metacognitive approach that I favor, the phenomenology of remembering is partly explained by what memory represents and partly explained by the existence of a metacognitive feeling that accompanies memory representations. I argue that accounting for the feeling of first-handedness in terms of the metacognitive feeling that accompanies memory representations allows us to solve the puzzle of alethic memory.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":340575,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy and the Mind Sciences","volume":"8 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139446609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Why have “revolutionary” tools found purchase in memory science? 为什么 "革命性 "工具会在记忆科学领域大受欢迎？
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences Pub Date : 2023-12-20 DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2023.10499
David Colaço, Sarah Robins
{"title":"Why have “revolutionary” tools found purchase in memory science?","authors":"David Colaço, Sarah Robins","doi":"10.33735/phimisci.2023.10499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.10499","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000The study of the neural basis of memory has advanced over the past decade. A key contributor to this memory “renaissance” has been new tools. On its face, this matches what might be described as a neuroscientific revolution stemming from the development of tools, where this revolution is largely independent of theory. In this paper, we challenge this tool revolution account by focusing on a problem that arises in applying it to this “renaissance”: it is centered around memory, but the tools were not developed for solving problems in memory science. To resolve this problem, we introduce an account that distinguishes tool development and tool uptake, and we argue that while theoretical considerations may not inform development, they do inform uptake. Acknowledging the distance between these stages of tool use draws our attention to the questions of why and how tool uptake occurs in the domains that it does.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":340575,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy and the Mind Sciences","volume":"59 19","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138956941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The relevance of communication theory for theories of representation 传播理论与表征理论的相关性
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences Pub Date : 2023-12-15 DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2023.10992
S. Mann
{"title":"The relevance of communication theory for theories of representation","authors":"S. Mann","doi":"10.33735/phimisci.2023.10992","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.10992","url":null,"abstract":"Prominent views about representation share a premise: that mathematical communication theory is blind to representational content. Here I challenge that premise by rejecting two common misconceptions: that Claude Shannon said that the meanings of signals are irrelevant for communication theory (he didn't and they aren't), and that since correlational measures can't distinguish representations from natural signs, communication theory can't distinguish them either (the premise is true but the conclusion is false; no valid argument can link them).","PeriodicalId":340575,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy and the Mind Sciences","volume":"80 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138999605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ontogenetic emergence as a criterion for theories of consciousness: Comparing GNW, SOMA, and REFCON 作为意识理论标准的本体出现：比较GNW、SOMA和REFCON
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences Pub Date : 2023-11-23 DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2023.9902
Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup, Morten Overgaard
{"title":"Ontogenetic emergence as a criterion for theories of consciousness: Comparing GNW, SOMA, and REFCON","authors":"Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup, Morten Overgaard","doi":"10.33735/phimisci.2023.9902","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.9902","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years increasing attention has been given to systematic comparison of theories of consciousness. Laudable practical projects have emerged in this regard, such as adversarial collaboration and the development of databases lending themselves to comparisons of empirical support for theories. In addition to the practical advances, theoretical advances have been made, such as a list of issues a theory of consciousness must address. We propose adding the issue of the ontogenetic emergence (O-emergence) of consciousness to the list of issues we use to evaluate theories of consciousness. O-emergence concerns how and when consciousness emerges ontogenetically in human beings. The underlying assumption is that there exists a point in the development of a human individual before which that individual is not and cannot be conscious. This assumption, in turn, depends on a widely shared assumption of cognitive neuroscience, which is that consciousness somehow depends on — or derives from — brain activity. In this paper, we lay out the O-emergence criterion and investigate whether it can be accounted for within the Global Neuronal Workspace theory, the Self-Organizing Meta-representational Account, and the Reorganization of Elementary Functions framework.","PeriodicalId":340575,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy and the Mind Sciences","volume":"66 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139246524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Theory of mind deficits in language delayed deaf subjects? 语言迟缓聋人的思维理论缺陷？
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences Pub Date : 2023-11-21 DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2023.10269
Endre Begby
{"title":"Theory of mind deficits in language delayed deaf subjects?","authors":"Endre Begby","doi":"10.33735/phimisci.2023.10269","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.10269","url":null,"abstract":"Recent studies claim to show that language delayed deaf subjects typically display longlingering deficits in Theory of Mind (ToM) development, despite suffering no known deficits in other cognitive domains. These claims are supported by experimental evidence indicating that such subjects fare poorly on False Belief (FB) tasks. This paper turns a critical eye on these claims. In particular, I argue that the reported results raise important questions about the status of FB tasks as evidence, and about how such evidence should be weighted against naturalistic observations of subjects engaged in everyday activities requiring complex social coordination. I conclude that these studies give us no decisive reason to believe that language delayed deaf subjects suffer distinctively and symptomatically in the domain of social cognition. To the contrary, the attribution of significant socio-cognitive impairment is potentially stigmatizing and may not help us understand the unique challenges these subjects face or suggest remedial strategies to aid them in overcoming these challenges.","PeriodicalId":340575,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy and the Mind Sciences","volume":"27 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139250719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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