Proceedings of the 31st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference最新文献_第2页

Proactive Security Analysis of Changes in Virtualized Infrastructures 虚拟化基础设施变化的主动安全分析

Proceedings of the 31st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Pub Date : 2015-12-07 DOI: 10.1145/2818000.2818034

Sören Bleikertz, Carsten Vogel, Thomas Gross, S. Mödersheim

引用次数: 41

Towards Analyzing the Input Validation Vulnerabilities associated with Android System Services Android系统服务相关输入验证漏洞分析

Proceedings of the 31st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Pub Date : 2015-12-07 DOI: 10.1145/2818000.2818033

Chen Cao, Neng Gao, Peng Liu, Ji Xiang

引用次数: 43

Decentralized Authorization and Privacy-Enhanced Routing for Information-Centric Networks 信息中心网络的去中心化授权和增强隐私的路由

Proceedings of the 31st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Pub Date : 2015-12-07 DOI: 10.1145/2818000.2818001

Mariana Raykova, Hasnain Lakhani, H. Kazmi, Ashish Gehani

引用次数: 8

Combining Differential Privacy and Secure Multiparty Computation 结合差分隐私和安全多方计算

Proceedings of the 31st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Pub Date : 2015-12-07 DOI: 10.1145/2818000.2818027

Martin Pettai, Peeter Laud

引用次数: 77

Control Flow and Code Integrity for COTS binaries: An Effective Defense Against Real-World ROP Attacks COTS二进制文件的控制流和代码完整性:对真实世界ROP攻击的有效防御

Proceedings of the 31st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Pub Date : 2015-12-07 DOI: 10.1145/2818000.2818016

Mingwei Zhang, R. Sekar

{"title":"Control Flow and Code Integrity for COTS binaries: An Effective Defense Against Real-World ROP Attacks","authors":"Mingwei Zhang, R. Sekar","doi":"10.1145/2818000.2818016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2818000.2818016","url":null,"abstract":"Despite decades of sustained effort, memory corruption attacks continue to be one of the most serious security threats faced today. They are highly sought after by attackers, as they provide ultimate control --- the ability to execute arbitrary low-level code. Attackers have shown time and again their ability to overcome widely deployed countermeasures such as Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) and Data Execution Prevention (DEP) by crafting Return Oriented Programming (ROP) attacks. Although Turing-complete ROP attacks have been demonstrated in research papers, real-world ROP payloads have had a more limited objective: that of disabling DEP so that injected native code attacks can be carried out. In this paper, we provide a systematic defense, called Control Flow and Code Integrity (CFCI), that makes injected native code attacks impossible. CFCI achieves this without sacrificing compatibility with existing software, the need to replace system programs such as the dynamic loader, and without significant performance penalty. We will release CFCI as open-source software by the time of this conference.","PeriodicalId":338725,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 31st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131745302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 41

Privacy-preserving Virtual Machine 保护隐私的虚拟机

Proceedings of the 31st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Pub Date : 2015-12-07 DOI: 10.1145/2818000.2818044

Tianlin Li, Yaohui Hu, Ping Yang, Kartik Gopalan

{"title":"Privacy-preserving Virtual Machine","authors":"Tianlin Li, Yaohui Hu, Ping Yang, Kartik Gopalan","doi":"10.1145/2818000.2818044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2818000.2818044","url":null,"abstract":"Cloud computing systems routinely process users' confidential data, but the underlying virtualization software in use today is not constructed to minimize the exposure of such data. For instance, virtual machine (VM) checkpointing can drastically prolong the lifetime and vulnerability of confidential data without users' knowledge by storing such data as part of a persistent snapshot. A key requirement for minimizing the exposure of any data is the ability to cleanly isolate such data for either exclusion or processing. Traditional mechanisms for memory taint tracking are expensive whereas those for isolating application footprint in VM-based sandboxes are not transparent. In this paper, we propose a transparent and lightweight mechanism for isolating a confidential application's memory footprint in a VM. The key idea is for a parent VM to spawn a child VM, called a Privacy-preserving Virtual Machine (PPVM) within which the confidential application executes. Hypervisor features, such as VM checkpointing, that need to exclude the memory of a confidential application can safely ignore the child VM's memory footprint. Alternatively, features such as checkpoint encryption or malware tracking can operate only on the child VM's memory. We implement memory isolation for PPVM through a lightweight VM fork operation that uses copy-on-write to reduce the memory and filesystem overhead of the PPVM. Transparency is achieved through a confidential shell that allows the parent VM to spawn the confidential application in the PPVM and exercise control over it during runtime. We demonstrate the effectiveness of PPVM through its use with VM checkpointing, which can safely checkpoint the parent VM while excluding or encrypting the associated PPVM. We show that our PPVM implementation achieves effective memory isolation with low overheads on memory, CPU, and network performance.","PeriodicalId":338725,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 31st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130418722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Proximity Verification for Contactless Access Control and Authentication Systems 非接触式访问控制与认证系统的近距离验证

Proceedings of the 31st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Pub Date : 2015-12-07 DOI: 10.1145/2818000.2818004

Aanjhan Ranganathan, Boris Danev, Srdjan Capkun

{"title":"Proximity Verification for Contactless Access Control and Authentication Systems","authors":"Aanjhan Ranganathan, Boris Danev, Srdjan Capkun","doi":"10.1145/2818000.2818004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2818000.2818004","url":null,"abstract":"Today, contactless smart cards are used to provide physical access control and authentication in a wide variety of applications. Prior research have demonstrated the vulnerability of contactless smart cards to relay attacks. For example, an attacker can relay the communication between the card reader and the smart card to steal a car or pay for goods in a supermarket. To solve this problem, smart cards need to be enhanced with secure proximity verification, i.e., distance bounding, which enables the card reader and the card to verify their mutual distance. However, existing technologies do not support the deployment of distance bounding in such systems: NFC cannot provide sufficient distance resolution, and hardware complexity of the proposed (e.g., UWB-based) distance bounding radios prevents their use in contactless smart cards. In this work, we propose a novel distance bounding system specifically designed for short-range contactless access control and authentication applications. Our system combines frequency modulated continuous wave (FMCW) and backscatter communication. The use of backscatter communication enables low-complexity, power-efficient design of the prover which is critical for contactless smart cards. In addition, our distance bounding system enables the implementation of a majority of distance bounding protocols developed in prior art. We analyze our system against various attack scenarios and show that it offers strong security guarantees. Additionally, we evaluate our system's communication and distance measurement characteristics using a prototype implementation.","PeriodicalId":338725,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 31st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130087823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 12

Defeating ROP Through Denial of Stack Pivot 通过拒绝Stack Pivot击败ROP

Proceedings of the 31st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Pub Date : 2015-12-07 DOI: 10.1145/2818000.2818023

Aravind Prakash, Heng Yin

{"title":"Defeating ROP Through Denial of Stack Pivot","authors":"Aravind Prakash, Heng Yin","doi":"10.1145/2818000.2818023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2818000.2818023","url":null,"abstract":"Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) is a popular and prevalent infiltration technique. While current solutions based on code randomization, artificial diversification and Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) have rendered ROP attacks harder to accomplish, they have been unsuccessful in completely eliminating them. Particularly, CFI-based approaches lack incremental deployability and impose high performance overhead -- two key requirements for practical application. In this paper, we present a novel compiler-level defense against ROP attacks. We observe that stack pivoting -- a key step in executing ROP attacks -- often moves the stack pointer from the stack region to a non-stack (often heap) region, thereby violating the integrity of the stack pointer. Unlike CFI-based defenses, our defense does not rely on the control-flow of the program. Instead, we assert the sanity of stack pointer at predetermined execution points in order to detect stack pivoting and thereby defeat ROP. The key advantage of our approach is that it allows for incremental deployability, an Achilles heel for CFI. That is, we can selectively protect some modules that can coexist with other unprotected modules. Other advantages include: (1) We do not depend on ASLR -- which is particularly vulnerable to information disclosure attacks, and (2) We do not make any assumptions regarding the so called \"gadget\". We implemented our defense in a proof-of-concept LLVM-based system called PBlocker. We evaluated PBlocker on SPEC 2006 benchmark and show an average runtime overhead of 1.04%.","PeriodicalId":338725,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 31st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"266 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116046885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 20

Accurate, Low Cost and Instrumentation-Free Security Audit Logging for Windows 准确，低成本和仪器免费的安全审计日志为Windows

Proceedings of the 31st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Pub Date : 2015-12-07 DOI: 10.1145/2818000.2818039

Shiqing Ma, K. H. Lee, C. Kim, J. Rhee, X. Zhang, Dongyan Xu

引用次数: 73

Secure and Efficient Key Derivation in Portfolio Authentication Schemes Using Blakley Secret Sharing 基于Blakley秘密共享的组合认证方案安全高效密钥派生

Proceedings of the 31st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Pub Date : 2015-12-07 DOI: 10.1145/2818000.2818043

Peter Mayer, M. Volkamer

引用次数: 4