2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks最新文献

Congestion games with resource reuse and applications in spectrum sharing 资源复用的拥塞博弈及其在频谱共享中的应用

2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks Pub Date : 2009-05-13 DOI: 10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137399

Mingyan D. Liu, S. Ahmad, Yunnan Wu

{"title":"Congestion games with resource reuse and applications in spectrum sharing","authors":"Mingyan D. Liu, S. Ahmad, Yunnan Wu","doi":"10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137399","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137399","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we consider an extension to the classical definition of congestion games (CG) in which multiple users share the same set of resources and their payoff for using any resource is a function of the total number of users sharing it. The classical congestion games enjoy some very appealing properties, including the existence of a Nash equilibrium and that every improvement path is finite and leads to such a NE (also called the finite improvement property or FIP), which is also a local optimum to a potential function. On the other hand, this class of games does not model well the congestion or resource sharing in a wireless context, a prominent feature of which is spatial reuse. What this translates to in the context of a congestion game is that a user's payoff for using a resource (interpreted as a channel) is a function of the its number of its interfering users sharing that channel, rather than the total number among all users. This makes the problem quite different. We will call this the congestion game with resource reuse (CG-RR). In this paper we study intrinsic properties of such a game; in particular, we seek to address under what conditions on the underlying network this game possesses the FIP or NE. We also discuss the implications of these results when applied to wireless spectrum sharing.","PeriodicalId":338565,"journal":{"name":"2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115620705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 42

Competitive optimization of cognitive radio MIMO systems via game theory 基于博弈论的认知无线电MIMO系统竞争优化

2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks Pub Date : 2009-05-13 DOI: 10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137432

G. Scutari, D. Palomar, S. Barbarossa

{"title":"Competitive optimization of cognitive radio MIMO systems via game theory","authors":"G. Scutari, D. Palomar, S. Barbarossa","doi":"10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137432","url":null,"abstract":"The concept of cognitive radio (CR) has recently received great attention from the researchers' community as a promising paradigm to achieve efficient use of the frequency resource by allowing the coexistence of licensed (primary) and unlicensed (secondary) users in the same bandwidth. In this paper, we propose a distributed approach based on game theory to design cognitive MIMO transceiver in hierarchical CR networks, where primary users establish null and/or soft shaping constraints on the transmit covariance matrix of secondary users, so that the interference generated by secondary users be confined within the interference-temperature limits. We formulate the resource allocation problem among secondary users as a strategic noncooperative game, where each transmit/receive pair competes against the others to maximize the information rate over his own MIMO channel, under transmit power and/or null/soft shaping constraints. We provide a unified set of conditions that guarantee the uniqueness and global asymptotic stability of the Nash equilibrium of all the proposed games through totally distributed and asynchronous algorithms. Interestingly, the proposed algorithms overcome the main drawback of classical waterfilling based algorithms-the violation of the interference-temperature limits-and they have many of the desired features required for cognitive radio applications, such as low-complexity, distributed nature, robustness against missing or outdated updates of the users, and fast convergence behavior.","PeriodicalId":338565,"journal":{"name":"2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129252712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 32

From competition to coopetition: Stackelberg equilibrium in multi-user power control games 从竞争到合作:多用户权力控制游戏中的Stackelberg均衡

2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks Pub Date : 2009-05-13 DOI: 10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137391

Yi Su, M. Schaar

{"title":"From competition to coopetition: Stackelberg equilibrium in multi-user power control games","authors":"Yi Su, M. Schaar","doi":"10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137391","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers the problem of how to allocate power among competing users sharing a frequency- selective interference channel. We model the interaction between these selfish users as a non-cooperative game. We study how a foresighted user, who knows the channel state information and response strategies of its competing users, should optimize its own transmission strategy. To characterize this multiuser interaction, the Stackelberg equilibrium is introduced. We start by analyzing in detail a simple two-user scenario, where the foresighted user can determine its optimal transmission strategy by solving a bi-level program which allows him to account for the myopic user's response strategies. Therefore, the competition among users is transformed into a cooperative competition (coopetition) since the foresighted user will avoid interfering the myopic user. Since the optimal solution is computationally prohibitive, we propose a low-complexity algorithm based on Lagrangian duality theory. Numerical simulations illustrate that, if a foresighted user has the necessary information about its competitor, the resulting coopetition will benefit both users. Possible methods to acquire the required information and to extend the formulation to more than two users are also discussed.","PeriodicalId":338565,"journal":{"name":"2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130609825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 8

Efficiency and stability of Nash equilibria in resource allocation games 资源配置博弈中纳什均衡的效率与稳定性

2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks Pub Date : 2009-05-13 DOI: 10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137425

T. Harks, K. Miller

{"title":"Efficiency and stability of Nash equilibria in resource allocation games","authors":"T. Harks, K. Miller","doi":"10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137425","url":null,"abstract":"We study resource allocation games, where users send data along paths and links in the network charge a price equal to marginal cost. When users are price taking, it is known that there exist distributed dynamics that converge towards a fully efficient Nash equilibrium. When users are price anticipating, however, a Nash equilibrium does not maximize total utility in general. In this paper, we explore the inefficiency of Nash equilibria for general networks and semi-convex marginal cost functions. While it is known that for m ≥ 2 users and convex marginal cost functions, no efficiency guarantee is possible, we prove that an additional differentiability assumption on marginal cost functions implies a bounded efficiency loss of 2/(2m + 1). For polynomial marginal cost functions with nonnegative coefficients, we precisely characterize the price of anarchy. We also prove that the efficiency of Nash equilibria significantly improves if all users have the same strategy space and the same utility function. We propose a class of distributed dynamics and prove that whenever a game admits a potential function, these dynamics globally converge to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we show that in general the only class of marginal cost functions that guarantees the existence of a potential function are affine linear functions.","PeriodicalId":338565,"journal":{"name":"2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123452626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

Service provider competition and pricing for dynamic spectrum allocation 动态频谱分配的服务提供商竞争和定价

2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks Pub Date : 2009-05-13 DOI: 10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137401

J. Acharya, R. Yates

{"title":"Service provider competition and pricing for dynamic spectrum allocation","authors":"J. Acharya, R. Yates","doi":"10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137401","url":null,"abstract":"We consider dynamic spectrum allocation in the downlink between multiple service providers and users, and develop a model that is applicable for many future scenarios. The service providers set prices for spectrum and transmit data to users, who purchase their spectrum. Each provider transmits at a specific power spectral density which is an indicator of the efficiency of the modulation and coding technology used for transmission. A user application is characterized by a utility function of its received rate which is a function of the allocated spectrum, its link gains to the providers and the providers' transmit power spectral densities. The providers satisfy the spectrum requests of the users by purchasing spectrum from a broker. The providers compete to secure the services of the users and to maximize their profits. Using concepts from microeconomics, we characterize the SP price competition game and show that in the optimal solution each provider has its own customer base. We also characterize the prices charged and profits made by the providers and show how they vary with provider efficiencies and spectrum costs charged by the broker.","PeriodicalId":338565,"journal":{"name":"2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114200093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 18

Large population games in radial loss networks: Computationally tractable equilibria for distributed network admission control 径向损失网络中的大种群博弈:分布式网络准入控制的计算可处理均衡

2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks Pub Date : 2009-05-13 DOI: 10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137428

Zhongjing Ma, P. Caines, R. Malhamé

{"title":"Large population games in radial loss networks: Computationally tractable equilibria for distributed network admission control","authors":"Zhongjing Ma, P. Caines, R. Malhamé","doi":"10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137428","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137428","url":null,"abstract":"The computational intractability of the dynamic programming (DP) equations associated with optimal admission and routing in stochastic loss networks of any non-trivial size (Ma et al, 2006, 2008) leads one to consider suboptimal distributed game theoretic formulations of the problem. The special class of radial networks with a central core of infinite capacity is considered, and it is shown (under adequate assumptions) that an associated distributed admission control problem becomes tractable asymptotically, as the size of radial network grows to infinity. This is achieved by following a methodology first explored by M. Huang et. al. (2003, 2006–2008) in the context of large scale dynamic games for sets of weakly coupled linear stochastic control systems. At the established Nash equilibrium, each agent reacts optimally with respect to the average trajectory of the mass of all other agents; this trajectory is approximated by a deterministic infinite population limit (associated with the mean field or ensemble statistics of the random agents) which is the solution of a particular fixed point problem. This framework has connections with the mean field models studied by Lasry and Lions (2006, 2007) and close connections with the notion of oblivious equilibrium proposed by Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2005, 2008) via a mean field approximation.","PeriodicalId":338565,"journal":{"name":"2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129392337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Selection of efficient pure strategies in allocation games 分配博弈中有效纯策略的选择

2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks Pub Date : 2009-05-13 DOI: 10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137457

Pierre Coucheney, Corinne Touati, B. Gaujal

引用次数: 11

A power allocation strategy using Game Theory in Cognitive Radio networks 基于博弈论的认知无线电网络功率分配策略

2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks Pub Date : 2009-05-13 DOI: 10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137392

E. D. Re, Gherardo Gorni, L. Ronga, R. Suffritti

引用次数: 35

N-player cournot and price-quantity function mixed competition n人古诺与价格-数量函数混合竞争

2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks Pub Date : 2009-05-13 DOI: 10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137388

S. Wu, J. Musacchio

{"title":"N-player cournot and price-quantity function mixed competition","authors":"S. Wu, J. Musacchio","doi":"10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137388","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137388","url":null,"abstract":"We study the value of network providers committing to offering a quantity of bandwidth to a market versus having the amount of bandwidth offered be conditional on the prices that the market settles upon. For instance a cable television ISP has the option to shift capacity from Internet service to television channels if the market price for Internet service is low, and thus such a provider can avoid committing to a fixed capacity being devoted to Internet service. To study the issue, we consider a two-stage game. In the first stage, competing network providers either commit to set a quantity of bandwidth to offer to the market, or choose to offer bandwidth to the market according to a function relating price to quantity. If they choose the later option, the network provider initially chooses a slope for their function. In the second stage, the quantity players choose the quantity to offer, where as the function players choose the offset term of their function. We show that a unique Nash equilibrium exists for the second stage play, and that it is the only subgame-perfect equilibrium for each provider to choose a quantity commitment in the first stage. We also show that a quantity commitment is not always a subgame-perfect equilibrium when demand uncertainty is introduced to the model.","PeriodicalId":338565,"journal":{"name":"2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130071476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Resource allocation games in interference relay channels 干扰中继信道中的资源分配博弈

2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks Pub Date : 2009-05-13 DOI: 10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137447

E. Belmega, B. Djeumou, S. Lasaulce

{"title":"Resource allocation games in interference relay channels","authors":"E. Belmega, B. Djeumou, S. Lasaulce","doi":"10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137447","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137447","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we study a distributed network comprising an interference channel in parallel with an interference relay channel. Therefore each source node can use two frequency bands and has to implement a certain power allocation policy. An example of application of such a model is the case where the performance of terminals operating in unlicensed bands would be enhanced by being allowed to exploit an additional frequency band in which a relay is available. In this network model, each user is selfish and wants to maximize its Shannon transmission rate. We analyze two cases. In the first case, the relaying node is assumed to implement an amplify-and-forward (AF) protocol while in the second case it implements the decode-and-forward (DF) protocol introduced by Cover and El Gamal. For both cases we analyze the existence and uniqueness issues of the equilibrium of the aforementioned power allocation games. Several interesting and new results are provided. In particular: 1. The existence of a Nash equilibrium is shown to be always guaranteed in the case of the AF protocol; 2. The performance of a user or the network does not necessarily increase with the transmit power available at the relay; 3. We show that there is naturally a game in interference relay channels (even if the power allocation policy is fixed) when the DF protocol is used; this game is induced by the decentralized choice of the cooperation degree between each source node and the relay node.","PeriodicalId":338565,"journal":{"name":"2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128897075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 17