Alan C. Marco, M. Carley, S. Jackson, Amanda F. Myers
{"title":"The USPTO Historical Patent Data Files Two Centuries of Innovation","authors":"Alan C. Marco, M. Carley, S. Jackson, Amanda F. Myers","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2849514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2849514","url":null,"abstract":"Patent classification systems are largely designed for administrative purposes, limiting their value for most research purposes. To address this deficiency, Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) developed a higher-level classification for the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Patent Citation Data File by aggregating U.S. Patent Classification (USPC) classes into six economically relevant technology categories (and 37 sub-categories) and classified granted patents accordingly. While this classification scheme has proved useful for researchers investigating US patent grants, comparable information on pending or abandoned patent applications has been unavailable for several reasons. We apply the NBER sub-categories to published and publicly-available unpublished patent applications as well as in-force and expired patents to create the <i>USPTO Historical Patent Data Files</i>, four research datasets containing time series and micro-level data by NBER sub-category. These new datasets comprise annual information on patent applications, patent grants, and patents-in-force dating back to 1840. Additionally, we provide information on the monthly stocks and flows of utility patent applications and grants from 1981 to 2014. Our hope is that researchers will make use of the data files for primary analysis or as controls for other projects. These data, for the first time, provide for detailed study of patent application disposal and the complex dynamics between new filings, pendency, and abandonment. Historical data enable researchers to put into context recent trends in patenting activity, litigation, and technological change.","PeriodicalId":337989,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Patent Law & Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"178 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133797498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Relationship between Patenting Motives and Pendency Durations","authors":"F. Jell, J. Henkel, Karin Hoisl","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2406536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2406536","url":null,"abstract":"One of the most neglected aspects of strategic patenting behavior is the timing of the pre-examination phase. While an expeditious grant is often desirable, applicants may also benefit from a prolonged period of pre-examination pendency to create uncertainty or to otherwise improve their position in the competition. We build on work on strategic patenting behavior, and analyze whether the different strategic motives of applicants to file patent applications determine the duration of patent pendency. To do so, we exploit a distinctive feature of the German patent system, i.e. deferred examination. We base our analysis on original survey data on 186 German inventions. These data are matched with comprehensive register information on patents filed at the GPTO, which provides unique information to explore our topic. We find that motives related to gaining time to make decisions, increase pendency periods. Motives that require legal certainty affect pendency timing negatively. Our data also provide initial evidence that motives which rely on a broad scope of patent protection tend to delay lapse decisions. Our study has implications for managers, policy makers, and scholars.","PeriodicalId":337989,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Patent Law & Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134456346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Software Legal Protection: Shaping the EU Software Patent","authors":"Mihai Avram","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2525015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2525015","url":null,"abstract":"The EU software patent could be the long awaited resolve to an extensive debate around software. The resolution should be based on the understanding of the copyright and patent basics, the legal conflict between territoriality and the internet, the experience of the existing US software patent, and the identification of the interested parties. In 2013 EU patents with unitary effect (for inventions) were approved and starting 1st of January 2014 the Regulations defining the patent framework have effect in the 25 of the 27 member states. This means it is the best moment to ‘strike’ with a fresh new initiative supporting the EU software patent. The paper’s objective is to prove that the patent could become the most effective method for the legal protection of software in the EU. This conclusion will be based on an analysis of software copyright versus software-patent distinctions, existing models of software patents (the US), interests of the stakeholders (big companies, SME, Open-Source promoters) and the previous rejected EU software patent directive.","PeriodicalId":337989,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Patent Law & Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"349 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134483269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Court-Appointed Neutral Economic Experts","authors":"J. Sidak","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3176682","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3176682","url":null,"abstract":"Complex civil litigation routinely includes expert economic testimony. However, it may be hard for a jury to determine at trial which expert economist is more credible, and it may be hard for the judge to determine at the Daubert hearing whether the methodology upon which a given expert economist relies is intellectually rigorous enough to produce results that constitute admissible testimony. One solution rarely employed is for the court to appoint its own neutral economic expert under Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence when a lawsuit contains a claim for damages that will require rigorous analysis of data. Based on my recent experience as Judge Richard Posner’s court-appointed economic expert on damages in patent infringement litigation, I explain how the wider use of Rule 706 would assist the judge and jury and would facilitate the prompt settlement of intellectual property, antitrust, securities, contract, business tort, and other complex disputes. The benefits to courts and litigants would surely exceed the costs.","PeriodicalId":337989,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Patent Law & Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127011899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Economic Interpretation of FRAND","authors":"D. Carlton, Allan L. Shampine","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2256007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2256007","url":null,"abstract":"Standard setting organizations have for many years required members to commit to license patents essential to use of standards on Fair, Reasonable and Non-discriminatory terms. Unfortunately, SSOs have not defined what FRAND means, leaving its interpretation to courts and regulators. This paper explains the economic concerns underlying FRAND – hold-up and strategic behavior leading to inefficient behavior in a standard setting context – and how a proper economic interpretation of FRAND can eliminate or mitigate those concerns. Ex ante analyses based on the “reasonable” principle can potentially eliminate hold-up, but, as a practical matter, may be costly, difficult to perform and error-prone. In such circumstances, the “non-discriminatory” principle of FRAND can provide some protection against hold-up even when the “reasonable” principle of FRAND does not.","PeriodicalId":337989,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Patent Law & Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"93 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133751463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Reto M. Hilty, T. Jaeger, M. Lamping, Hanns Ullrich
{"title":"The Unitary Patent Package: Twelve Reasons for Concern","authors":"Reto M. Hilty, T. Jaeger, M. Lamping, Hanns Ullrich","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2169254","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2169254","url":null,"abstract":"A balanced, innovation-friendly and uniform patent system is indispensable for Europe. However, the latest EU proposal for a patent package (Patent Regulation and flanking court system) is both dangerous and misguided. While a superficial glance may create the false impression of a patent law advancement through the proposal, it instead actually threatens to forestall the necessary legal progress and innovation capacities for the foreseeable future. It might prove disastrous to implement a patent system which is already known to be detrimental from both the legal as well as the innovation perspectives. This paper provides a short introduction to the major reasons for concern regarding the current proposals and explains why it is imperative to reconsider the proposals entirely afresh.","PeriodicalId":337989,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Patent Law & Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128787742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How to License a Technology Standard?","authors":"Chun-Hui Miao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1986985","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1986985","url":null,"abstract":"I examine the optimal licensing strategy of the owner of a proprietary technology standard in a monopolistically competitive industry. The standard owner can be either an outsider innovator or a joint venture of downstream firms. I find that (1) a simple revenue royalty replicates the integrated monopoly outcome; (2) a patent pool cannot do better than adopt a non-discriminatory licensing policy that offers higher royalty rates to pool members than to nonmembers; (3) if the standard owner sells a complementary good, then it may choose a decentralized marketplace as a commitment not to maximize licensing revenue. Implications to the use of RAND pricing in standard settings are discussed.","PeriodicalId":337989,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Patent Law & Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130816163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Access to Intellectual Property for Innovation: Evidence on Problems and Coping Strategies from German Firms","authors":"Elisabeth Müller, I. Cockburn, Megan J. MacGarvie","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1718408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1718408","url":null,"abstract":"Transaction costs and contracting problems associated with proliferation of patents may have a negative impact on innovation. We present novel data on how frequently innovative German firms encountered problems with access to intellectual property (IP) for their innovation activities. While a small percentage of firms reported having abandoned or not started innovation projects because of IP issues, larger fractions reported having pursued their projects after modifying them. Using “coping mechanisms” such as acquisition of additional IP rights or taking legal action to limit the IP held by others was quite common. Much of the incidence of self-reported IP problems and coping activity was concentrated in firms which were larger, more R&D intensive, and had more patents than the corresponding median firm. After controlling for firm characteristics, we find that firms operating in technology areas with higher concentration of IP ownership experience a lower probability of reporting IP-related problems.","PeriodicalId":337989,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Patent Law & Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130837099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Promoting Progress: Incentivizing Technology Risk-Taking and Investment with Limited Exclusive Patent Rights","authors":"Neal E. Solomon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1623988","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1623988","url":null,"abstract":"Analytical economic evidence shows that a strong patent system provides incentives for investing in technology and encourages competition that tends to promote progress in the long run.Critics of patents look to short run exclusive rights that suggest an “anticommons” that blocks competition, but these arguments are limited. Patent critics ignore the ex ante risks and costs of scientific discovery and technological invention. The article examines the microeconomic arguments for investment in technology and examines the costs and risks of technology investment. The article applies real options analysis (ROA) to modeling of risk scenarios. The article also examines transaction costs to determine that costs are a significant factor in technology investment justifications. The increased risks increase the costs of capital. With increased uncertainty of the patent grant, the costs of capital increase beyond an optimal rate of investment, with high risk inventions at the periphery not sustainable.The article argues for strong patent rights that protect ex ante investment in risky technologies, maximizes competition between multiple technologies and promotes progress in the long run.","PeriodicalId":337989,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Patent Law & Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116844254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Isumo Bergmann, D. Butzke, Lothar Walter, J. P. Fuerste, M. Moehrle, V. Erdmann
{"title":"Evaluating the Risk of Patent Infringement by Means of Semantic Patent Analysis: The Case of DNA Chips","authors":"Isumo Bergmann, D. Butzke, Lothar Walter, J. P. Fuerste, M. Moehrle, V. Erdmann","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9310.2008.00533.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9310.2008.00533.x","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we are going to present a method for detecting the risks of patent infringement by evaluating similarities between patent documents on the basis of semantic patent analysis. This approach enables the user to visualize similarities in the contents on a semantic patent map by means of multi-dimensional scaling. The effectiveness of the semantic patent map has already been demonstrated by Dressler (2006) with regard to patents of seal technology, in which documents are commonly kept short and the extracted contents are concise. This paper will open out to the field of biotechnology, where patents can easily comprise several hundreds of pages. The method presented here conveys an interdisciplinary approach and combines computer-aided natural language processing with domain-specific expertise of biochemical processes. This is illustrated by an authentic case of infringement involving two manufacturers of DNA chips. Our experiment will show how the infringement case is visualized on a patent map based on semantic patent analysis. This experiment can be compared with the search for a needle in a haystack, the two competitive patents representing significantly conflicting needles. From an approximate number of 4,000 patents in the current US Class 435/6, a set of patents was selected that included the needles mentioned. This paper will point out how such mutual interference can be detected by way of semantic patent analysis, and what advice may be given to R&D managers who are faced with the risk of patent infringement.","PeriodicalId":337989,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Patent Law & Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117121736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}