Corporate Law: Securities Law最新文献

How Should a Firm Go Public? A Dynamic Model of the Choice between Fixed-Price Offerings and Auctions in Ipos and Privatizations 公司应该如何上市?ipo与私有化中固定价格发行与拍卖选择的动态模型

Corporate Law: Securities Law Pub Date : 2019-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.423860

Thomas J. Chemmanur, Mark H. Liu

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引用次数: 46

Do we need a European 'National Market System'? Competition, Arbitrage, and Suboptimal Executions 我们需要一个欧洲“国家市场体系”吗?竞争、套利和次优执行

Corporate Law: Securities Law Pub Date : 2011-05-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1760778

Andreas Storkenmaier, M. Wagener

引用次数: 14

Emergency Short Selling Restrictions in the Course of the Financial Crisis 金融危机过程中的紧急卖空限制

Corporate Law: Securities Law Pub Date : 2010-06-22 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1441236

Seraina N. Grunewald, A. Wagner, R. Weber

引用次数: 16

Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously 诉讼治理:严肃问责

Corporate Law: Securities Law Pub Date : 2010-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1503513

J. Coffee

{"title":"Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously","authors":"J. Coffee","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1503513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1503513","url":null,"abstract":"Both Europe and the United States are rethinking their approach to aggregate litigation. In the United States, class actions have long been organized around an entrepreneurial model that uses economic incentives to align the interest of the class attorney with those of the class. But increasingly, potential class members are preferring exit to voice, suggesting that the advantages of the U.S. model may have been overstated. In contrast, Europe has long resisted the U.S.’s entrepreneurial model, and the contemporary debate in Europe centers on whether certain elements of the U.S. model - namely, opt-out class actions, contingent fees, and the “American rule” on fee shifting - must be adopted in order to assure access to justice. Because legal transplants rarely take, this Essay offers an alternative “non-entrepreneurial model” for aggregate litigation that is consistent with European traditions. Relying less on economic incentives, it seeks to design a representative plaintiff for the class action who would function as a true “gatekeeper,” pledging its reputational capital to assure class members of its loyal performance. Effectively, this model marries aspects of U.S. “public interest” litigation with existing European class action practice. Examining the differences between U.S. and European practice, this Essay argues none of these differences are dispositively prohibitive and that functional substitutes, including an opt-in class action and third party funding, could be engineered so as to yield roughly comparable results. Although the two systems might perform similarly in terms of compensation, the ultimate question, it argues, is the degree to which a jurisdiction wishes to authorize and arm a private attorney general to pursue deterrence for profit.","PeriodicalId":336554,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Securities Law","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128659408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 15

The SEC and the Madoff Scandal: Three Narratives in Search of a Story 证券交易委员会和麦道夫丑闻:寻找故事的三种叙述

Corporate Law: Securities Law Pub Date : 2009-09-18 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1475433

Donald C. Langevoort

引用次数: 17

Lawyers, Bureaucratic Autonomy, and Securities Regulation During the New Deal 律师、官僚自治和新政期间的证券监管

Corporate Law: Securities Law Pub Date : 2009-09-12 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1470934

Daniel R. Ernst

引用次数: 2

Trust Behavior: The Essential Foundation of Securities Markets 信任行为:证券市场的基本基础

Corporate Law: Securities Law Pub Date : 2009-07-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1442023

Lynn A. Stout