{"title":"Combining Losing Games into a Winning Game","authors":"Bruno R'emillard, J. Vaillancourt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2636986","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2636986","url":null,"abstract":"Parrondo’s paradox is extended to regime switching random walks in random environments. The paradoxical behavior of the resulting random walk is explained by the effect of the random environment. Full characterization of the asymptotic behavior is achieved in terms of the dimensions of some random subspaces occurring in Oseledec’s theorem. The regime switching mechanism gives our models a richer and more complex asymptotic behavior than the simple random walks in random environments appearing in the literature, in terms of transience and recurrence.","PeriodicalId":334366,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic)","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126265848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Temporary Workers are Not Free-Riders: An Experimental Investigation","authors":"D. Dragone, Fabio Galeotti, Raimondello Orsini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2366294","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2366294","url":null,"abstract":"We conduct an artefactual field experiment to study whether the individual preferences and propensity to cooperate of temporary workers differ from permanent contract workers. We find that temporary and permanent contract workers have different other-regarding preferences, but display similar contribution patterns in an anonymous Public Good Game. Students, instead, are more selfish and contribute less than temporary and permanent workers.","PeriodicalId":334366,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121514895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Play it Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning in Restarting, Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games","authors":"Kenju Kamei, L. Putterman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2324398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2324398","url":null,"abstract":"Previous research has shown that opportunities for two-sided partner choice in finitely repeated social dilemma games can promote cooperation through a combination of sorting and opportunistic signaling, with late period defections by selfish players causing an end-game decline. How such experience would affect play of subsequent finitely-repeated games remains unclear. In each of six treatments that vary the cooperation premium and the informational basis for reputation formation, we let sets of subjects play sequences of finitely-repeated voluntary contribution games to study the competing forces of (a) learning about the benefits of reputation, and (b) learning about backward unraveling. We find, inter alia, that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in reputation grows across sets of finitely-repeated games.","PeriodicalId":334366,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129948631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Phase Diagram of Prisoner's Dilemma: Empirical Evidence from the Human Subjects Experiments","authors":"Bin Xu, Qiqi Cheng, Zhijian Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1412086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1412086","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents the empirical phase diagram showing the cooperation phase, the mixed phase and the defection phase of prisoner’s dilemma experiment. The empirical data includes 21 experiments using a total of 350 human subjects. Experimental parameters are the possibility of continuation within [0, 1], the sizes of population within [12, 24], and a prisoner's dilemma payoff matrix (S, R, T, P) = (-2, 2, 4, 0). Twenty-one different combinations of these parameters were used in the experiments. The results provide the first empirical instance for Folk Theorem.","PeriodicalId":334366,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic)","volume":"26 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122387629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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