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PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic)最新文献

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Knowing Me, Knowing You: An Experiment on Mutual Payoff Information and Strategic Uncertainty 认识我，认识你:关于相互回报信息和战略不确定性的实验
PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3915018
Hazem Alshaikhmubarak, David Hales, Maria Kogelnik, Molly Schwarz, Kent Strauss
{"title":"Knowing Me, Knowing You: An Experiment on Mutual Payoff Information and Strategic Uncertainty","authors":"Hazem Alshaikhmubarak, David Hales, Maria Kogelnik, Molly Schwarz, Kent Strauss","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3915018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3915018","url":null,"abstract":"We use a laboratory experiment to study how mutual payoff information affects play in strategic settings. Subjects play the Prisoner's Dilemma or Stag Hunt game against randomly re-matched opponents under two information treatments. In our partial-information treatment subjects are shown only their own payoffs, while in our full-information treatment they are shown both their own and their opponent's payoffs. In both treatments, they receive feedback on their opponent's action after each round. We find that mutual payoff information has a substantial effect on the equilibrium reached in the Stag Hunt and convergence in both games. Using a belief-learning model and simulations of play, we provide evidence that this effect is driven not only by initial play but also by the way subjects learn. We propose that strategic uncertainty is a probable channel driving these effects.","PeriodicalId":334366,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic)","volume":"2 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114123332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Promises and Punishment 承诺与惩罚
PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-08-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3913750
M. Dufwenberg, Flora Li, Alec Smith
{"title":"Promises and Punishment","authors":"M. Dufwenberg, Flora Li, Alec Smith","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3913750","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3913750","url":null,"abstract":"We study the effect of communication on beliefs, behavior, and efficiency in the context of hold-up problems with a punishment option. We apply a novel behavioral motivation, frustration-dependent anger, that links unmet payoff expectations with the willingness to forgo material payoffs to punish others, and we conjecture that communication works through this mechanism to raise expectations about the likelihood of belief-dependent costly punishment and to increase trust, cooperation, and efficiency. In an experiment we allow communication in the form of a single pre-play message. We measure beliefs and our design permits the observation of promises and deception. The results are consistent with the theory that costly punishment results from belief- dependent anger and frustration. Promises drive the effect of communication on beliefs and broken promises lead to higher rates of costly punishment.","PeriodicalId":334366,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121228693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
How Alliances Form and Conflict Ensues 联盟如何形成，冲突如何发生
PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-07-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3893024
Lu Dong, Lingbo Huang, J. Lien, Jie Zheng
{"title":"How Alliances Form and Conflict Ensues","authors":"Lu Dong, Lingbo Huang, J. Lien, Jie Zheng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3893024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3893024","url":null,"abstract":"In a social network in which friendly and rival bilateral links can be formed, how do alliances between decision-makers form, and what determines whether a conflict will arise? We study a network formation game between ex-ante symmetric players in the laboratory to examine the dynamics of alliance formation and conflict evolution. A peaceful equilibrium yields the greatest social welfare, while a successful bullying attack transfers the victimized player’s resources evenly to the attackers at a cost. Consistently with the theoretical model predictions, peaceful and bullying outcomes are prevalent among the randomly re-matched experimental groups, based on the cost of attack. We further examine the dynamics leading to the final network and find that groups tend to coordinate quickly on a first target for attack, while the first attacker entails a non-negligible risk of successful counter-attack by initiating the coordination. These findings provide insights for understanding social dynamics in group coordination.","PeriodicalId":334366,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128997199","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does Informative Opposition Influence Electoral Accountability? 信息反对派影响选举问责制吗?
PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-07-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3880904
Satoshi Kasamatsu, Daiki Kishishita
{"title":"Does Informative Opposition Influence Electoral Accountability?","authors":"Satoshi Kasamatsu, Daiki Kishishita","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3880904","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3880904","url":null,"abstract":"In majoritarian legislatures, minority parties cannot directly influence policymaking. However, they may serve as whistleblowers against the majority parties' harmful policymaking. This study aims to explore whether a minority party's monitoring mitigates a political agency problem in a majoritarian legislature. For this purpose, we construct a two-period election model in which voters face information asymmetries regarding each party's type and the state of the world. After the majority party's policymaking, the minority party sends a cheap-talk message about whether to oppose the policymaking. We show that the monitoring by the minority party is not useful, even if we allow the possibility that the party is the truth-telling type. As long as the initial popularity of the minority party is not too high, its opposition is informative, but does not change the electorate's voting behaviors. Consequently, it does not improve electoral accountability at all. This irrelevance of monitoring is resolved when the minority party can directly influence policymaking, for example, through obstruction.","PeriodicalId":334366,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126336916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How Lies Induced Cooperation in 'Golden Balls': A Game-Theoretic Analysis 谎言如何诱导“金球”合作:博弈论分析
PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-12-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3509505
S. Brams, Ben D. Mor
{"title":"How Lies Induced Cooperation in 'Golden Balls': A Game-Theoretic Analysis","authors":"S. Brams, Ben D. Mor","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3509505","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3509505","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze a particular episode of a popular British TV game show, “Golden Balls,” in which one of the two contestants lied about what he intended to do, which had the salutary effect of inducing both contestants to cooperate in what is normally a Prisoners' Dilemma (PD), wherein one or both contestants usually defected. This “solution” to PD assumes that the liar desired to be honorable in fulfilling his pledge to split the jackpot if he won but, surprisingly, he achieved this end without having to do so, astonishing the audience and receiving its acclaim. We note that this action has a biblical precedent in King Solomon’s decision to cut a baby in two.","PeriodicalId":334366,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116146331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Accommodating Cardinal, Ordinal and Mixed Preferences: An Extended Preference Domain for the Assignment Problem 容纳基数偏好、顺序偏好和混合偏好:分配问题的扩展偏好域
PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-09-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3445120
Ali O. Polat
{"title":"Accommodating Cardinal, Ordinal and Mixed Preferences: An Extended Preference Domain for the Assignment Problem","authors":"Ali O. Polat","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3445120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3445120","url":null,"abstract":"We extend the preference domain of the assignment problem to accommodate ordinal, cardinal and mixed preferences together and thereby allow the mechanism designer to elicit different levels of information about individuals' preferences. Given a fixed preference relation over a finite set of alternatives, our domain contains preferences over lotteries which are monotonic, continuous and satisfy independence axiom. Under a natural coarseness relation, the stochastic dominance relation is the coarsest element of the domain and represents fully ordinal preferences. Any von Neumann Morgenstern expected utility preference is a finest element and represents fullycardinal preferences. The extended domain can be characterized by an expected multi-utility representation. We provide a preference reporting language enabling agents to use the extended domain. We generalize the pseudo market mechanism of Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) for the extended domain and show that the family of pseudo market mechanisms are efficient and weakly envy-free while they fail strategy-proofness. The extended domain naturally admits the impossibility results of the cardinal domain and the ordinal domain. We show, however, that one can find a mechanism which is efficient and weakly strategy-proof for the agents with ordinal preferences.","PeriodicalId":334366,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic)","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129991192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Experimental Evidence on Deceitful Communication: Does Everyone Have a Price? 欺骗性沟通的实验证据:每个人都有代价吗?
PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-06-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3339811
R. Vranceanu, D. Dubart
{"title":"Experimental Evidence on Deceitful Communication: Does Everyone Have a Price?","authors":"R. Vranceanu, D. Dubart","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3339811","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3339811","url":null,"abstract":"This paper introduces a new task to elicit individual aversion to deceiving, defined as the lowest payoff for which an individual agrees to switch from faithful to deceitful communication. The core task is a modified version of the Deception Game as presented in Gneezy (Am. Econ. Rev. 95 (1): 384395: 2005). Deceitful communication brings about a constant loss for the receiver, and a range of benefits for the sender. A multiple-price-list mechanism is used to determine the sender's communication strategy contingent on the various benefits from deception. The results show that 71% of the subjects in the sender role will implement pure or threshold communication strategies. Among them, 40% appear to be process driven, being either \"ethical\" or \"spiteful\". The other 60% respond to incentives in line with the fixed cost of lying theory; they will forego faithful communication if the benefit from deceiving the other is large enough. Regression analysis shows that this reservation payoff¤ is independent of the risk aversion and social preferences of the subject; it would thus capture an inner preference for \"behaving well\".","PeriodicalId":334366,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic)","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132588374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Encouraging Upstream Experimentation and Downstream Coordination in a Design and Development Game 在设计和开发游戏中鼓励上游实验和下游协调
PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-08-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3017809
James David Campbell
{"title":"Encouraging Upstream Experimentation and Downstream Coordination in a Design and Development Game","authors":"James David Campbell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3017809","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3017809","url":null,"abstract":"Upstream players produce design ideas and downstream players select among these ideas to develop finished products. Design diversity is valuable at the upstream stage and coordination is valuable at the downstream stage, in the sense that this maximizes the sum of payoffs to all players. However, this outcome is not always realized since both the upstream and downstream players may have an individual incentive to use different strategies, so that coordination occurs too soon or not at all. This problem is associated with too much predictability or too little difference in the relative value of designs. We show that an intermediary whose interests align with the industry as a whole can solve either problem by selecting among designs in such a way that occasionally rewards inferior ideas, so long as the intermediary has enforcement power or can extract commitments from downstream players. We discuss the application of the model to technology standards, political primaries, and trend-driven industries.","PeriodicalId":334366,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic)","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127646297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Costly Inspection and Money Burning in Internal Capital Markets 内部资本市场的昂贵检查和烧钱行为
PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-04-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3144149
Rohit Patel, Can Urgun
{"title":"Costly Inspection and Money Burning in Internal Capital Markets","authors":"Rohit Patel, Can Urgun","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3144149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3144149","url":null,"abstract":"Bureaucracy and influence activities consume a great deal of managers’ time and effort in an organization. These activities are surplus destroying in the sense that they produce no direct output or information. This paper suggests a positive role for these activities. We develop a model for allocation in internal capital markets that takes a mechanism design perspective and incorporates both costly inspection and money burning (e.g. bureaucracy, influence activities) as tools for the headquarters to pursue optimal allocations. We find that the optimal mechanism deploys both the instruments of costly inspection and money burning, often at the same time on an agent.","PeriodicalId":334366,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133564974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Coup-Proo fing and Military Ine fficiencies: An Experiment 防政变和军事效率:一项实验
PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-07-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2809148
Andrew W. Bausch
{"title":"Coup-Proo fing and Military Ine fficiencies: An Experiment","authors":"Andrew W. Bausch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2809148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2809148","url":null,"abstract":"Coup-proofing occurs when a leader arranges his military to prevent military leaders from overthrowing him. However, coup-proofing often has the additional effect of lowering the military's effectiveness in conflict. Coup-proofing is discussed in the context of the Nouri al-Maliki's regime in Iraq before two formal models are presented. The first model shows when coups are possible, leaders select military commanders with lower ability but higher loyalty. The second model shows that when coups are possible, leaders rotate their military commanders to prevent any one commander from becoming too powerful. The paper then presents experimental tests of the models. The results of these laboratory experiments show that leaders are more likely to select loyal commanders or rotate their commanders under the coup treatment relative to groups with no leadership turnover or with leadership turnover according elections. Thus, when faced with the possibility of a coup, leaders intentionally lower their military effectiveness. This paper captures the dynamics behind a fundamental inefficiency introduced into groups when leadership is valuable, delegation is necessary, and powerful subordinates can remove the leader from office.","PeriodicalId":334366,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory & Experiments (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116865069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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