CGN: Political Contributions & Lobbying by Firms (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Mining for Favors: The Impact of Political Influence on Regulatory Enforcement","authors":"Anastasia V. Shcherbakova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3873473","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3873473","url":null,"abstract":"Regulatory capture can generate significant social and economic costs, particularly<br>in dangerous occupations. In this article I evaluate whether political influence has<br>allowed firms to systematically evade safety and health regulations using data from one<br>of the country’s most dangerous occupations—mining. Using an instrument to capture<br>exogenous variation in political influence decisions, I show that when mining firms use<br>influence, they reduce their expected non-compliance costs by 30 percent, but report a<br>40 percent increase in death rates. Importantly, the largest benefit comes during the<br>adjudicative stage meant to be isolated from political influence.","PeriodicalId":333883,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Political Contributions & Lobbying by Firms (Topic)","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132877985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Cases","authors":"S. Padfield","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2025159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2025159","url":null,"abstract":"In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court held that corporate political speech could not be regulated on the basis of corporate status alone. In support of that conclusion, the majority characterized corporations as mere “associations of citizens.” The dissent, meanwhile, viewed corporations as state-created entities that “differ from natural persons in fundamental ways” and “have been effectively delegated responsibility for ensuring society’s economic welfare.\" I have argued previously that these two competing conceptions of the corporation implicate corporate theory, with the majority adopting an aggregate/contractarian view, and the dissent an artificial entity/concession view. Even if one understands Citizens United to be primarily about listeners’ rights, this stark contrast of competing theories of the corporation is difficult to ignore. At the very least, what the majority and dissent thought about corporate speakers was relevant to the question whether the campaign finance restrictions challenged in Citizens United should fall within that narrow class of speech restrictions justified on the basis of the speaker’s identity due to “an interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their functions.” Somewhat surprisingly, however, the majority was silent, and the dissent expressly disavowed, any role for corporate theory. I have previously offered some explanations for this apparent inconsistency, and concluded that an active “silent corporate theory debate” was indeed integral to the outcome of Citizens United - despite protestations to the contrary. In this project, I examine the key Supreme Court cases leading up to Citizens United to see whether a similar silent corporate theory debate is evident in those cases. I find that there is indeed such an on-going debate, and proceed to argue that in future cases involving the rights of corporations the justices should make their views regarding the proper theory of the corporation express. This will allow for a more meaningful discussion of the merits of those decisions, and impose an additional layer of intellectual accountability on the jurists","PeriodicalId":333883,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Political Contributions & Lobbying by Firms (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131315682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Corporate Governance of Political Expenditures: 2011 Benchmark Report on S&P 500 Companies","authors":"Heidi J. Welsh, Robin Young","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1959566","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1959566","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate accountability and disclosure of political expenditures appears to be increasing, with the boards of 31 percent of S&P 500 companies now explicitly overseeing such spending, compared to 23 percent in 2010. However, this increased oversight and transparency does not appear to correlate with less spending, as companies with board oversight of political expenditures spent about 30 percent more in 2010 than those without such explicit policies. This paper examines two years of corporate political spending governance data collected on all U.S. companies in the S&P 500 in 2010 and 2011, documenting an increasing role for boards of directors and greater transparency about the process companies use to spend money in politics - both directly in political campaigns and indirectly through trade associations and 501(c)4 non-profit groups. It finds voluntary disclosure of money spent remains limited, however, particularly for indirect spending, and inconsistencies between what companies report and data gleaned from public records. The paper also calculates a direct political spending footprint for S&P 500 companies - the amount of money companies contributed to national political committees and state-level candidates, parties and ballot initiatives, as well as federal lobbying - concluding companies disbursed $1.1 billion in 2010. In addition, the paper provides comparative \"political spending intensity\" figures normalized by revenue for different sectors. Two case studies examine ballot initiatives spending in California by PG&E in the 2010 election and indirect corporate support for judicial races in Ohio by Procter & Gamble. Appendices provide an analysis of current investor campaigns for more disclosure of political spending and excerpts from corporate policies about independent expenditures.","PeriodicalId":333883,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Political Contributions & Lobbying by Firms (Topic)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115585368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}