{"title":"徇私:政治影响对监管执行的影响","authors":"Anastasia V. Shcherbakova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3873473","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Regulatory capture can generate significant social and economic costs, particularly<br>in dangerous occupations. In this article I evaluate whether political influence has<br>allowed firms to systematically evade safety and health regulations using data from one<br>of the country’s most dangerous occupations—mining. Using an instrument to capture<br>exogenous variation in political influence decisions, I show that when mining firms use<br>influence, they reduce their expected non-compliance costs by 30 percent, but report a<br>40 percent increase in death rates. Importantly, the largest benefit comes during the<br>adjudicative stage meant to be isolated from political influence.","PeriodicalId":333883,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Political Contributions & Lobbying by Firms (Topic)","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Mining for Favors: The Impact of Political Influence on Regulatory Enforcement\",\"authors\":\"Anastasia V. Shcherbakova\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3873473\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Regulatory capture can generate significant social and economic costs, particularly<br>in dangerous occupations. In this article I evaluate whether political influence has<br>allowed firms to systematically evade safety and health regulations using data from one<br>of the country’s most dangerous occupations—mining. Using an instrument to capture<br>exogenous variation in political influence decisions, I show that when mining firms use<br>influence, they reduce their expected non-compliance costs by 30 percent, but report a<br>40 percent increase in death rates. Importantly, the largest benefit comes during the<br>adjudicative stage meant to be isolated from political influence.\",\"PeriodicalId\":333883,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"CGN: Political Contributions & Lobbying by Firms (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"85 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"CGN: Political Contributions & Lobbying by Firms (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3873473\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CGN: Political Contributions & Lobbying by Firms (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3873473","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Mining for Favors: The Impact of Political Influence on Regulatory Enforcement
Regulatory capture can generate significant social and economic costs, particularly in dangerous occupations. In this article I evaluate whether political influence has allowed firms to systematically evade safety and health regulations using data from one of the country’s most dangerous occupations—mining. Using an instrument to capture exogenous variation in political influence decisions, I show that when mining firms use influence, they reduce their expected non-compliance costs by 30 percent, but report a 40 percent increase in death rates. Importantly, the largest benefit comes during the adjudicative stage meant to be isolated from political influence.