The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Cases

S. Padfield
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引用次数: 16

Abstract

In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court held that corporate political speech could not be regulated on the basis of corporate status alone. In support of that conclusion, the majority characterized corporations as mere “associations of citizens.” The dissent, meanwhile, viewed corporations as state-created entities that “differ from natural persons in fundamental ways” and “have been effectively delegated responsibility for ensuring society’s economic welfare." I have argued previously that these two competing conceptions of the corporation implicate corporate theory, with the majority adopting an aggregate/contractarian view, and the dissent an artificial entity/concession view. Even if one understands Citizens United to be primarily about listeners’ rights, this stark contrast of competing theories of the corporation is difficult to ignore. At the very least, what the majority and dissent thought about corporate speakers was relevant to the question whether the campaign finance restrictions challenged in Citizens United should fall within that narrow class of speech restrictions justified on the basis of the speaker’s identity due to “an interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their functions.” Somewhat surprisingly, however, the majority was silent, and the dissent expressly disavowed, any role for corporate theory. I have previously offered some explanations for this apparent inconsistency, and concluded that an active “silent corporate theory debate” was indeed integral to the outcome of Citizens United - despite protestations to the contrary. In this project, I examine the key Supreme Court cases leading up to Citizens United to see whether a similar silent corporate theory debate is evident in those cases. I find that there is indeed such an on-going debate, and proceed to argue that in future cases involving the rights of corporations the justices should make their views regarding the proper theory of the corporation express. This will allow for a more meaningful discussion of the merits of those decisions, and impose an additional layer of intellectual accountability on the jurists
公司理论在最高法院竞选资金案件中的沉默作用
在“联合公民诉联邦选举委员会”一案中,最高法院以5比4的多数裁定,不能仅根据公司地位对公司的政治言论进行监管。为了支持这一结论,多数人认为公司仅仅是“公民的社团”。与此同时,持不同意见的人认为,公司是国家创建的实体,“在根本方面不同于自然人”,“被有效地赋予了确保社会经济福利的责任”。我以前曾说过,这两种相互竞争的公司概念涉及公司理论,大多数人采用了集合/契约论的观点,而持不同意见的人则采用了人为实体/让步的观点。即使人们理解“联合公民”主要关注的是听众的权利,这种相互竞争的公司理论之间的鲜明对比也很难被忽视。至少,多数派和持不同意见的人对公司发言人的看法与“联合公民”案中受到质疑的竞选资金限制是否应该属于基于发言人身份的狭隘言论限制,这种限制是基于“允许政府实体履行其职能的利益”。然而,有些令人惊讶的是,大多数人保持沉默,持不同意见的人明确否认公司理论的任何作用。我之前曾对这种明显的不一致提供过一些解释,并得出结论认为,积极的“沉默的企业理论辩论”确实是联合公民案结果的组成部分——尽管有人提出了相反的抗议。在这个项目中,我研究了导致“联合公民”案的最高法院关键案件,看看在这些案件中是否明显存在类似的沉默的公司理论辩论。我发现确实存在这样一种正在进行的辩论,并继续认为,在未来涉及公司权利的案件中,法官应该就公司的适当理论表达自己的观点。这将允许对这些决定的优点进行更有意义的讨论,并对法学家施加额外的智力责任
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