RUDN Journal of Philosophy最新文献_第8页

Fanaticism as a Τype of Μentality in the Works of Gabriel Marcel and Karen Armstrong 狂热主义在加布里埃尔·马塞尔和卡伦·阿姆斯特朗作品中的Τype和Μentality

RUDN Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-09-30 DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-697-712

F. I. Guseynov

{"title":"Fanaticism as a Τype of Μentality in the Works of Gabriel Marcel and Karen Armstrong","authors":"F. I. Guseynov","doi":"10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-697-712","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-697-712","url":null,"abstract":"The author examines the fanatical type of mentality in its secular and religious forms based on the analysis of the works of Gabriel Marcel and Karen Armstrong. The origins of the phenomenon of fanaticism are found in the basic foundations of Modern culture as the time of the replacement of myth by logos (Armstrong) and the domination of the abstract spirit (Marcel). The understanding of the foundations of fanaticism as a broad phenomenon undertaken by the French philosopher and the British religious scholar is associated with interpretations of the concept of the transcendent. Although the socio-spiritual situation in which Marcel and Armstrong work is different, their conclusions generally coincide and become especially relevant today, when the world is on the verge of a new world war. The author briefly formulates definitions of some basic categories of G. Marcel's philosophy - \"philosophical experience\", \"first reflection\", \"second reflection\", \"fanaticized consciousness\", \"disparity\", \"abstraction\", \"abstract spirit\", \"collective violence\", \"property\", \"being\", \"ideologue\", \"intersubjectivity\", \"identity\", etc. Gabriel Marcel's reflection on the fundamental difference between a true believer and a religious fanatic is discussed, despite the fact that both are spoken on behalf of absolute values. The will to refuse to \"question\" the object of one's faith presupposes immunity to the arguments of critical thinking, which by definition would be intended to act as a kind of antidote to fanaticism as a special type of radical consciousness. The basis of fanaticism turns out to be insensitivity to what is the fanatic's idefix, while modern fanatics, in contrast to the ordinary idea of them, are often well-educated people. This is a decentered consciousness dominated by \"carnal thought\". Such an idea may be called the idea of equality or justice, but it is not actually a thought born from experience and sympathy for people.","PeriodicalId":32651,"journal":{"name":"RUDN Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48197658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

An Old Annex, Long since Unhabitable: The Critique of Practical Reason as an Offspring of Architectonic Classicism 一个早已不宜居住的老附属建筑:作为建筑古典主义后代的实践理性批判

RUDN Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-09-30 DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-623-643

A. Sudakov

{"title":"An Old Annex, Long since Unhabitable: The Critique of Practical Reason as an Offspring of Architectonic Classicism","authors":"A. Sudakov","doi":"10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-623-643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-623-643","url":null,"abstract":"The Critique of Practical Reason is traditionally regarded as one of Kant’s central works on practical philosophy. Its structural and stylistic parallels with the Critique of Pure Reason sustain one’s conviction about its fundamental systematic relevance in Kant’s ethics. Nevertheless, the compositional sketch of the system of critical philosophy in the first Critique does not presume any separate critique of reason in its practical use. This inspires to investigate the question of the sense and aim of the critique of practical reason in Kant’s main works of the 1780s. Such an investigation discovers, that the concept of such a critique emerges in Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, which intends to find and to establish the supreme principle of pure morals, to supply its full-value deduction and insofar to present a sufficient introduction to the system of moral metaphysics. It is for the purpose of such a deduction, which demonstrates the normative validity and truth of categorical imperatives, that Kant considers a transition to a critique of practical reason necessary. And yet this transition as well as this critique are presumed to take place within the subject field of the Groundwork itself: the main features of the practical critique of reason as described in the Groundwork III are, according to Kant, sufficient for the purpose of justification of critical morality. If, however, the deduction of the moral law given in Groundwork III should fail, no possible future “progress of metaphysics” could compensate this failure, - because this deduction occurs at the «extreme boundary of all practical philosophy”, beyond which lies the realm of moral faith. Kant scholars consider the concepts of the “fact of pure reason” and the doctrine of the highest derivative good as crucial innovations of the second “Critique”. There are however reasons enough to dispute the question as to whether both doctrines really make for an innovation - and for an advance.","PeriodicalId":32651,"journal":{"name":"RUDN Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46208674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Hermann Cohen’s logic of the pure knowledge as a philosophy of science 赫尔曼·科恩的纯知识逻辑作为一种科学哲学

RUDN Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-09-30 DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-658-671

Z. Sokuler

{"title":"Hermann Cohen’s logic of the pure knowledge as a philosophy of science","authors":"Z. Sokuler","doi":"10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-658-671","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-658-671","url":null,"abstract":"The connection of Hermann Сohen’s “The Logic of Pure Knowledge” with the revolutionary transformations in physics and mathematics at the end of the 19th century is shown. Сohen criticised Kant’s answer to the question “How is mathematics possible”? If Kant refers to a priori forms of pure intuition, Сohen sees in it a restriction of freedom of mathematical thinking by limits of intuition. It has been shown that Cohen's position is in accordance with the main development of mathematics in the last decades of the 19th century, in particular, with K. Weierstrass’ striving to get rid of geometrical or mechanical images and intuitions in the mathematical analysis. Cohen was also well informed about the latest ideas in physics of his time. They are also discussed in “The Logic of Pure Knowledge.” The revolutionary spirit of physics and mathematics was appealing to Cohen, and he felt a corresponding enthusiasm for it. The ongoing scientific revolution is consonant with Cohen’s assertion that the foundations of science are hypotheses. The purity of pure thinking does not guarantee the correctness of any of its constructions. Each step in the development of science requires a critique of existing notions. The development of knowledge from the naive to the critical one shows a movement from a picture of the world as a set of stable things to a picture of continuous movement and change, where change is more important than what changes. Cohen sees such a development in an evolution of the concept of substance in modern physics and he welcomes the replacement of material substance by energy, seeing this movement as a confirmation of critical idealism. Finally, it is discussed whether we can speak of the actuality of Cohen’s logic of pure knowledge.","PeriodicalId":32651,"journal":{"name":"RUDN Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44386911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Karl Popper and the Problem of Essentialism in Philosophy 卡尔·波普尔与哲学本质主义问题

RUDN Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-09-30 DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-672-686

A. Antonov

{"title":"Karl Popper and the Problem of Essentialism in Philosophy","authors":"A. Antonov","doi":"10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-672-686","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-672-686","url":null,"abstract":"In modern philosophy, essentialism is in most cases regarded as an outdated and, in fact, incorrect philosophical trend. And one of the scientists who created such a reputation of essentialism was the famous English philosopher of Austrian origin Karl Popper. The success of his book “The Open Society and its Enemies” led to the fact that in the West essentialism began to be considered not only cognitively untenable, but also suspicious as the theoretical basis of fascism, communism and totalitarianism. In the article, K. Popper’s arguments against essentialism are reviewed all over again, and it is shown that K. Popper’s criticism of essentialism as an anti-scientific and outdated doctrine is not the point of view of the philosophy as a whole, but it is just the position of empirical positivism. Essentialism deals with the reality that lies on the other side of phenomena. And this, according to K. Popper, necessarily leads to “ultimate” definitions. However, in accordance with the doctrine of falsification by K. Popper himself, every scientific conclusion within its expiration date is “ultimate”. The article shows that in reality essentialism did not only play an extraordinary role in the classical metaphysical theory of knowledge, but also continues to do so within the framework of modern ontology. Moreover, in the latter case, he does it with the help of abduction which is a specific form of logical inference generating scientific hypotheses. The existence of abduction in science, which generates new knowledge, suggests that essentialism is not something, at best, tolerable and excusable. This is the main way to development of sciences in general. In all cases, the author of the article considers only logical entities, but not legal, theological or any other.","PeriodicalId":32651,"journal":{"name":"RUDN Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42074615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Rosenzweig and Bakhtin. Hermeneutics of Language and Verbal Art in the System of the Philosophy of Dialogue 罗森茨威格和巴赫金。对话哲学体系中的语言解释学与言语艺术

RUDN Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-09-30 DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-537-556

I. Dvorkin

{"title":"Rosenzweig and Bakhtin. Hermeneutics of Language and Verbal Art in the System of the Philosophy of Dialogue","authors":"I. Dvorkin","doi":"10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-537-556","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-537-556","url":null,"abstract":"For all the differences in the teachings and fate of Franz Rosenzweig and Mikhail Bakhtin, comparing them with one another is extremely instructive and reveals important and often lost meanings of 20th-century philosophy. Bakhtin made his debut in 1929 as the author of Problems of Dostoevsky’s Creative Art, but then went into exile for sufficient years and emerged from oblivion only in the 1960s. Rosenzweig died in 1929 and was almost forgotten for many years. Now, almost a century later, we see in Bakhtin’s philosophy, especially in his early works, and in Rosenzweig’s philosophy very much in common. Both sought to create a new philosophical system that radically rethinks the subject of philosophy. Both went beyond the traditional New European ontology, both recognized the fundamentality of language and language arts in the philosophy of the future, and, finally, both became the creators of the philosophy of dialogue as an important trend in 20th-century thought. For all that, there were many cultural, religious, and intellectual differences between Bakhtin and Rosenzweig. However, consideration of both the commonalities and differences in their philosophical systems is extremely fruitful not only for the cultural history of the 20th century but also for philosophical studies of the future.","PeriodicalId":32651,"journal":{"name":"RUDN Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48552683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Homo Hallucinas: Review of the Book «Introduction to Singular Philosophy» of F.I. Girenok 人的幻觉:书评的书«介绍奇异哲学»的F.I.吉雷诺克

RUDN Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-09-30 DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-713-719

D. D. Romanov

引用次数: 0

Interpretation of the Origin by F. Rosenzweig and M. Heidegger 罗森茨威格与海德格尔对起源的阐释

RUDN Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-09-30 DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-557-571

Maksim F. Litvinov

{"title":"Interpretation of the Origin by F. Rosenzweig and M. Heidegger","authors":"Maksim F. Litvinov","doi":"10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-557-571","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-557-571","url":null,"abstract":"The research focuses on the problem of interpretation of such a concept as the origin, which is ultimate for philosophical thought and bases existentially oriented constructions of Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Heidegger. It is argues in this paper the fundamental difference between the interpretations of the origin in “The Star of Redemption» and in «Being and Time”, despite all points of intersection and coincidences that bring closer together dialogical and existential-historical thinking. Such differentiation of positions is determined by the necessity both to neutralize romantic connotations, which expose the origin ( Ursprung ) as abyss ( Abgrund ), and to methodologically clarify the possibility not so much to think as to practically assert a limited and unclosed within itself integral being, including ontological and ethical dimensions. The origin of oblivion and renewal, imposed by Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity, is contrasted with Rosenzweig's origin of the “eternal overworld”, reconstructed on the basis of Herman Cohen's religio-philosophical intuitions and his analysis of the infinitesimal as a principle of reality. Rosenzweig’s position, which aims at a correlative consideration of the purely logical content of the infinitesimal quantity (almost-Nothing) and the existential experience of the finiteness of everything, is favorably distinguished by the absence of a one-sided focus on recalling, where fore-running although is declared, but it is immediately restrained by being-towards-death. As a result, Rosenzweig’s dialogism turns out to be free from overestimating what Heidegger’s interpretation calls resoluteness, which in fact is not much different from paralysis in the clearance of being. Cohen’s problem of an infinite task's realization, being actualized in Rosenzweig’s conception, allows to go beyond being-towards-death in juxtaposing the trajectories of initial elements into a true gestalt.","PeriodicalId":32651,"journal":{"name":"RUDN Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45419643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

How social ontology is possible from the point of view of epistemology and philosophy of language? 从认识论和语言哲学的角度看，社会本体论是如何可能的?

RUDN Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-09-30 DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-607-622

A. Antonovskiy, R. Barash

{"title":"How social ontology is possible from the point of view of epistemology and philosophy of language?","authors":"A. Antonovskiy, R. Barash","doi":"10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-607-622","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-607-622","url":null,"abstract":"The article critically examines the project of Brian Epstein's social ontology. The authors propose to interpret a social fact as derived from the appropriate perspective of an observer carrying out a structural reconstruction of a social phenomenon and identify difficulties in the way of analyzing social facts as structurally independent of causally determining factors. The article shows that the determination and foundation of social facts cannot be understood as asymmetric, substantiates the symmetrical nature of the relationship between the determinable complex fact and the ontological foundations that determine them, and suggests that the judgments describing them are equivalent, and also proves the need to involve philosophical and scientific methodology, the resources of the philosophy of language and epistemology to address the issue of the validity of projects “ontological fixation”, which the authors of the article propose to consider as a scientific classification. Understanding the ontology of the social is possible only when going beyond its limits, and any classifications can be idiosyncrasies of individual classifiers or observers, scientifically unequal and requiring epistemological evaluation. The authors note that epistemology allows us to judge the necessity or, on the contrary, artificiality of classification, and the question of the ontological basis of a social fact should be solved by analogy. Accordingly, the search for such ontological foundations is not possible without prior resolution of the epistemological problem: which classifications (fixations) of “natural” or “social species” are structurally necessary (in the sense that their macro-properties properties stem from the internal structure), and which are arbitrarily constructed by the observer, based on his idiosyncrasy or local-historical, cultural or ideological position.","PeriodicalId":32651,"journal":{"name":"RUDN Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44247493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Rosenzweig and Luther. The Concept of Faith in the Perspective of «New Thinking» and Bible Translation 罗森茨威格和路德。新思维视野下的信仰观与圣经翻译

RUDN Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-09-30 DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-493-508

H. Dober

引用次数: 0

B. Epstein’s Social Ontology 爱泼斯坦的社会本体论

RUDN Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-09-30 DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-572-581

A. Orekhov

{"title":"B. Epstein’s Social Ontology","authors":"A. Orekhov","doi":"10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-572-581","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-572-581","url":null,"abstract":"The article realizes the analysis of B. Epstein’s social ontology. Social ontology is teaching on basic principles of constructing of social reality, founded on interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary strategies of investigations of the social world. There are five leading programs in contemporary social ontology: “CIIF-program” of J. Searle, “Cambridge program” of T. Lawson, “Tufts program” of B. Epstein, “critical realism” and “the other institutionalism”. “Tufts program” is one from them. Social ontology tries to make progress on clarifying all of these in the context of specific topics: group intentions, laws, corporations, property, institutions, social groups. To begin an inquiry in social ontology, we need to choose which entities to work out the ontology of, that is, where to focus our attention in analyzing the social world. B. Epstein supposes his own model of re-conceptualization of framework of social ontology: two concepts play here a leading role, - “grounding” and “anchoring”. “Anchoring” and grounding”: these are two fundamental aspects to the building of the social world. Correspondingly, social ontology consists of two distinct projects. The grounding project is the inquiry into the conditions for the social facts to obtain. There are facts in the world are metaphysically sufficient reasons, - that is, grounds, - but it is more exact social facts of some kind. The anchoring project is the inquiry into what puts those conditions in place. Also it should be realized research concerning the grounding conditions for social facts. The last work of B. Epstein “The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of Social Sciences” is devoted to criticism of ontological individualism in philosophical analysis of social knowledge.","PeriodicalId":32651,"journal":{"name":"RUDN Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43803553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0