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Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design最新文献

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Stable and envy-free lottery allocations for affordable housing 为经济适用房提供稳定且不受嫉妒影响的彩票拨款
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design Pub Date : 2023-12-21 DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2023.12.001
Zhan Wang, Jinpeng Ma, Hongwei Zhang
{"title":"Stable and envy-free lottery allocations for affordable housing","authors":"Zhan Wang, Jinpeng Ma, Hongwei Zhang","doi":"10.22574/jmid.2023.12.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.001","url":null,"abstract":"Affordable housing lotteries often enforce a rule preventing duplicate lottery entries that makes the model in Hylland & Zeckhauser (1979) (HZ) inapplicable. We revisit HZ and propose a new individually stable (IS) allocation that can be achieved by a Tickets algorithm and accommodate the rule. A strictly envy-free (SEF) allocation is shown to be the unique IS and Pareto-optimal allocation, the outcome of the unique strong Nash equilibrium of a congestion game, and the unique Pseudo market equilibrium allocation in HZ. The algorithm always obtains the unique SEF allocation (if any) and fixes a designed flaw of existing lotteries.","PeriodicalId":32451,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design","volume":"65 45","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138950701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players 具有近似激励相容性和众多参与者的最优机制设计
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design Pub Date : 2023-12-21 DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2023.12.004
Pathikrit Basu
{"title":"Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players","authors":"Pathikrit Basu","doi":"10.22574/jmid.2023.12.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.004","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a setting in which a mechanism designer must choose the appropriate social alternative depending on the state of nature. We study the problem of optimal design and demonstrate that a mechanism which allocates resources so as to achieve the social optimum and assigns payments equal to the posterior expected utility of the agent at the social optimum, is an epsilon-optimal mechanism for environments with many players.","PeriodicalId":32451,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design","volume":"6 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138948575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reducing incentive constraints in bidimensional screening 减少二维筛选中的激励约束
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design Pub Date : 2023-12-21 DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2023.12.005
Braulio Calagua
{"title":"Reducing incentive constraints in bidimensional screening","authors":"Braulio Calagua","doi":"10.22574/jmid.2023.12.005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.005","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies screening problems with quasilinear preferences, where agents' private information is two-dimensional and the allocation instrument is one-dimensional. We define a preorder to compare types based on their marginal valuation to the instrument, which facilitates the reduction of incentive compatibility constraints that must be checked. With this approach, the discretized problem becomes computationally tractable. As an application, we numerically solve a problem introduced by Lewis & Sappington (1988)","PeriodicalId":32451,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design","volume":"43 17","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138949937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Golden rule in cooperative commons 合作公地的黄金法则
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design Pub Date : 2023-12-21 DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2023.12.002
S. Flåm
{"title":"Golden rule in cooperative commons","authors":"S. Flåm","doi":"10.22574/jmid.2023.12.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.002","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers common use of natural, renewable resources. It identifies good prospects for efficiency and welfare. To be precise, a core outcome -- hence cooperation -- can be secured over time by principal planning of total quotas, and in time by agents who share these in short-term markets. Information flows in two directions: to the principal as market prices and from him as total quantities. Of particular interest is eventual convergence to a golden-rule, steady state.","PeriodicalId":32451,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design","volume":"48 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138950031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Centralized clearing mechanisms: A programming approach 集中清理机制:一种编程方法
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design Pub Date : 2022-12-03 DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2022.12.002
P. Csóka, P. Herings
{"title":"Centralized clearing mechanisms: A programming approach","authors":"P. Csóka, P. Herings","doi":"10.22574/jmid.2022.12.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2022.12.002","url":null,"abstract":"We consider financial networks where agents are linked to each other by financial contracts. A centralized clearing mechanism collects the initial endowments, the liabilities and the division rules of the agents and determines the payments to be made. A division rule specifies how the assets of the agents should be rationed. Since payments made depend on payments received, we are looking for solutions to a system of equations. The set of solutions is known to have a lattice structure, leading to the existence of a least and a greatest clearing payment matrix. Previous research has shown how decentralized clearing selects the least clearing payment matrix. We present a centralized approach towards clearing in order to select the greatest clearing payment matrix. To do so, we formulate the determination of the greatest clearing payment matrix as a programming problem. When agents use proportional division rules, this programming problem corresponds to a linear programming problem. We show that for other common division rules, it can be written as an integer linear programming problem.","PeriodicalId":32451,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41919577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Object-based unawareness: Axioms 基于对象的不知情：公理
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design Pub Date : 2021-12-07 DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2021.12.001
Oliver J. Board, Kim-Sau Chung
{"title":"Object-based unawareness: Axioms","authors":"Oliver J. Board, Kim-Sau Chung","doi":"10.22574/jmid.2021.12.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2021.12.001","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides foundations for a model of unawareness, called object-based unawareness (OBU) structures, that can be used to distinguish between what an agent is unaware of and what she simply does not know. At an informal level, this distinction plays a key role in a number of papers such as Tirole (2009) and Chung & Fortnow (2016). In this paper, we give the model-theoretic description of OBU structures by showing how they assign truth conditions to every sentence of the formal language used. We then prove a model-theoretic sound and completeness theorem, which characterizes OBU structures in terms of a system of axioms. We then verify that agents in OBU structures do not violate any of the introspection axioms that are generally considered to be necessary conditions for a plausible notion of unawareness. Applications are provided in our companion paper.","PeriodicalId":32451,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44818083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
A deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast, and fair childcare assignment 分散、快速、公平的托儿分配的延迟接受机制
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design Pub Date : 2021-12-07 DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2021.12.003
Tobias Reischmann, Thilo Klein, Sven Giegerich
{"title":"A deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast, and fair childcare assignment","authors":"Tobias Reischmann, Thilo Klein, Sven Giegerich","doi":"10.22574/jmid.2021.12.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2021.12.003","url":null,"abstract":"We design and implement a program-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism with ties (DAT) and apply it to childcare assignment in two German cities. The mechanism can accommodate complementarities in providers' preferences, is fast to terminate even in larger cities, is difficult to manipulate in practice, and produces stable allocations. It can be further sped up by introducing two new features. First, allowing for an arbitrary share of facilities who participate in a centralized manner by submitting a rank-order-list over applicants. Second, by breaking ties in applicants' rank-order-lists on a first-come-first-serve basis, which sets incentives for programs to propose faster. We provide and evaluate simulation results.","PeriodicalId":32451,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46720105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Axioms concerning uncertain disagreement points in 2-person bargaining problems 关于二人谈判问题中不确定分歧点的公理
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design Pub Date : 2021-12-07 DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2021.12.002
Y. Chun
{"title":"Axioms concerning uncertain disagreement points in 2-person bargaining problems","authors":"Y. Chun","doi":"10.22574/jmid.2021.12.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2021.12.002","url":null,"abstract":"We consider 2-person bargaining situations in which the feasible set is known, but the disagreement point is uncertain. We investigate the implications of various axioms concerning uncertain disagreement points and characterize the family of linear solutions, which includes the egalitarian, lexicographic egalitarian, Nash, and Kalai-Rosenthal solutions. We also show that how the important subfamilies (or members) of this family can be singled out by imposing additional axioms or strengthening the axioms used in the characterizations.","PeriodicalId":32451,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41458943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On a class of linear-state differential games with subgame individually rational and time consistent bargaining solutions 一类具有子博弈个体理性和时间一致议价解的线性状态微分对策
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design Pub Date : 2020-12-07 DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2020.12.003
Simon Hoof
{"title":"On a class of linear-state differential games with subgame individually rational and time consistent bargaining solutions","authors":"Simon Hoof","doi":"10.22574/jmid.2020.12.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2020.12.003","url":null,"abstract":"We consider n-person pure bargaining games in which the space of feasible payoffs is constructed via a normal form differential game. At the beginning of the game the agents bargain over strategies to be played over an infinite time horizon. An initial cooperative solution (a strategy tuple) is called subgame individually rational (SIR) if it remains individually rational throughout the entire game and time consistent (TC) if renegotiating it at a later time instant yields the original solution. For a class of linear-state differential games we show that any solution which is individually rational at the beginning of the game satisfies SIR and TC if the space of admissible cooperative strategies is restricted to constants. We discuss an application from environmental economics.","PeriodicalId":32451,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41795723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Efficient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Valuations 具有相互依赖估价的有效和优势可解拍卖
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design Pub Date : 2019-11-01 DOI: 10.22574/JMID.2019.11.001
Kim-Sau Chung, Jeffrey C. Ely
{"title":"Efficient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Valuations","authors":"Kim-Sau Chung, Jeffrey C. Ely","doi":"10.22574/JMID.2019.11.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22574/JMID.2019.11.001","url":null,"abstract":"In auction environments in which agents have private values, the Vickrey auction induces agents to truthfully reveal their preferences and selects the efficient allocation accordingly. When the agents' valuations are interdependent, various generalizations of the Vickrey auction have been found which provide incentives for truthful revelation of all private information and preserve efficiency. However, these mechanisms generally do not provide the bidders with dominant strategies. The existing literature has therefore used a stronger equilibrium solution concept. In this paper we show that while the generalized VCG mechanism admits a multiplicity of equilibria, many of which are inefficient. We give conditions under which the efficiency equilibrium is the unique outcome of iterative elimination of ex post weakly dominated strategies. With two bidders, the standard single-crossing condition is sufficient. With more than two bidders, we show by example that a strengthening of the single-crossing condition is necessary.","PeriodicalId":32451,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47658420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
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