{"title":"具有近似激励相容性和众多参与者的最优机制设计","authors":"Pathikrit Basu","doi":"10.22574/jmid.2023.12.004","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We consider a setting in which a mechanism designer must choose the appropriate social alternative depending on the state of nature. We study the problem of optimal design and demonstrate that a mechanism which allocates resources so as to achieve the social optimum and assigns payments equal to the posterior expected utility of the agent at the social optimum, is an epsilon-optimal mechanism for environments with many players.","PeriodicalId":32451,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design","volume":"6 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players\",\"authors\":\"Pathikrit Basu\",\"doi\":\"10.22574/jmid.2023.12.004\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We consider a setting in which a mechanism designer must choose the appropriate social alternative depending on the state of nature. We study the problem of optimal design and demonstrate that a mechanism which allocates resources so as to achieve the social optimum and assigns payments equal to the posterior expected utility of the agent at the social optimum, is an epsilon-optimal mechanism for environments with many players.\",\"PeriodicalId\":32451,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design\",\"volume\":\"6 4\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.004\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.004","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players
We consider a setting in which a mechanism designer must choose the appropriate social alternative depending on the state of nature. We study the problem of optimal design and demonstrate that a mechanism which allocates resources so as to achieve the social optimum and assigns payments equal to the posterior expected utility of the agent at the social optimum, is an epsilon-optimal mechanism for environments with many players.
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