{"title":"¿Es posible una ontología procesual de las entidades bioquímicas? Consideraciones a partir del caso de los receptores celulares y la señalización celular","authors":"Fiorela Alassia","doi":"10.17533/udea.ef.345867","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.345867","url":null,"abstract":"Las macromoléculas biológicas, consideradas como los ítems del dominio bioquímico, son típicamente concebidas bajo la categoría ontológica de individuos sustanciales. En este trabajo argumentaré que el marco filosófico de la ontología procesual, según el cual el mundo viviente no está poblado de individuos sino de una jerarquía dinámica de procesos, resulta más adecuado para dar cuenta de la estructura y funcionamiento de las macromoléculas. En particular, analizaré su aplicación al fenómeno de la señalización celular y a uno de sus conceptos claves, los receptores celulares. Los conocimientos actuales en bioquímica permiten concebir los receptores como entidades procesuales y dinámicas, estabilizadas relacionalmente y no separadas del fenómeno bioquímico del que forman parte.","PeriodicalId":32344,"journal":{"name":"Estudios de Filosofia","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45615266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Can there be an input from philosophical debates on a better use of nature? Towards an improvement of nature rights in environmental economics","authors":"E. Nuppenau","doi":"10.17533/udea.ef.345881","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.345881","url":null,"abstract":"This contribution will deal with granting rights to nature. We will define nature rights as a social process of creating institutions which are linked to philosophical discourses on nature perceptions. The idea is to use different narratives in order to understand how nature rights have and can be accomplished/derived by humans. Then we will give hints for future directions of right detection embedded in eco-systems. We will specifically focus on right derivation needed for contracting with nature. We take beaver, wolf and black tern as examples and generalize on case specific findings. All of them need habitats and landscapes in which they can live. The message is that landscapes and habitats are part of nature rights and that they must be also addressed, not only nature rights for individual species. Additionally, we will use different strains of thought to get hints on practical nature rights establishment.\u0000 ","PeriodicalId":32344,"journal":{"name":"Estudios de Filosofia","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44166279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Deleuze’s reading of the Critique of Pure Reason","authors":"Pablo Pachilla","doi":"10.17533/udea.ef.343613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.343613","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to provide an analysis of Gilles Deleuze’s interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason such as it appears in his 1963 monographic work La Philosophie critique de Kant. We will show that the originality of Deleuze’s reading lies in reading the critical project in retrospect, taking the sensus communis problem from the Critique of the Power of Judgment and applying it to the first Critique. In so doing, he points out the survival of a pre-established harmony, now interiorized, both between heterogeneous faculties and between the matter of phenomena and the Ideas of reason. This implies a reinterpretation of the critical project that has passed unnoticed within Kantian studies and that places the Third Critique as the ground of the previous ones, unveiling common sense as a condition of possibility of knowledge.","PeriodicalId":32344,"journal":{"name":"Estudios de Filosofia","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46325455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Memoria y percepción en la entrevista autobiográfica: una simulación episódica que se adapta en tiempo real al contexto","authors":"Carlos Alberto Guerrero Velázquez","doi":"10.17533/udea.ef.n64a02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n64a02","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Normalmente se piensa en la percepción y la memoria como dos capacidades independientes, creyendo que la primera solo tiene influencia sobre la segunda durante la codificación. En las entrevistas autobiográficas de historia oral y memoria histórica, los entrevistados seleccionan, adaptan y completan sus recuerdos para crear diferentes versiones de ellos. En este artículo se argumenta que lo anterior es consecuencia de la naturaleza simulativa de la memoria episódica, y del empleo por los entrevistados de información perceptiva para generar y adaptar sus recuerdos a un discurso autobiográfico, buscando satisfacer un propósito comunicativo. Para ilustrar esto, se analizan tres factores contextuales que influyen sobre la construcción del recuerdo en una entrevista autobiográfica (objetivo comunicativo, idioma de comunicación e interacción emocional), mostrando que, en este tipo de recuperación, memoria y percepción contribuyen simultáneamente a construir simulaciones de eventos que se adaptan en tiempo real al contexto donde ocurre la evocación.\u0000","PeriodicalId":32344,"journal":{"name":"Estudios de Filosofia","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44325315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Descartes y la memoria intelectual","authors":"Diego Díaz Quiroz","doi":"10.17533/udea.ef.n64a06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n64a06","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000En el presente artículo se investiga la doctrina de la memoria intelectual en Descartes. En sus escritos, Descartes no solamente reconoció una memoria corporal, explicable en términos puramente fisiológicos, sino también una memoria intelectual o espiritual. En el presente artículo, se investiga si Descartes postuló una memoria intelectual por motivos teológicos o por motivos filosóficos. A partir del análisis de ciertos textos específicos en los cuales Descartes explica con relativo detalle en qué consiste la memoria intelectual, se intentará mostrar que Descartes, por motivos estrictamente filosóficos, apela a la memoria intelectual para explicar algunos procesos de reminiscencia que se producen en el ser humano. Las motivaciones de Descartes para postular una memoria intelectual no son teológicas, como han sostenido algunos comentadores contemporáneos de la doctrina cartesiana de la memoria.\u0000","PeriodicalId":32344,"journal":{"name":"Estudios de Filosofia","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48058448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What makes a mental state feel like a memory: feelings of pastness and presence","authors":"Melanie G. Rosen, Michael Barkasi","doi":"10.17533/udea.ef.n64a05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n64a05","url":null,"abstract":"The intuitive view that memories are characterized by a feeling of pastness, perceptions by a feeling of presence, while imagination lacks either faces challenges from two sides. Some researchers complain that the “feeling of pastness” is either unclear, irrelevant or isn’t a real feature. Others point out that there are cases of memory without the feeling of pastness, perception without presence, and other cross-cutting cases. Here we argue that the feeling of pastness is indeed a real, useful feature, and although this feeling does not define memory ontologically, it is a characteristic marker which helps us easily categorise a mental state first-personally. We outline several cognitive features that underlie this experience, including the feeling of past accessibility, ergonomic significance, immersion, objectivity and mental strength. Our account is distinctly phenomenal, rather than doxastic, although our web of beliefs may contribute to this experience.","PeriodicalId":32344,"journal":{"name":"Estudios de Filosofia","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45937658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Memory and perception, insights at the interface: editors’ introduction","authors":"C. McCarroll, K. Michaelian, S. Munoz","doi":"10.17533/udea.ef.n64a01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n64a01","url":null,"abstract":"The recent development of specialized research fields in philosophy of memory and philosophy of perception invites a dialogue about the relationship between these mental capacities. Following a brief review of some of the key issues that can be raised at the interface of memory and perception, this introduction provides an overview of the contributions to the special issue, and outlines possible directions for further research.","PeriodicalId":32344,"journal":{"name":"Estudios de Filosofia","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42990376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Defending functionalism and self-reference in memory","authors":"Jordi Fernández","doi":"10.17533/udea.ef.n64a12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n64a12","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In recent work, Sarah Robins, Gerardo Viera and Steven James have provided some insightful objections to the ideas offered in my book, Memory: A Self-Referential Account. In this paper, I put forward some responses to those objections. Robins challenges the idea that being a memory could be a matter of having a particular functional role within the subject’s cognitive economy. Viera challenges the idea that the content of a memory could explain some of its phenomenological properties. And James challenges the idea that our memories could be immune to error through misidentification. All three commentators are targeting, not tangential aspects of, but fundamental assumptions in the account of memory proposed in the book. For that reason, modifying some of those assumptions would amount to proposing a whole different account of memory. I hope to show, however, that such a radical move is not necessary. For there are possible responses to the objections from all three commentators which are available within the constraints of the account proposed in the book.\u0000","PeriodicalId":32344,"journal":{"name":"Estudios de Filosofia","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48655736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Estudios de FilosofiaPub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.18800/estudiosdefilosofia.202001.007
Alicia Josefa Alegría Sabogal
{"title":"El “Poder” de los Adagios Reflexiones en memoria de Ciro Alegría Varona a partir de los conceptos de interés y propiedad privada en Rousseau y Marx","authors":"Alicia Josefa Alegría Sabogal","doi":"10.18800/estudiosdefilosofia.202001.007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18800/estudiosdefilosofia.202001.007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":32344,"journal":{"name":"Estudios de Filosofia","volume":"383 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67862164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Crítica marxiana de la igualdad en la ciudadanía moderna","authors":"Levy del Aguila Marchena","doi":"10.17533/UDEA.EF.N62A02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17533/UDEA.EF.N62A02","url":null,"abstract":"En el presente artículo se expone la crítica de Marx a la igualdad como dimensión fundamental de la ciudadanía moderna. Para ello, se enlaza la temprana crítica marxiana a “la esfera celestial” ciudadana con el modo en que se articulan los procesos de producción y circulación en la configuración de las sociedades modernas según la lógica mercantil y la lógica del capital. Según nuestra tesis, la economía política de Marx nos ofrece elementos para entender mejor, y de manera más integral, su crítica temprana, en particular acerca de la relación entre lo público y lo privado, y sobre el lugar de la igualdad ciudadana en la sociedad capitalista. \u0000 ","PeriodicalId":32344,"journal":{"name":"Estudios de Filosofia","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46782711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}