{"title":"Crisis of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and its Constitutional Implication","authors":"Hwanghee Lee","doi":"10.24324/kiacl.2023.29.1.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24324/kiacl.2023.29.1.1","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyzes the causes and the progress of the crisis in the Polish constitutional court/tribunal since 2015 and reflects on the constitutional implications of the Polish case from the perspective of the tension between the constitutional court/tribunal and political power. The constitutional court/tribunal checks political power and should be independent of political power. At the same time, however, the constitutional court/tribunal is in a situation where it is dependent on political power, both in terms of the composition of its personnel and the formation of its judicial system. This conflicting relation between the need for independence and the need for dependence creates a certain tension between the constitutional court/tribunal and political power. Political powers, especially those with a parliamentary majority, are exposed to the incentives to tame a constitutional court/tribunal that binds them and to enjoy arbitrary rule. If these incentives are not managed stably, the constitutional court/tribunal can become an ally or supporter of the political power. Poland has failed to do so, causing a constitutional court/tribunal crisis. In this article, we focus on the institutional aspects. The Polish system gave the parliamentary majority a monopoly on the composition of the court/tribunal and did not provide sufficient means for the opposition to check it, which made it easy for the parliamentary majority to mold the court/tribunal into its political cronies. This paper is on the position that this case can serve as a lesson for improving our system. Also noteworthy in the Polish case is the constitutional court/tribunal's response to several legislative attempts to undermine it. This article considers possible solutions for our constitutional court system by analogizing this situation to our own.","PeriodicalId":322578,"journal":{"name":"Korean Association of International Association of Constitutional Law","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114592366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Political Party Clause of the Korean Constitution: De Constitutione Ferenda","authors":"Jeongran Yun","doi":"10.24324/kiacl.2023.29.1.165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24324/kiacl.2023.29.1.165","url":null,"abstract":"The Korean Constitution’s political party clause(party clause) and party legislation which were designed during the authoritarian regime have since shaped the reality of party politics and the party system so far. Particularly, the theoretical background and legal argument that formed the basis for such party regulation still impact constitutional jurisprudence and judicial practice. This article thus explores a way forward to get out of the wrong path paved in the past that has led the Korean malfunctioning party politics. In scholarship and politics, the problem regarding the interpretation and reform of party law – ie. ‘Political Parties Act’ – that regulates the political parties has been actively discussed. Relatively, however, any intensive discussion on the party clause in the Constitution which justifies such party regulation was rare. So, in the first place, bringing a new perspective to the interpretation of the party clause would be necessary in terms of de constitutione lata. Nonetheless, a more fundamental solution would be revising the party clause, Article 8, of the current Constitution, which remains in its original form for the last sixty years and keeps justifying the anachronic party legislation. In this sense, this article argues it is now inevitable to engage in de constitutione ferenda due to the party clause’s problematic background and interpretative limitations, examines the various ideas presented to revise the party clause in the constitutional amendment discussions under the current Constitution, and finally suggest a desired direction for amending the party clause, Article 8, of the Korean Constitution.","PeriodicalId":322578,"journal":{"name":"Korean Association of International Association of Constitutional Law","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115537405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A study on State Surveillance of Telecommunications in Jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights","authors":"Sang-Hak Lee","doi":"10.24324/kiacl.2023.29.1.35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24324/kiacl.2023.29.1.35","url":null,"abstract":"The pace of progress in digital technology is difficult to predict. At the same time, the growing threat of serious crime raises questions about the tension between “individual freedom” and “public safety” more acutely than ever. The conflict between the two is clearly revealed in the discussion of the state's surveillance of communications. The European Court of Human Rights has so far guaranteed the right to respect for privacy “offline” and the right to freedom of expression. In particular, it is noteworthy that in the ruling on May 25, 2021, the judgment was made in connection with the current situation transferred to “cyberspace”. Until recently, the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights regarding the Internet have not been so prominent. However, it is no exaggeration to say that the European Court of Human Rights is now facing new challenges due to technological advances. Data movement on the Internet transcends national borders, and data theft by government agencies is possible due to the opaque route. There is no question that the scope of surveillance is much broader and that it gives access to the core areas of privacy. The European Court of Human Rights stated that wiretapping is possible only when there is “serious suspicion against the person being monitored.” General and unrestricted surveillance violates the European Convention on Human Rights. Above all, it cannot be denied that in recent years, it is inevitable to grant wide-ranging powers to intelligence agencies to respond to threats to national security. As is well known, it would be difficult to imagine even a moment of everyday life freed from today's information and communication technology. Against the background of this digital stage, techniques that ensured encryption and anonymity, such as the dark web and telegram, appeared. Therefore, it is self-evident that finding and responding to clues in the field is virtually impossible. In line with this situation, it is necessary to legally prepare appropriate countermeasures for the security authorities. At the same time, the European Court of Human Rights emphasizes that legal and technical safeguards must be secured to prevent abuse and violation of fundamental rights. Ultimately, in order to collect information related to serious crimes or acts of terrorism in today's information and communication environment connected to the Internet of Things, corresponding regulations must be prepared. This is the principle of equality of arms. From this point of view, the general authority to collect information regulated by the Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Officers and “Regulations on Information Collection and Processing” is not only incompatible with today's digital information and communication environment, but it is difficult to avoid criticism that it is a way that is far behind in comparison. In future legislation, disclosure and non-disclosure (secret) means should be separated, and in the case of non-di","PeriodicalId":322578,"journal":{"name":"Korean Association of International Association of Constitutional Law","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121069276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Critical Review of Substantive Due Process of Law: Discussion on the Necessity of Substantive Due Process of Law in the Korean Constitution","authors":"Jong-Hyun Kim","doi":"10.24324/kiacl.2023.29.1.59","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24324/kiacl.2023.29.1.59","url":null,"abstract":"The origin of the due process of law goes back to the Constitution, and it was stipulated in the Amendments to the United States Constitution and established as a principle governing the procedural and substantive aspects of governmental actions that deprive life, liberty, and property. The substantive due process was accepted as a criterion for judicial review after the 1880s, and became the basis for invalidating various economic regulatory legislation in the Lochner era. Since the 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court has derived several fundamental rights not enumerated in the Constitution based on the substantive due process doctrine. The due process of law was first introduced into Korean legal order during the period of the U.S. Military Government in Korea. Article 12 of the current Constitution stipulates due procedures. The Constitutional Court and mainstream theories acknowledge that the provision is an adaptation of the Anglo-American due process of law. However, opinions differ as to whether the substantive due process is necessary in the Korean Constitution. In the United States, the substantive due process is criticized as a conceptual contradiction and that the courts take the place of other institutions. Some argue that the due process of law was procedural in its history, and that fundamental rights should be derived from other constitutional provisions. It is also pointed out that there is inconsistency in the specific application of the due process principle, and that there are limitations in determining fundamental rights based on historical and traditional standards. The practical significance of the substantive due process principle cannot be overlooked. However, in order for the substantive due process principle to be recognized in the Korean Constitution, it needs to be supported by convincing arguments. Korea is a single country, has a general provision on the limit of restriction of constitutional rights, and has a detailed list of fundamental rights, leaving less room for the substantive due process to operate than the United States. However, the arguments presented from the standpoint of affirming the necessity of the substantive due process of law are insufficient. In addition, it is judged that the substantive due process of law has not established itself as an independent judicial review standard in the Korean Constitutional Court, at least until now.","PeriodicalId":322578,"journal":{"name":"Korean Association of International Association of Constitutional Law","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122243881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Constitutional review of invalidation of election due to election crimes by others","authors":"H. Kim","doi":"10.24324/kiacl.2023.29.1.133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24324/kiacl.2023.29.1.133","url":null,"abstract":"Trials for election crimes function to punish criminal acts that infringe on the freedom of elections and undermine the fairness of elections. Indirectly, it restores the fairness of elections disturbed by election crimes. However, there are far more cases in which the result of an election is changed by punishment for election crimes than in cases where the result of an election is corrected through an election lawsuit. In particular, there are many constitutional problems with a system that uniformly invalidates elections only by sentences of imprisonment or fines of 3 million won or more for other people's election crimes, not their own. The invalidation of the election due to election crimes by others violates the constitutional principle of responsibility or self-responsibility, as well as due process of law, thereby violating the candidate's right to hold public office. Above all, it can impose a burden on judges to simultaneously consider the policy judgment on the invalidation of the elected candidate in sentencing for other people's election crimes, thereby damaging the unique function of the judiciary. Comparatively, the UK and Japan also recognize the invalidity of elections due to election crimes by others. However, apart from the criminal trial for election crimes, whether to invalidate the election due to election crimes is decided through the judgment of the election court or the court in charge of election litigation. These comparative legislative examples can support the argument that the election invalidation system under Articles 263 and 265 of the Public Official Election Act violates the due process of law and violates the candidate's right to hold public office. In order to overcome the unconstitutionality of the invalidation of elections due to election crimes by others, it is necessary to think about guaranteeing a separate procedure for invalidation of elections. Therefore, legislative improvement should be made in the direction of organizing a due process that can determine whether or not an election is invalid, separate from criminal trials for other people's election crimes.","PeriodicalId":322578,"journal":{"name":"Korean Association of International Association of Constitutional Law","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122088875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Constitutional nature of the Charter for the environment of 2004","authors":"Dong Hoon Han","doi":"10.24324/kiacl.2022.28.3.33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24324/kiacl.2022.28.3.33","url":null,"abstract":"The Charter for the environment of 2004 was enacted following President Jacques Chirac's determination during his campaign to re-elect the presidency. The Charter for the environment of 2004 is the basis for environmental rights in the French Constitution. \u0000The Charter for the environment of 2004 was enacted to give declarative and symbolic character. The Charter for the environment of 2004 includes rights to a healthy environment (Article 1), access to information to the environment, and participation in public decisions affecting the environment (Article 7), as well as principles of prevention (Article 3), precaution (Article 5), and sustainable development (Article 6). The Charter for the environment of 2004 also includes fundamental rights of future generations (Articles 1 and 7). \u0000The French Constitutional Court recently recognized the constitutional normative effect of the Charter for the environment of 2004, developing a position that further restricts legislators' discretion. The French Constitutional Court takes a position to recognize the subjective rights and horizontal effect of Article 1 of The Charter for the environment of 2004, and shows an attitude that further restricts the freedom of legislative formation on the right to information and participation in Article 7. \u0000In the case of Korea, there is an interpretation that understands environmental rights as a national task norm or goal clause that presents the direction of national action with binding force to state institutions and denies the nature of the subjective right. This interpretation should be critically reviewed in terms of the purpose of recognizing environmental rights under the Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the need to deal with desperate environmental problems such as the global climate crisis.","PeriodicalId":322578,"journal":{"name":"Korean Association of International Association of Constitutional Law","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127558511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"U.S. Territorial Residents’ Right to Vote for the Federal Representatives","authors":"Eun Joo Chun","doi":"10.24324/kiacl.2022.28.3.99","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24324/kiacl.2022.28.3.99","url":null,"abstract":"The United States is a federal state, which means the Federal Constitution distributes legislative and executive power between the federal government and the state governments. In this regard, the Federal Constitution states that the right of election for the members of the House of Senate and the House of Representative, as well as the President and the Vice President is vested in each states. The electoral college system is a result of the constitutional determination, and its premise is the citizens of the United States are primarily the members of each states. However, this very design has created an alignation of the U.S. territory residents. Guam, Puerto Rico, Virgin Island, Northern Mariana Islands, Samoa, etc, are not states according to the Federal Constitution, therefore their residents are not subject to the right to vote for the federal representatives. Futhermore residents who were originally residents of a state but have moved to a U.S. territory are also deprived of such right, for they are no longer members of any state. \u0000The denial of the right to vote on federal level for the U.S. territory residents is largely supported by the decisions of the U.S. federal and district courts. The “Insular Cases” set up “Incorporation Doctrine”, which situated the right to vote as artificial or remedial right. Throughout the 20th century, the right to vote has clearly been considered as the fundamental right, yet the territorial residents’ right to vote for the federal representatives has taken as a privilege that can be neglected. Particularly, the issue of violation of equal protection on the matter of territorial residents who originally resided in a state, has consistently been ignored, as the courts overlooked the inherent legislative flaw of UOCAVA. \u0000The denial of the territorial residents’ right to vote for the federal representatives is problematic on two levels. For one, it contradicts the interpretation of the U.S Supreme Court on the right to vote, thus threatening its legitimacy. On another note, the territorial residents become repudiated as second class citizens, which leads to the negligence of the federal government’s duty to create an environment where all members are equally respected, posing questions on the relevance of the institution.","PeriodicalId":322578,"journal":{"name":"Korean Association of International Association of Constitutional Law","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134192225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Preliminary Study on Global Constitutionalism","authors":"Jeonghun Bae","doi":"10.24324/kiacl.2022.28.3.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24324/kiacl.2022.28.3.1","url":null,"abstract":"Since the late twentieth century, with the end of the Cold War and the acceleration of globalization, discussions on “Global Constitutionalism”, an expanded understanding of modern constitutionalism, have emerged. Proponents of Global Constitutionalism argue that the specific principles of modern constitutionalism, such as guaranteeing human rights, separation of powers, the rule of law, democracy, and judicial review in the transnational human rights regime, can have global implications. Various criticisms have been raised against this argument based on the notions of the homogenous nation state, legal positivism, legal pluralism, etc. If, however, it is possible to establish constitutionalism grounded in constitutional pluralism, while responding to temporal and spatial particularities, the discussion on Global Constitutionalism should be valid and useful in explaining the changes in the field of international-transnational law in the twenty-first century. Further theoretical and practical groundwork is needed to realize the contents of Global Constitutionalism, but it is difficult to regard Global Constitutionalism as a completely unrealistic concept.","PeriodicalId":322578,"journal":{"name":"Korean Association of International Association of Constitutional Law","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128336014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Constitutional implications of judicial review on the use of facial recognition technology by the police in UK","authors":"Song-Ok Kim","doi":"10.24324/kiacl.2022.28.3.65","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24324/kiacl.2022.28.3.65","url":null,"abstract":"Between May 2017 and April 2019, the South Wales Police in the UK operated the system called “AFR Location” equipped with automated facial recognition technology (henceforth, AFR) for the purpose of finding criminals and missing persons in need of protection. The system is deployed CCTV cameras on police vehicles and analyzes the faces of members of the public are taken from the CCTV feeds and compares them with the faces of the Watchlist to check whether they are the same person. These systems were temporarily used at large public events, such as the Defence Exhibition, and had safeguards to control the risk of data processing, such as software management to delete data such as facial images and biometric data immediately or within 24 hours. However, a civil liberties campaigner filed a lawsuit in October 2018 to challenge the lawfulness of the South Wales Police’s use of AFR, stating the use of AFR violates his right of privacy. This was reportedly the first case to deal with the lawfulness of facial recognition technology by police in the worlds. \u0000The Divisional Court dismissed the Claimant’s claim for judicial review on all grounds and ruled in favor of the South Wales Police, but the Court of Appeal affirmed the unlawfulness of the South Wales Police’s use of AFR. The main reason for the unlawfulness is the breach of the requirements of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 8(1) stipulates “the right to respect private life”, and Article 8(2) provides that such rights shall be no interference by a public authority except such as is “in accordance with the law” and is necessary in a democratic society. According to this, Court of Appeal concluded that there is not a sufficient legal frameworks to properly control the use of AFR by the South Wales Police. There are not enough legal safeguards to properly control the use of AFR system, because there are not any criteria for determining where AFR can be deployed and who can be placed on the watchlist. \u0000This judgment of the Court of Appeal has great implications for us. In light of the fact that Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights is similar to Article 37(2) of the Constitution of Republic of Korea, it provides implications for how the principle of rule of law should be interpreted in relation to the processing of personal and sensitive information processed by biometrics. In other words, whether or not the principle of rule of law has been uphold should be evaluated as whether there are sufficient safeguards to prevent the actual risk of abuse and arbitrary use, not just whether there is a legal basis of processing of data in the Missing Children Act, Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Officer, and the Personal Information Protection Act. In this dimension, this study attempted to suggest proposals of these Acts.","PeriodicalId":322578,"journal":{"name":"Korean Association of International Association of Constitutional Law","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130448364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Civic Education in a Democratic Republic- Focusing on the review of populism from the perspective of constitutional theory","authors":"Zin-Wan Park","doi":"10.24324/kiacl.2022.28.2.157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24324/kiacl.2022.28.2.157","url":null,"abstract":"Among several important constitutional principles, populist constitutionalism emphasizes the principle of popular sovereignty or popular sovereignty. The principle of popular sovereignty is not only an important ideology of democracy, but also an important ideology of populism. The principle of popular sovereignty in harmony with representative democracy accepts the principle of rule of law as an essential component, whereas the principle of absolute popular sovereignty pursued by populism seems to be incompatible with the principle of rule of law. This is where the incompatibility between populism and liberal constitutionalism begins. \u0000Although populism's critique of liberal constitutionalism provides a very important insight into structural problems in liberal democracy, populist constitutionalism ultimately leads to the completion of an authoritarian or dictatorial ruling system to maintain their permanent maintenance of political dominance. It poses a serious threat to democracy in that it seeks to justify it through constitutional amendment or constitutional enactment. \u0000As the legal-practical approach of populism, the instrumentalist approach holds that the legal values pursued by populism are determined according to how effectively they are useful as a tool for environmental domination that well explains and predicts current social phenomena. This instrumentalist approach can be seen to contain elements of an opportunistic and seditious nature within it. Paradoxically, using the instrumentalist approach of the populists to overthrow the liberal-democratic constitutional system and to realize their political programs, the most used tool is also the constitution. \u0000Populists criticize the liberal understanding of constitutionalism and the rule of law. \u0000Their critique is the constitutional control mechanism for political phenomena based on liberal constitutionalism. What they criticize is the control of politics through the rule of law, that is, the establishment of limits for political domains through the law, that is, the pursuit of depoliticization through the law. Populists prefer the theoretical approach for critique of liberal constitutionalism and the arguments formed through it, and they share and spread their opinions on it through various media as well as various media. \u0000Despite these populists' criticisms of liberal constitutionalism and the rule of law, the starting point of the constitutional evaluation of populism must be evaluated from the perspective of democracy and the rule of law from the point of view of the liberal constitutionalism they criticize. \u0000A democratic constitutional state attempts to find a constitutional theory formed within the framework of a constitutional system in the rule of law, as a clue to solving problems related to various domestic and international political phenomena such as populism. The principle of the rule of law, which has justice, legal stability, and proportionality as its ideological componen","PeriodicalId":322578,"journal":{"name":"Korean Association of International Association of Constitutional Law","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128877780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}