Crisis of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and its Constitutional Implication

Abstract

This article analyzes the causes and the progress of the crisis in the Polish constitutional court/tribunal since 2015 and reflects on the constitutional implications of the Polish case from the perspective of the tension between the constitutional court/tribunal and political power. The constitutional court/tribunal checks political power and should be independent of political power. At the same time, however, the constitutional court/tribunal is in a situation where it is dependent on political power, both in terms of the composition of its personnel and the formation of its judicial system. This conflicting relation between the need for independence and the need for dependence creates a certain tension between the constitutional court/tribunal and political power. Political powers, especially those with a parliamentary majority, are exposed to the incentives to tame a constitutional court/tribunal that binds them and to enjoy arbitrary rule. If these incentives are not managed stably, the constitutional court/tribunal can become an ally or supporter of the political power. Poland has failed to do so, causing a constitutional court/tribunal crisis. In this article, we focus on the institutional aspects. The Polish system gave the parliamentary majority a monopoly on the composition of the court/tribunal and did not provide sufficient means for the opposition to check it, which made it easy for the parliamentary majority to mold the court/tribunal into its political cronies. This paper is on the position that this case can serve as a lesson for improving our system. Also noteworthy in the Polish case is the constitutional court/tribunal's response to several legislative attempts to undermine it. This article considers possible solutions for our constitutional court system by analogizing this situation to our own.