ERN: Pricing (Topic)最新文献_第8页

ERN: Pricing (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-12-01 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-49849-2_9

M. Camilleri

引用次数: 0

Dynamic Pricing and Timing of Upgrades 动态定价和升级时间

ERN: Pricing (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-10-16 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3056060

M. Çakanyıldırım, Ö. Özer, X. Zhang

{"title":"Dynamic Pricing and Timing of Upgrades","authors":"M. Çakanyıldırım, Ö. Özer, X. Zhang","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3056060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3056060","url":null,"abstract":"Upgrading is a travel industry practice used to mitigate supply-demand mismatches among products of different quality levels. Such upgrades are usually implemented either at the booking time or at the check-in time. In this paper, we consider dynamically-offered upgrades between the booking and the check-in times by a firm that sells two types of products (premium and regular). The firm decides on the timing and quantity of upgrades. Customers who purchased the regular product may be offered upgrades via notifications containing a link to an upgrade website. A regular product purchaser either accepts or rejects the upgrade offer after clicking the link and observing the upgrade fee (price) dynamically determined by the firm. The upgrades are time limited; when they are not profitable, the firm can stop them by deactivating the upgrade links. Formulating the firm’s revenue maximization problem as a dynamic program, we show that the optimal upgrade policy is of a pulsing type. The firm either maintains zero or the maximum number of upgrade links. We identify a condition under which both the optimal number of active links and the optimal upgrade fee are monotone with respect to the leftover capacities. We then propose and analyze four model variations to incorporate relevant business rules and customer behaviors. The first one has a restricted upgrade fee choice set. The second one has limited upgrade activation and deactivation (e.g., the firm activates and deactivates upgrade links only in the morning of a day, but adjusts upgrade fees dynamically throughout the day). The third one allows a stockout upward substitution, in which the firm can sell a premium product to an arriving regular customer at a discount if the regular product stocks out. The fourth one incorporates consumer choice behaviors. Through a systematic numerical study, we first quantify the revenue improvement from the industry-standard check-in upgrade to dynamic pricing and timing of upgrades. We then identify business contexts, in which the revenue improvement is significant. Finally, we examine the robustness of the optimal dynamic upgrade policy.","PeriodicalId":321987,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Pricing (Topic)","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129121309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

The Closed-Form Solution to Bertrand Competition with Exogenous Entry Costs or Participation 具有外生进入成本或参与的伯特兰竞争的封闭型解

ERN: Pricing (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-10-11 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3051387

I. Welch

引用次数: 0

Near-Optimality of Coarse Service Grades for Customer Differentiation in Queueing Systems 排队系统中顾客差异化的粗服务等级的近最优性

ERN: Pricing (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-09-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2438300

Hamid Nazerzadeh, R. Randhawa

引用次数: 27

Large-Scale Bundle Size Pricing: A Theoretical Analysis 大规模捆绑规模定价:一个理论分析

ERN: Pricing (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-08-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2907118

Tarek Abdallah, A. Asadpour, Josh E. Reed

{"title":"Large-Scale Bundle Size Pricing: A Theoretical Analysis","authors":"Tarek Abdallah, A. Asadpour, Josh E. Reed","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2907118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2907118","url":null,"abstract":"Bundle size pricing (BSP) is a multi-dimensional selling mechanism where the firm prices the size of the bundle rather than the different possible combinations of bundles. In BSP, the firm offers the customer a menu of different sizes and prices. The customer then chooses the size that maximizes his surplus and customizes his bundle given his chosen size. While BSP is commonly used across several industries, little is known about the optimal BSP policy in terms of sizes and prices along with the theoretical properties of its profit. In this paper, we provide a simple and tractable theoretical framework to analyze the large-scale BSP problem where a multi-product firm is selling a large number of products. The BSP problem is in general hard as it involves optimizing over order statistics, however we show that for large numbers of products, the BSP problem transforms from a hard multi-dimensional problem to a simple multi-unit pricing problem with concave and increasing utilities. Our framework allows us to identify the main source of inefficiency of BSP that is the heterogeneity of marginal costs across products. For this reason, we propose two new BSP policies called \"clustered BSP'' and \"assorted BSP'' that significantly reduce the inefficiency of regular BSP. We then utilize our framework to study richer models of BSP such as when customers have budgets and when there exists multiple customer types.","PeriodicalId":321987,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Pricing (Topic)","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121247985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 12

Asymmetric Auctions with Endogenous Participation 内生参与的不对称拍卖

ERN: Pricing (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3124081

R. Marquez, Rajdeep Singh

引用次数: 0

Pricing Decisions under Financial Frictions: Evidence from the WDN Survey 金融摩擦下的定价决策:来自WDN调查的证据

ERN: Pricing (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-07-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3000845

José Manuel Montero

引用次数: 60

Dynamic Pricing for Heterogeneous Time-Sensitive Customers 异构时间敏感型客户的动态定价

ERN: Pricing (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2992112

Negin Golrezaei, Hamid Nazerzadeh, R. Randhawa

{"title":"Dynamic Pricing for Heterogeneous Time-Sensitive Customers","authors":"Negin Golrezaei, Hamid Nazerzadeh, R. Randhawa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2992112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2992112","url":null,"abstract":"Problem definition : A core problem in the area of revenue management is pricing goods in the presence of strategic customers. We study this problem when customers are heterogeneous with respect to their initial valuations for the good and their time sensitivities—that is, the customers differ in both their initial valuations and the rates at which their initial valuation decreases with a delay in the purchase. Academic/practical relevance : In many settings, especially in fashion and electronic retail, a customer’s valuation for the product is time-sensitive and decreases over time. In these situations, customers are not only different in terms of their initial willingness to pay for these products when they are first introduced to the market, but they are also different in terms of how rapidly they lose interest in these products. We show that when a firm sells products in such settings, it can realize significant benefits by incorporating dynamic pricing, even in the absence of demand uncertainty. Methodology : Dynamic mechanism design. Results : We characterize the optimal mechanism for selling durable goods when the customers differ in both their initial valuations and the rates at which their initial valuation decreases. We show that delayed allocation and dynamic pricing can be effective screening tools for maximizing firm profit and can also increase social welfare. We also investigate the impact of production and holding costs on the optimal mechanism. Managerial implications : Our work shows how firms can exploit scenarios in which their customers have time-sensitive valuations and are forward-looking to achieve a win–win, by both generating additional revenue and improving social welfare.","PeriodicalId":321987,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Pricing (Topic)","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125523673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 31

Design and Dynamic Pricing of Vertically Differentiated Inventories 垂直差异化库存的设计与动态定价

ERN: Pricing (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-03-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2862490

I. Stamatopoulos, Christos Tzamos

{"title":"Design and Dynamic Pricing of Vertically Differentiated Inventories","authors":"I. Stamatopoulos, Christos Tzamos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2862490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2862490","url":null,"abstract":"We study a model in which a monopoly firm designs the quality profile of its inventory and then dynamically updates its pricing menu for a finite selling horizon to maximize revenue. In a counterfactual scenario, a social planner goes through the same process to maximize total welfare. We show that in both scenarios the problem of dynamically pricing heterogeneous-quality (vertically differentiated) inventories is equivalent to that of dynamically pricing homogeneous-quality inventories, in the sense that a solution to one implies a solution to the other. Moreover, we prove a strong scarcity result, which suggests that the sale of a product drives up the prices on all remaining products, whether of higher or lower quality. We then consider product line design under a production technology that utilizes costly and potentially limited resources. We show that with unlimited (but costly) resources, the revenue maximizer undersupplies quality to all products compared with the social planner. With limited resources, we show that the revenue maximizer exhibits elitism: he overallocates (underallocates) resources on the production of high-quality (low-quality) products. However, as the volume of expected consumer arrivals increases to infinity, both the revenue maximizer and the welfare maximizer allocate resources equally across products. This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management.","PeriodicalId":321987,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Pricing (Topic)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121681030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 11

Advertising in Vertical Relationships: An Equilibrium Model of the Automobile Industry 垂直关系中的广告:汽车产业的均衡模型

ERN: Pricing (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-01-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2549247

C. Murry

引用次数: 21