具有外生进入成本或参与的伯特兰竞争的封闭型解

ERN: Pricing (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-10-11 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.3051387

I. Welch

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引用次数: 0

摘要

对于具有进入成本的标准对称共值Bertrand博弈，存在闭型解。均衡产品价格不再为零。进入成本为零时，Bertrand解得到;当进入成本为单位时，得到垄断解。在Lang和Rosenthal(1991)中可以找到一个更普遍的解决方案。

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The Closed-Form Solution to Bertrand Competition with Exogenous Entry Costs or Participation

With entry costs, there are closed-form solutions for the canonical symmetric common-value Bertrand game. Equilibrium product prices are no longer zero. With zero entry costs, the Bertrand solution obtains; with unit entry cost, the monopoly solution obtains. A more general solution can be found in Lang and Rosenthal (1991).

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ERN: Pricing (Topic)

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