{"title":"The Theory of Trade Policy and Trade Agreements: A Critique","authors":"Wilfred J. Ethier","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.907075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.907075","url":null,"abstract":"During the past half century, multilateral trade liberalization has reduced tariffs to historically low levels. The Received Theory of multilateral trade agreements, based solely on terms-of-trade externalities between national governments, offers an explanation that has become the conventional wisdom among international trade theorists. But it displays two puzzles that cast doubt on its practical relevance: the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle and the Anti-Trade-Bias Puzzle. This paper examines the consistency of the implications of the Received Theory with actual trade policy. The basic conclusion is that the theory is inconsistent with reality. Furthermore, it is the role of terms-of-trade externalities — the central component of the Received Theory — that is the sole cause of this inconsistency.","PeriodicalId":320446,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Regional Arrangements (Topic)","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134379101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Agricultural Reciprocity Under Economic Partnership Agreements","authors":"Christopher Stevens, J. Kennan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.922275","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.922275","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates how the formation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the EU might affect the ability of the six Development Cooperation Ireland programme countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to continue to provide protection to their domestic agri-food sectors. Various scenarios are constructed on the assumption that ‘substantially all' trade with the EU must be liberalised if the EPAs are to be compatible with WTO rules on regional trade agreements. The paper concludes that EPAs are unlikely to require major changes in existing levels of border protection provided to domestic agriculture in Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mozambique and Zambia but that the effects on Tanzania and Uganda could be greater. It argues that the preparation of a ‘defensive' EPA strategy by these countries should occur in parallel with a strategic review of agricultural trade policy.","PeriodicalId":320446,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Regional Arrangements (Topic)","volume":"124 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115884490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Perils of Success? The Case of International Investment Protection","authors":"Anne van Aaken","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1020959","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1020959","url":null,"abstract":"Foreign direct investment forms an ever more important part of globalised market structures, and international investment law has become one of the most successful and judicialised areas of public international law. In order to attract investment, States commit themselves to treaties that restrict their regulatory sovereignty in ways that are sometimes unpredictable, owing to vague terms in the treaties and the broad use by investment tribunals of their delegated discretion. This article uses economic contract theory in order to understand whether the commitment problem ex ante and the flexibility problem ex post are optimally solved. It is hypothesised that the participation constraints on States may be overlooked by investment tribunals, thereby leading to an undesired weakening of protection of investors in the long run due to reactions by States. First, States may opt out of the system, for example by exiting treaties or by non-compliance. Second, they may also water down the substantive or procedural protections. Third, whereas investment treaties were seen in the beginning as a restraint on developing countries, investment increasingly flows to equally highly regulated developed countries. As legal protection is reciprocal but the capital flows used to be unilateral, developed countries might also react to their restriction of sovereignty, as the United States has already done, for example. These perils could lead to a backlash in international investment protection of which indications are already visible.","PeriodicalId":320446,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Regional Arrangements (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114093283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Let’s Play? An Examination of the ‘Level Playing Field’ in EU Free Trade Agreements","authors":"M. Gillis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3753436","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3753436","url":null,"abstract":"Free Trade Agreements to which the European Union is a party increasingly contain minimum obligations with respect to taxation, subsidies, and labour and environmental standards. Those obligations have been termed, in a highly pervasive and rhetorically effective metaphor, the ‘level playing field’. This article is directly concerned with the concept of the level playing field. Specifically, it examines the level playing field concept vis-à-vis ‘free trade’, how it has been implemented in recent EU FTAs, particularly with respect to labour and environmental standards, why the concept seems to be gaining in influence and authority, and what that might mean for the liberal trading regime.","PeriodicalId":320446,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Regional Arrangements (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128347579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Can European Socio-Economic Governance be Social Investment Proof?","authors":"S. Bekker","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198790488.003.0028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198790488.003.0028","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter on the European Semester in the a book \"The Uses of Social Investment\", which provides the first study of the welfare state, under the new post-crisis austerity context and associated crisis management politics, to take stock of the limits and potential of social investment. It surveys the emergence, diffusion, limits, merits, and politics of social investment as the welfare policy paradigm for the 21st century, seen through the lens of the life-course contingencies of the competitive knowledge economy and modern family-hood.","PeriodicalId":320446,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Regional Arrangements (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126589009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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