Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky最新文献

{"title":"What Is the Difference between Hegel and Marx?","authors":"A. Blunden","doi":"10.1163/9789004470972_003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004470972_003","url":null,"abstract":"Here I have drawn some material from my recent “Hegel for Social Movements” to review the vexed question of the relation between Marx and Hegel. I base my observations on what Marx has written on various philosophical, methodological and political issues and not what he himself has said about his relation to Hegel, which are generally polemical and misleading. Nor shall I rely on what Engels has said in the course of popularising Marx’s ideas for 19th century socialists. The main difference between Hegel & Marx is the times they lived in The philosophical difference between Hegel and Marx is a topic which has been hotly disputed for over a century. The differences between the philosophical approaches of Hegel and Marx will be dealt with in detail later on, but the essential difference between Marx and Hegel is the times they lived in. Given the economic, social and cultural peculiarities of Germany in Hegel’s day there was some basis for Hegel to believe that it would be through philosophy that Germany could modernise itself. Today, this stands clearly exposed as an ‘idealist’ position ‒ to believe that an economic, social and cultural transformation could be achieved via a philosophical revolution, rather than the other way around. But this does not invalidate the choice Hegel made in his day. After Hegel’s death in 1831, his students did draw the revolutionary conclusions that were implicit in their teacher’s philosophy. Hegelianism spilt over the walls of the academy as his students popularised his teachings and translated them into the language of politics ‒ or more correctly, translated politics into the language of Hegelian philosophy. In 1841, the Prussian government moved to “expunge the dragon's seed of Hegelian pantheism” from the minds of Prussian youth. The newly-appointed Minister for Culture mobilized Friedrich Schelling (the last surviving representative of German Idealism, and now a conservative) to come to Berlin and do the job. His lecture in December 1841 was attended by Engels, Bakunin, Kierkegaard and notables from all over Europe but manifestly failed to quell the spread of radical ideas and revolutionary agitation which embraced Hegelian philosophy. It is a remarkable fact that almost all the revolutionaries of the 19th and 20th century were either students of Hegel, Hegelians of the second or third philosophical generation or influenced by other figures of German Philosophy of the time – Kant, Fichte and Schelling, but above all Hegel ‒ whether in the form of Marxism or other critical philosophical currents. So Hegel was not entirely mistaken in his belief in the political power of philosophy. By the time that Marx resigned the editorship of the Rheinische Zeitung in 1843, France had been rocked by a series of working class revolts and Paris was seething with revolutionary ferment, the English working class had constructed the first working class political party in history (the National Charter Association) and were challe","PeriodicalId":320224,"journal":{"name":"Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117256196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Nancy Fraser on Welfare Dependency","authors":"","doi":"10.1163/9789004470972_024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004470972_024","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":320224,"journal":{"name":"Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124908014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Virtue and Utopia","authors":"","doi":"10.1163/9789004470972_019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004470972_019","url":null,"abstract":"In his elaboration of ‘practical anarchism’ (‘practical’ as in ‘practical philosophy’, i.e., ethical), Franks draws extensively on Alasdair MacIntyre’s virtue ethics, especially as set out in After Virtue (1981), and proposes that: “anarchism ... and its distinguishing characteristic of adherence to prefigurative tactics ... is best considered as a social virtue theory compatible with the format developed by MacIntyre.” (p. 156) I am not an anarchist, but I am interested in the prospects for a united and effective Left, and I think Franks’ proposal to found anti-capitalist politics on virtue ethics has much to offer. Franks accepts MacIntyre’s concept of ‘practices’ which is close to what I call ‘collaborative projects’. In particular: “like MacIntyre, they [anarchists] view the social world as being constructed out of intersecting social practices.” (p. 141) MacIntyre defines a ‘practice’ as: “any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity.” (1981, 175) and he goes on to gives examples: games like chess or football, professions such as architecture, enquiries such as physics, chemistry or history, arts such as painting and music, and the creation and sustaining of households, cities and nations. All practices are aimed at the achievement of some good. And a virtue is defined as: “an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices.” (p. 178) So virtue is relative to the practice in which it is utilized. No human quality is absolutely virtuous, at least for the foreseeable future. Practices, as MacIntyre sees it, are components of a tradition. A tradition is “an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute a tradition” (p. 207).","PeriodicalId":320224,"journal":{"name":"Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky","volume":"271 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115852396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}