{"title":"An Epistemology for Target Centred Virtue Ethics","authors":"C. Swanton","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198861676.003.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198861676.003.0014","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter provides an epistemology for virtue ethics—target-centred virtue epistemology, arguing that we all need the epistemic virtues rather than relying on the wisdom of a virtuous agent. It thus contrasts target-centred virtue epistemology with qualified agent virtue epistemology. Epistemic virtues are understood in terms of their epistemic targets rather than primarily in terms of virtuous epistemic motives. The chapter argues that virtue epistemology is a branch of virtue ethics, and that epistemic virtues should be understood as not isolated from ethical virtue but are instead ‘virtues proper’. It discusses too the evidential status of “moral intuitions” in relation to target-centred virtue epistemology, and deleterious social factors in the transmission of beliefs such as the network and contagion social epistemic models, in relation to personal epistemic virtue.","PeriodicalId":318660,"journal":{"name":"Target Centred Virtue Ethics","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127836631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Target Centred Virtue Ethics and Role Ethics","authors":"C. Swanton","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198861676.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198861676.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"The development of ‘virtue jurisprudence’ (a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics for law) has highlighted the importance of virtue in legal ethics. Yet it has been criticized because it cannot account for “robust” role differentiation. In this chapter I argue that Target Centred Virtue Ethics can account for two features which constitute the ‘Role Dilemma’: (a) There is robust role differentiation; that is, role differentiation as conceived by the Standard Conception of law (and, e.g., business).(b) Occupiers of legal roles are not permitted to act immorally (except perhaps in “tragic” dilemmas).Virtue ethics and Standard Conceptions of law (and, e.g., business) are standardly thought to be incompatible. This may be true where virtue ethics is conceived in “orthodox” neo-Aristotelian terms. I reject this version of virtue ethics for role ethics and show that Target Centred Virtue Ethics can subscribe to both horns of the dilemma (a) and (b) above.","PeriodicalId":318660,"journal":{"name":"Target Centred Virtue Ethics","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128564779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Worldhood of Ethics","authors":"C. Swanton","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198861676.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198861676.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses the question what is the nature of the distinctively ethical mode of access to entities such that they have ethical being and there are ethical facts. In answering this question the chapter discusses the basic properties of ethical facts, the domain of the ethical, the nature of the ethical logos in relation to ethical orientation, the nature of reasons and relations of fittingness, the point and function of the thick evaluative concepts, and their relation to virtue and vice concepts. In the course of the latter discussion we show how the view proposed is naturalistic without being scientistic.","PeriodicalId":318660,"journal":{"name":"Target Centred Virtue Ethics","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133933064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Wrong Logos","authors":"C. Swanton","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198861676.003.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198861676.003.0013","url":null,"abstract":"Reasons of beneficence are at the core of ethics, and also of many of its most intractable theoretical problems, indeed paradoxes. What is needed for the resolution of these problems is an appreciation of the distinctive nature of the logos of ethics. In brief that logos is seen as an openness to a practical reality of notably reasons, for the understanding of which a familiarity with the thick ethical concepts is required. Such reasons provide direct intentional access to ethical reality. But if we attempt to gain intentional access to ethical facts through the wrong logos where the thick concepts are invisible or not central paradoxes ensue. This chapter discusses three: the paradox of supererogation, the ‘It Makes no Difference’ Paradox (e.g., that of ‘pooled beneficence’), and that of the underdetermination by reasons for action (e.g., of what charity to support).","PeriodicalId":318660,"journal":{"name":"Target Centred Virtue Ethics","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124915598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Thick Concept Centralism and Objectivity","authors":"C. Swanton","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198861676.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198861676.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter defends the objectivity of ethics against Bernard Williams’ claim to the contrary. According to Williams, understandings of ethics through the thick concepts (such as patience, humility, justice) are relative to “insider perspectives.” A form of relativism threatens. This defence is illustrated by an interpretation of Nietzsche who transcends the insider perspective in his attack on “slave morality.” On the interpretation offered, Nietzsche can be read as an objectivist (suitably understood) about virtue and vice. Much vice in particular is, for example, expressive of resentment, psychoanalytically understood; is reactive and weak and in the service of a morality that is altruistic in a highly problematic sense. My interpretation of Nietzsche, I argue, has implications for the Williams’ critique. It allows for a way of transcending the “insider perspective” by appeal to the human sciences, an appeal that Nietzsche’s own form of naturalism in ethics itself makes.","PeriodicalId":318660,"journal":{"name":"Target Centred Virtue Ethics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131099966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Basic Virtue and Differentiated Virtue","authors":"C. Swanton","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198861676.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198861676.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that virtue ethics in traditional form has been overly simple, since it has not adequately integrated within its theoretical structures such important ethical features as role ethics, the narrative quality of our lives, cultural and historical location. It is important for Target Centred Virtue Ethics to offer a theoretical account of how such features can be accommodated within virtue ethics and how the targets of virtues can be more closely specified once that is done. The resulting view is not relativist but an objectivist realist position. This is achieved by a distinction between basic and differentiated virtue so that in role ethics, for example, a basic virtue such as generosity is role differentiated to form a virtue of generosity qua CEO which limits permitted acts of generosity.","PeriodicalId":318660,"journal":{"name":"Target Centred Virtue Ethics","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116144081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A New Metaphysics for Virtue Ethics","authors":"C. Swanton","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198861676.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198861676.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter proposes a new metaphysics for virtue ethics, hermeneutic ontology, that is opposed to the orthodox ‘natural goodness’ metaphysics of goodness owed to Foot, and developed in a virtue ethical direction by Hursthouse. This ‘new metaphysics’ is initially inspired by McDowell’s view that the stance of science is not the only mode of access to the real and in particular to ethical reality. But the notion of access is ambiguous between an ontological notion and an epistemological notion. The development of the ontological notion is the topic of this chapter and is owed to Heidegger. Central to this development is the idea that intentional access to the being of entities as, for example, ethical is through logos, a network of significance relations. Two key problems—the plurality of the logoi, and critique of the logos—are topics of later sections.","PeriodicalId":318660,"journal":{"name":"Target Centred Virtue Ethics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125531319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Concealment of Ethics","authors":"C. Swanton","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198861676.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198861676.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"To fully appreciate the worldhood of ethics it must be revealed through logos in the richest and most accurate way. According to Heidegger, phenomena can not only be intentionally accessed through a logos but also ‘covered up’ or ‘concealed’. Ways of covering up shed light indirectly on the logos of ethics. Until we see how ethics is covered up our ethical thought is liable to suffer from various forms of distortion. So to complete the discussion of the worldhood of ethics we need to not only expose the way ethics is opened up; we need also to be aware of the way it has been and is concealed.","PeriodicalId":318660,"journal":{"name":"Target Centred Virtue Ethics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124373665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Has Virtue Ethics Sold Out?","authors":"C. Swanton","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198861676.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198861676.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses a contemporary criticism of virtue ethics as focusing too much on providing a criterion of right action. I claim that the criticism is off the mark on a variety of fronts, including a misinterpretation of Anscombe, a misguided view that what is offered is a criterion of right action as opposed to a framework, and that what is offered is a criterion of morally right action in a suspect sense of “moral.” I show how the important deontic notions can have a place in virtue ethics. The chapter explores also further problems with the notion of rightness in ethics: the essential contestedness of even core concepts of rightness and both combinatorial and degree vagueness in the relation between the thick concepts and rightness.","PeriodicalId":318660,"journal":{"name":"Target Centred Virtue Ethics","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123880902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：