{"title":"A List of Meetings between Wittgenstein and Sraffa","authors":"Moira De Iaco","doi":"10.15845/nwr.v7i2.3491","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/nwr.v7i2.3491","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a list of meetings between Wittgenstein and Sraffa during the period 1929-1951. It was compiled using Sraffa’s notes from his pocket diaries and including supplement appointments noted by Wittgenstein. The information - like addresses or names of other speakers - added by Sraffa to some appointments have been here explained in the footnotes. As it is shown, it emerges by the list that the meetings between Wittgenstein and Sraffa can be divided in several different periods.","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79060325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hamann's Influence on Wittgenstein","authors":"Lauri Snellman","doi":"10.15845/NWR.V7I1.3467","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/NWR.V7I1.3467","url":null,"abstract":"The paper examines Johann Georg Hamann’s influence on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s late philosophy. Wittgenstein’s letters, diaries and Drury’s memoirs show that Wittgenstein read Hamann’s writings in the early 1930s and 1950s. Wittgenstein’s diary notes and the Cambridge lectures show that Wittgenstein’s discussion of Hamann’s views in 1931 corresponds to adopting a Hamannian view of symbols and rule-following. The view of language as an intertwining of signs, objects and meanings in use forms a common core in the philosophies of Hamann and Wittgenstein. The harmony of language and reality takes place in communicative use, so non-communicative private languages and pre-linguistic ideal forms of representation are not possible. Language is a free response to reality, and it involves belief-systems and trust.","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"77 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83995923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Intellectual Asceticism and Hatred of the Human, the Animal, and the Material","authors":"P. Segerdahl","doi":"10.15845/NWR.V7I1.3494","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/NWR.V7I1.3494","url":null,"abstract":"Friedrich Nietzsche associated philosophical asceticism with “hatred of the human, and even more of the animal, and more still of the material”: with aversion to life. Given the prevalent view that philosophy is anthropocentric and idealizes the human, Nietzsche’s remark about philosophical hatred of the human is unexpected. In this paper, I investigate what Nietzsche’s remark implies for philosophical claims of human uniqueness. What is the meaning of the opposition between human and animal, if the opposition somehow expresses hatred also of the human? The investigation leads to an inquiry into metaphysics as an intellectual kind of magic, and into the notion of “power over life” as it connects to intellectual asceticism. Finally, I relate Nietzsche’s remarks on ascetic ideals to Donna Haraway’s questioning of the Anthropocene as a story to think with. I propose that the dualism of the story, the idea of a conflict between Humanity and Nature, can be seen as a feature of the metaphysical attitude that life is to be mastered through escaping from it into the purity of thinking.","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80773679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of Wittgenstein on Thought and Will by Roger Teichmann (2)","authors":"D. Richter","doi":"10.15845/NWR.V6I2.3441","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/NWR.V6I2.3441","url":null,"abstract":"Review of Teichmann, Roger, Wittgenstein on Thought and Will. New York/Oxford: Abingdon Books, Routledge 2015.","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75549448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Remarks on Perception and Other Minds","authors":"E. Dain","doi":"10.15845/NWR.V6I2.3403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/NWR.V6I2.3403","url":null,"abstract":"It is a simple truth about the English language that we can see or hear or feel what others are thinking or feeling. But it is tempting to think that there is a deeper sense in which we cannot really see or hear or feel these things at all. Rather, what is involved must be a matter of inference or interpretation, for instance. In these remarks, I argue against a variety of ways in which that thought, the thought that we cannot really see or hear or feel what others are thinking or feeling, might be developed.","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"114 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77749996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of Wittgenstein on Thought and Will by Roger Teichmann (1)","authors":"R. Wiseman","doi":"10.15845/NWR.V6I2.3464","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/NWR.V6I2.3464","url":null,"abstract":"Review of Teichmann, Roger, Wittgenstein on Thought and Will. New York/Oxford: Routledge, 2015. 180 pages. ","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"107 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79338753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Giving Hostages to Irrationality?","authors":"L. Hertzberg","doi":"10.15845/NWR.V6I2.3463","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/NWR.V6I2.3463","url":null,"abstract":"Peter Winch, following Wittgenstein, was critical of the notion that philosophy could pass judgment on matters like the sense of words, the rationality of actions, or the validity of arguments. His critique had both what we might call a local strand – the insight that criteria of thought and action are not universal but vary between cultures and between practices – and a personal strand – the insight that those local criteria are ultimately given shape through the particular applications made of them by individuals. These strands are prominent, for instance, in Winch’s discussion of cross-cultural understanding as well as his treatment of the distinction between valid reasoning and illicit persuasion.","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79927574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Three Metaphors Toward a Conception of Moral Change","authors":"Nora Hämäläinen","doi":"10.15845/NWR.V6I2.3453","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/NWR.V6I2.3453","url":null,"abstract":"Contemporary moral philosophy is split between an inherently a-historical moral philosophy/theory on the one hand and a growing interest in moral history and the historicity of morality on the other. In between these, the very moments of moral change (and their implications for the possibility of moral realism and moral objectivity) are often left insufficiently attended to and under-theorized. Yet moral change is, arguably, one of the defining features of present day moral frameworks, and thus one of the main things we need to make sense of in moral philosophy. In this paper, I present an account of moral change through the use of three metaphors: the tipping point, the bargaining table and the strong rope. I suggest these as coordinates for the development of a full-blown, historically sensitive conception of morality.","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78316744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Wittgenstein's Critique of Moore in On Certainty","authors":"E. Owesen","doi":"10.15845/NWR.V6I2.3440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/NWR.V6I2.3440","url":null,"abstract":"This paper clarifies Wittgenstein’s critique of Moore in On Certainty, and argues that this critique is largely misunderstood, for two reasons. Firstly, Wittgenstein partly misrepresents Moore. Secondly, Wittgenstein is wrongly taken to be an (access-) internalist regarding justification for knowledge. Once we realize these two points, we can understand Wittgenstein’s critique properly as a grammatical argument in that Moore fails to see how the concepts of knowledge and certainty relate to those of justification and evidence. On this reading, we can also understand that Moore and Wittgenstein were in more agreement than many people have thought, even though Moore was not able to exploit and express his philosophical insights (which he shares with Wittgenstein) properly.","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90339795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Tapestry: Susan Edwards-McKie Interviews Professor Dr B. F. McGuinness on the Occasion of His 90th Birthday","authors":"Susan Edwards-Mckie, B. Mcguinness","doi":"10.15845/NWR.V6I2.3465","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/NWR.V6I2.3465","url":null,"abstract":"Susan Edwards-McKie interviews Professor Dr B. F. McGuinness on the occasion of his 90th birthday.","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"235 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76110509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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